CHAPTER 6: LAND RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN TANZANIA: INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

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‘If markets do not exist in areas such as land, then they must be created [...] state intervention in markets beyond creation must be kept at minimum.’

Harvey (2005)

List of abbreviations

ARIMO Ardhi Institute Morogoro
ARITA Ardhi Institute Tabora
CCRO Certificate of Customary Right of Occupancy
CRO Customary Right of Occupancy
CVL Certificate of Village Land
DED District Executive Director
DLHT District Land and Housing Tribunal
EPZA Export Processing Zones Authority
GRO Granted Right of Occupancy
LGAF Land Governance Assessment Framework
MLHHSDD Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development
NAFCO National Agricultural Food Corporation
PO-RALG President’s Office Regional Administration and Local Governance
SAGCOT Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
SBF Sun Biofuels Africa Ltd
SPILL Strategic Plan for the Implementation of the Land Laws
TIC Tanzania Investment Centre
TZS Tanzanian shilling
URT United Republic of Tanzania
1 Overview

It is widely recognised that the fuzziness of land rights is a constraint on Tanzania’s development. In rural areas, land is the main resource of a large population of poor farmers and cattle herders – as well as of modern production units that can exploit a source of comparative advantage. Conflicts could be avoided for as long as land was abundant, but the last few decades have brought growing pressure on land. With an expanding urban population, unclear land rights also constrain development in urban areas.

Private ownership of land is a concept that has always been ideologically foreign to Tanzanian society. Instead, ownership of land is vested in the president, who is supposed to use it for the public good. Laws define various ‘occupancy rights’ for land users, which are meant to be substitutes for formal ‘property rights’ in other economies. These occupancy rights have to allow for various local customary rules of land allocation and transmission, which apply to much of the country’s land.

Because of this – and various flaws in the existing formal laws and their implementation – the present system is far from offering the security that is required for an efficient and productive economic use of land. There is a heavy administrative apparatus, which is commonly judged as inefficient and the source of rent-seeking opportunities. As noted by Fischer, many developing countries are characterised by poor policies and weak institutional settings which create opportunities for corruption and embezzlement by privileged interest groups (Fischer, 2005).

The next section of this chapter gives a brief historical perspective on land tenure issues, tracing continuity from colonial times through the ‘villagisation’ era to the recommendations of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters, Land Policy and Land Tenure Structure, which resulted in the 1995 National Land Policy and 1999 Land Acts. During this time the pendulum has swung between the desire to protect customary small-scale landholders and the desire to give investors the security they need to develop long-run and large-scale projects.

Despite many critiques and partial reforms, the system established in 1999 still provides the basis of land management in Tanzania. Section 3 explores that system, which categorises land in three ways: village land, which is under the jurisdiction of village councils, and accounts for around 70% of all land in Tanzania; reserved land, which includes forest reserves, beaches, and game parks, and accounts for 28% of all land in Tanzania; and general land, which accounts for only 2% of land but is economically crucial because it includes urban land and large-scale agricultural projects.¹

Different rules of occupancy apply to village land and general land, and disputes commonly involve attempts to reclassify village land as general land, which is necessary for it to attract external investment. When proposed changes to village land involve over 50 hectares, they need to be approved by the Commissioner for Land. The process is slow, cumbersome, and subject to various costs. The law provides for compensation for the people who previously occupied the land, but in practice this is typically inadequate and delayed.

¹ Section 5(12) of the Land Act (1999) on the transfer of village land to general land.
The situation is complicated by the fact that the formal rights of occupancy defined by the 1999 Act coexist with various informal ones, and the administrative process of surveying land to grant formal rights has been progressing slowly – indeed, a large majority of rural Tanzanians, and about half in urban areas, still do not have formal rights over the land they use. Section 4 explores these informal rights, completing a description of the actual situation regarding land tenure in Tanzania.

Section 5 provides an overview of the institutional arrangements for land administration in Tanzania, which are complex. It sets out the ways in which land rights can be granted, and the mechanisms for selling rights over land or using them to raise credit – although it is sometimes said that 'land in Tanzania has no value' because it is formally owned by the state, in fact there are various ways in which the right of occupancy is transferable for value. This section also explores the mechanisms for resolving disputes over land, of which there is a large and growing backlog.

Section 6 draws on the preceding discussion to identify the eight main institutional issues and challenges with the system. Although proposals for revising the National Land Policy are currently being discussed, these seem unlikely to be fully resolved:

- **Duality of tenure**: The handling of the distinction between general land and village land is the main source of friction and inefficiency, combining often inadequate protection for villagers with disincentives for investors that may lead to missed economic opportunities. Better defined, better implemented, and fairer administrative procedures for land transfers would provide efficiency gains on both sides.

- **Immense powers of eminent domain**: Land is deemed to be akin to state property, and the state has not always used its resulting powers judiciously or in the public interest – indeed, what constitutes the ‘public interest’ is a matter of debate. Customary landholders are not protected by fair information and consultation procedures, and the losses they endure can be very great.

- **Limited formalisation**: Procedures for formalisation are bureaucratic, unrealistic, expensive, and time-consuming. Registry records are often unclear, and automated systems are rare.

- **Gender discrimination**: Although discriminatory practices under customary law are illegal, in practice it remains a serious problem that women’s access to and control of land often depends on the will of male relatives, making it harder for them to obtain loans or invest in improving their land.

- **Institutional overlaps**: Multiple and diverse institutions are involved in implementing land-related laws and policies. The resulting overlaps can create inefficiency and undermine accountability.

- **Corruption and inefficient land administration**: While the government discourages informal payments, they are widely used. This indicates the need for further institutional reform and efforts to make people more aware of their legal entitlements and create incentives to report rent-seeking behaviour.

- **Ineffective land dispute settlement framework**: Dispute resolution mechanisms are often hard for ordinary people to access, whether because of the need to travel, the fees involved, language barriers, delays, or lack of clarity about authority.
• **Inadequate resources**: Shortfalls in human, material, and financial resources exacerbate problems with the legal and institutional framework.

The chapter concludes by summarising areas in which reform is a priority, including tackling corruption, improving coordination, scaling up programmes to formalise occupation rights, and streamlining procedures to demarcate land available for occupation and investment.

2 **A brief historical perspective on land tenure issues**

There is some continuity in matters of land tenure between colonial times and post-independence Tanganyika, and later the United Republic of Tanzania, with some basic principles of the colonial era retained but with disorderly and sometimes contradictory additions. What was kept from the colonial era is essentially the view that land, whatever its type and its use, is formally the property of the government. It is now formally in the hands of the president, considered as the ‘trustee’ of the national land.

Since colonial times, however, the sensitive issue has been the status of all the land under customary law and the alienation of that land for use by non-indigenous or foreign investors, notably for export-oriented large-scale agricultural production (Tenga and Mramba, 2014, p. 55). The explicit rejection of full private property – and consequently the necessity to rely on rights of occupancy somewhat akin to long-run leases – was strongly reaffirmed by Nyerere in the mid-1960s, often against the advice of foreign advisers. Nyerere expressed his view on that issue before independence: (Nyerere, 1958)

... in a country such as this, where, generally speaking, the Africans are poor and the foreigners are rich, it is quite possible that, within eighty or a hundred years, if the poor African were allowed to sell his land, all the land in Tanganyika would belong to wealthy immigrants, and the local people would be tenants. But even if there were no rich foreigners in this country, there would emerge rich and clever Tanganyikans. If we allow land to be sold like a robe, within a short period there would only be a few Africans possessing land in Tanganyika and all others would be tenants.

This view has not been debated since. In essence, it was realised during this time that – as recommended by the East African Royal Commission of 1953–55 – market mechanisms had to enable willing sellers to make land available to willing buyers (Shivji, 1998), but market freedom could not be left to price alone. It had to be further regulated.

Modifications to colonial rules related to the ways in which land could be alienated from customary users: from total discretion in colonial days (see Box 1) to the official protection of small farmers under customary law. The strength of this protection, however, fluctuated somewhat over time. Cases demonstrate a clear struggle between the need to protect customary small-scale landholders and statutory large-scale farmers. Indeed, the whole period after independence was characterised by an ongoing debate about the space to be given to customary laws and the way to give investors, including public entities, the security on the use of land they need to develop long-run and large-scale projects.
Box 1: Pre-independence land cases

The 1953 case of *Mtoro Bin Mwamba vs. A.G* (2TLR, 1953, 327) decided that the Washomvi law, or customary law, did not know individual ownership to land except for an individual’s usufructuary rights – and that where land was held by a native, the inference was that the possession was permissive and not adverse. In that case, the interest of the small-scale natives was merely right to the growing trees and not ownership of the land itself. In the cases of *Descendants of Sheikh Mbaruk bin Rashid vs. Minister for Lands and Mineral Resources* (E.A 348, 1960) and *Muhena bin Said vs. Registrar of Titles* (16 EACA, 1948, 79) it was established that land occupation by natives was none other than the admitted general permissive occupation by all inhabitants of the territory.

In some cases, the government used statutory instruments to frustrate customary land tenure in favour of statutory land tenure. The situation was complicated by the creation of the *Ujamaa* villages in Nyerere’s socialist era, the massive population resettlement operations undertaken under that programme, and the objective to improve agricultural productivity and the country’s export potential. In fact, the alienation of customary land was rather common during the ‘villagisation’ period, whether at the village level in order to reorganise production and increase productivity through mechanisation, or through parastatals being given the right to alienate large swaths of customary land.

Mpofu argues that villagisation marked the apex of the state bourgeoisie’s efforts to put rural production under its hegemony. He sees resettlement of peasants in chosen localities as a vehicle to facilitate state supervision and control of smallholding producers (Mpofu, 1986, p. 120). Tenga and Mramba noted that relocation of peasants during operation *vijiji* caused massive land tenure confusion and legal disputes (Tenga and Mramba, 2014). As a result, peasants whose land had been acquired sued in courts of law for restoration of such lands and, upon winning their cases, the government reacted by issuing notices to extinguish their customary tenures (Tenga and Mramba, 2014, pp. 61–62; Mchome, 2002, p. 70).

The general trend away from peasants’ control in the 1970s was evidenced in the overhaul and abolishment of local institutions that had grassroot-level participation, and their replacement with more bureaucratic ones directly controlled by the central government. This is reflected in Shivji’s view that *Ujamaa* served the interests and ideological hegemony of the state bourgeoisie (Shivji, 1986, Tanzania Publishing House. Dar es Salaam. p. 3), as *Ujamaa* remained a variant of petty bourgeois socialism and the official ideology of the state (Mpofu, 1986, p. 122).

The liberalisation period in the mid-1980s reverted to the dual land system with the development of large-scale plantations and better-protected customary land: a relative shortage of food products reinforced the weight given to farmers and cooperatives under customary law. Cases that witnessed the unavoidable tension between the two types of

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2 Consider the enactment of the Range Development and Management Act, No. 51 of 1964, which once applied in areas where pre-existing customary rights were extinguished. The Nyarubanja Tenure Enfranchisement Act, No. 1 of 1965 and the Customary Leaseholds (Enfranchisement) Act, No. 47 of 1968 abolished Nyarubanja form of feudal system in Karagwe and customary tenancies respectively. The Rural Farmlands (Acquisition and Regrant) Act 1966 and the Urban Leaseholds (Acquisition and Regrant) Act of 1968 granted land to tenants in rural and urban areas respectively. See also the Coffee Estates (Acquisition and Regrant) Act, 1973 and the Sisal Estates (Acquisition and Regrant) Act, 1974, which enable the government to take over land.

3 Swahili word for villages (plural). Singular – *kijiji*.

4 Consider Mpofu on abolishment of district and town councils with assumption of their functions by regional authorities (Mpofu, 1986, p. 122).
agricultural exploitation during this time include National Agricultural Food Corporation (NAFCO) vs. Mulbadaw Village Council and 67 others (see Box 2) (TLR, 1985, 88).

<table>
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<th>Box 2: NAFCO vs. Mulbadaw Village Council and 67 others</th>
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<td>About 26,000 acres of land in Basotu ward, Hanang district, including 8,125 acres in dispute between the litigants in this case, were occupied by the Kilimo department from 1968–69. NAFCO succeeded Kilimo, entering into occupation of 22,790 acres of the land in 1969. NAFCO was offered a 99-year right of occupancy in January 1973. No wheat was planted on the land until 1979. The Mulbadaw Village Council, and another 67 villagers of the same area, filed a case in the High Court against NAFCO, claiming damages for trespass over their lands and destruction of their crops and huts during the time of its occupation. The High Court awarded the Mulbadaw village TZS (Tanzanian shillings) 250,000$ as general damages, all the other claimants a global sum of TZS 1,300,000 (equivalent to US$151,163 (Bank of Tanzania, 2011, p. 115)), as general damages, and TZS 545,600 (equivalent to US$63,442 (Bank of Tanzania, 2011, p. 115)) as special damages. The judge also declared that the 8,125 acres in dispute belonged to the claimants, and ordered NAFCO to cease its trespass forthwith. However, after NAFCO appealed, the Court of Appeal stated that: '...an administrative unit did not necessarily imply that the land within its administrative jurisdiction was land belonging to it. The village council could acquire land only by allocation to it by the District Development Council under direction 5 of the Directions under the Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act, 1975...those villagers who had testified had customary tenancies or what are called deemed rights of occupancy...had to establish that they were natives before a court could hold that they were holding land on a customary tenancy. The 4 villagers [who] had not established that they were in occupation on the basis of customary tenancies were thus not “occupiers” in terms of the Land Ordinance'.</td>
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Little progress was achieved in trying to codify this complex relationship between formal and informal, or modern and traditional, land tenures and agricultural farms. This led to the aforementioned Presidential Commission on land matters under the direction of Professor Shivji, and the passing of the National Land Policy in 1995 and the Land Act in 1999. Despite many critiques and partial reforms, this system still provides the basis of land management in Tanzania.

3 Legal land tenure in Tanzania according to the 1999 Land Act

Section 4 of the Land Act reiterates the basic public property principle of land tenure in Tanzania:

> [a]ll land in Tanzania shall continue to be public land [our emphasis] and remain vested in the President as trustee for and on behalf of all the citizens of Tanzania...The President and every person to whom the President may delegate any of his functions under this Act, and any person exercising powers under this Act, shall at all times exercise those functions and powers and discharge duties as a trustee of all the land in Tanzania so as to advance the economic and social welfare of the citizens.

5 This amount was equivalent to US$29,070 (1US$ = TZS8.6 in 1975), according to the Bank of Tanzania (2011, p. 115).
It categorises land in three ways:

(4) For the purposes of the management of land under this Act and all other laws applicable to land, public land shall be in the following categories; (a) general land; (b) village land; and (c) reserved land.

Village land is under the jurisdiction of village councils (The Village Land Act, (1999) sections 7 and 8) and therefore governed by statutory law (The Village Land Act, 1999) and customary law. The councils, elected by village assemblies (The Local Government (District Authorities) Act, No. 7, (1982) section 57) are in charge of the management of all land in their perimeter (The Village Land Act, (1999) section 8). Village land mostly comprises rural land and peri-urban areas. Village land accounts for around 70% of all land in Tanzania, supporting around 80% of the population – many of them farmers and pastoralists (Draft Land Policy, 2016; Tenga and Kironde, 2012, p. 17).

Reserved land is set aside for special purposes, including forest reserves, beaches, game parks, game reserves, land reserved for public utilities and highways, and hazardous land (The Land Act, (1999) sections 6 and 7). It is administered under different legislation: for example, forestry reserves are administered under the Forest Act (Sundet, 2005). Reserved land accounts for 28% of all land in Tanzania.

General land covers all the land that is not either village land or reserved land. It is administered by the Commissioner for Land on behalf of the president (The Land Act,(1999) sections 9 and 10). Although it accounts for only 2% of land, it is economically crucial, supporting 20% of the population (Tenga and Kironde, 2012, fn. 28): it includes urban land and agricultural land granted to investors for large-scale operations (Tenga and Kironde, 2012, fn. 28).

The distinction between village land and general land is a potential source of dispute when attempts are made to free village land for external investors, a frequent case that is found not to be satisfactorily handled in the Land Act. The official definition of general land – ‘all public land which is not reserved land or village land and includes unoccupied or unused village land’ (The Land Act, (1999) section 2) – creates an apparent ambiguity, as there is no provision in the Act to clarify what is exactly meant by ‘unoccupied or unused village land’. The process for non-villagers to access land under the control of villages is slow and cumbersome, as villages are limited in the amount of land they can allocate – any amount above a maximum of 50 hectares must be approved by the district council or Commissioner for Land (Tenga and Kironde, 2012).

The distinction between the types of land is of utmost importance, and justifies the division of the Land Act of 1999 into two parts. The Village Land Act deals with customary land

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6 See the Village Land Act (1999, sections 18(1)(d) and 20), which provides for the application of customary law to regulate customary rights of occupancy.

7 Under section 3 of the Land Act, peri-urban area means an area which is within a radius of 10 kilometres/miles outside the boundaries of an urban area or within any larger radius which may be prescribed in respect of any particular urban area by the minister. See The Local Government (District Authorities) Act, No. 7 of 1982 (1982), section 28(2), which allows the minister for local government to provide for the inclusion of neighbouring villages in the area over which a township authority is established, for the purposes only of provision by the authority of any specified services to those villages.

8 The figures could have changed – for instance, general land is assumed to be between 3% and 5%, while village land is considered to have decreased to between 67% and 65%.
occupancy rights in rural areas, while the Land Act deals with all the other land, including agricultural investment and urban development as well as reserve land.

### 3.1 Rights of occupancy

Under the Land Acts, village and general land are ruled by different rules of occupancy. A ‘Right of Occupancy’ is defined as ‘a title to the use and occupation of land and includes the title of a Tanzanian citizen of African descent or a community of Tanzanian citizens of African descent using or occupying land in accordance with customary law’ (Tenga and Kironde, 2012).

The definition has two vital parts: the meaning, i.e. title to the use and occupation of land; and who shall qualify to occupy such land, including tribal communities that profess customary law. While the provision is a typical remnant of the British Land Policy, its retention in the law carries less weight, as various laws – including the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) Constitution 1977 as amended – recognise the rights of tribal communities. People who do not profess customary law can alternatively acquire a granted right of occupancy upon conversion of the land from village land into general land, even if they are not of the stated descent such as whites or those of Asiatic origin such as Indians. Also, under the British Land Ordinance natives in the context of land occupation included Swahilis and Somalis, while the Land Act, 1999 only requires one to be a member of a tribal community to hold land under customary law.

Two types of rights of occupancy apply, respectively, to general and village land: the Granted Right of Occupancy (GRO) re-asserts the pre-existing system of formal land titles on general land, whilst the Customary Right of Occupancy (CRO) refers to informal land rights granted by village councils on village land.

#### 3.1.1 GRO

This right, granted on general land, is deemed to be the main form of landholding in urban areas. It is granted by the commissioner on behalf of the president for a maximum of 99 years. The cost involves application fees, the cost of preparing the certificate of title, registration fees, survey fees, deed plan fees, stamp duty on the certificate and a duplicate, and a premium (Kironde, World Bank, 2014, p. 27). Tenga and Kironde note that government efforts to generate funds to acquire and service land, by charging a premium based on some formula of cost recovery, makes it difficult for low-income households to access land registration services (Tenga and Kironde, 2012, p. 28).

The premium has been 7.5% of the land value and land rent for some specified period, but a budget speech delivered by the Minister of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development (MLHHSD) expressed the ministry’s intention to reduce it to 2.5% of the land value (URT, 2018 p. 18). This will mean a huge decrease in the amount of premium and relief to land title applicants. Section 31 of the Land Act provides that, in determining the amount of a premium, the minister shall have regard to:

(a) the use of the land permitted by the right of occupancy which has been granted;
(b) the value of the land as evidenced by sales, leases, and other dispositions of land in the market in the area where the right of occupancy has been granted, whether those sales, leases and other dispositions are in accordance with the Act or any law relating to land which the Act replaces;

(c) the value of land in the area as evidenced by the price paid for land at any auction conducted by or on behalf of the government;

(d) the value of the land as evidenced by the highest offer made in response to a request made by or on behalf of the government, a local authority or parastatal for a tender for the development of land in the area;

(e) any unexhausted improvements on the land; and

(f) an assessment by a qualified valuer given in writing of the value of land in the open market.

In addition, as for the land rent, section 33 of the Land Act provides that:

rent is determined by the Minister depending on factors such as: (a) the area of the land; (b) the use of land; (c) the value of land; (d) where there is insufficient evidence of value in that area from which an assessment of the value of land may be arrived at, an assessment by a qualified valuer of the value of land in the open market in that area which may be developed for the purpose for which the right of occupancy has been granted; and (e) the amount of any premium required to be paid on the grant of a right of occupancy.

Table 1 shows the estimated cost to be incurred as premium and land rent to be granted land. It assumes that the land is acquired from previously un-surveyed land which has been made the subject of planning followed by survey, parceling, titling, and certification.

Table 1: Current official costs of first-time registration of a government grant (in TZS)

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<tr>
<th>Fee</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Premium</td>
<td>2.5% of land value</td>
<td>Application for a right of occupancy – 20,000</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Preparation of certificate of title – 50,000</td>
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<td>Registration fees – 80,000</td>
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<td>Survey fees – 300,000</td>
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<td>Deed plan fees – 20,000 (0–1 hectare varying with increase in size)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Stamp duty on certificate and duplicate – 1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land rent for one year</td>
<td>Paid per annum</td>
<td>Per m² depending on category, locality, and use</td>
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If the land has occupiers, a process of compensation will be followed: it was stated in the cases of Mwalimu Omary and another v. Omari Bilali (TLR 1990,9) Suzana Kakubukubu and two others v. Walwa Joseph Kasubi and the Municipal Director of Mwanza (TLR 1989, 119) and James Ibambas v Francis Sariya Mosha (TLR 1999, 364) that pre-existing rights to land
can be extinguished only upon payment of compensation. The amount of compensation paid to original occupiers follows criteria in the Land Act and the Land Acquisition Act. However, concerns remain as the amount is not necessarily dependent on prevailing market rates and the payment is not always prompt.

Efforts by the government to ensure availability of surveyed plots is unsatisfactory. For instance, the number of registered titles, transfer documents, and certificates of unit titles issued in the financial year 2017/18 is below what was originally intended. In the stated financial year, the MLHHSD registered 79,117 titles, of which 32,178 were certificates of title (from the initial plan of 400,000 titles) and 46,939 transfer documents (from the initial plan of 48,000 documents) (URT, 2018 p. 27). The capacity of the ministry to deliver is low, since issuance of new titles is not more than 35,000 titles per year.

The GRO can be likened to a ‘term of years’ or lease granted by a superior landlord. In the case of Abualy Alibhai Aziz v. Bhatia Brothers Ltd (2000), it was stated that:

‘a right of occupancy is something in the nature of a lease and a holder of a right of occupancy occupies the position of a sort of lessee vis-a-vis the superior landlord. It is a term, and is held under certain conditions. One of the conditions is that no disposition of the said right can be made without the consent of the superior landlord. [Since]…there is now no freehold tenure in Tanzania all land is vested in the Republic. So land held under a right of occupancy is not a freely disposable or marketable commodity like a motor car. Its disposal is subject to the consent of the superior or paramount landlord as provided for under the relevant Land Regulations.’

The implication is that the government exercises oversight powers over land dispositions under the custodial duty of the president (The Land Act, (1999) section 4). Under that mandate he not only approves dispositions but also gets notifications on any dispositions that are about to take place. Although this may seem unnecessary control over the freedom of disposition, it remains a regulatory mechanism, especially in cases of fraud, tax avoidance, breach of conditions, and transfer irregularities.

Sometimes the land for grants may include reserved land, where the president so permits. The grant is generally subject to the payment of rent, although the commissioner has power to grant the land without rent. The use of this power is less common, although it can be used as an incentive to attract investment in land. The grant has to be mandatorily registered under the Land Registration Act if it is for more than five years. The GRO may be acquired compulsorily in the public interest subject to prompt, reasonable and fair compensation, as provided under the Constitution and the Land Acquisition Act, Cap. 118.

Under section 19 of the Land Act, the GRO can be granted to citizens or non-citizens. Non-citizens can get it for investment purposes when they are registered with the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) or the Export Processing Zones Authority (EPZA). The section created debate in the recent past when foreign investors became much more interested in agricultural investments in Tanzania and were accused of ‘land grabbing’.

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9 See The Land Act (1999), section 33: the holder of a right of occupancy shall pay an annual rent.
10 See The Land Act (1999), section 33(7).
11 See the 4th Written Laws Misc. Amendment 2016, which amends section 19 of the Land Act.
A major area of concern, further explored below, is that investors cannot get village land unless it has first been transformed into general land. Boudreaux remarks that, to attract investors, the government has stated its intent to transfer a significant portion of village land to the general land category (Boudreaux, 2012, p. 3), with arguments that plenty of land in Tanzania is freely available and unoccupied (Boudreaux K. 2012).

In urban areas, which are general land, GROs coexist with other types of occupancy, including private individual semi-formal occupancy through derivative rights in the form of residential licences; private individual informal occupancy, where land is used informally with no or limited involvement of public authorities; communal or collective occupancy under the Unit Titles Act;¹² and informal occupation due to encroachment of public land. In all these types of urban tenure, occupancy is formal or informal, individual or collective, and legal or illegal. From a governance point of view, the regulation of these different types of land occupancy is very dependent on a resilient, effective, institutional framework to avoid disputes.

In a survey done by Land Matrix (2016) to provide the average land market demand and scale of land acquisitions in Tanzania, it was noted that, overall, 32 investors from 17 countries were engaged in large-scale land investments in Tanzania. Investors from the United States of America had the largest size under contract, while investors from the United Kingdom (UK) had the highest number of concluded deals. African investors did not play a significant role in land deals in Tanzania. Most of the land involved in these deals is customary land, which must undergo conversion into general land before it is granted to the investors. Due to inadequate compensation paid and delays in the payment, discontent arises with the government and between investors and local communities.

3.1.2 CRO

The CRO bears all the attributes of a GRO except that it only applies in a customary tenure setting and on village land. The Village Land Act provides room for both individual and collective land rights (The Village Land Act, (1999) sections 12 and 13). Village land can thus be used by an individual occupier or by a community, such as a pastoral community as grazing land, for forest reserve, water dam, etc. These options provide flexibility for occupiers to enjoy the preferred rights of occupancy.

The Act allows village councils to issue Certificates of Customary Rights of Occupancy (CCROs) upon application.¹³ In effect, these formalise customary tenures. But their issuance depends on regularisation of the village land. In essence, the Village Land Act provides room for a village to have its outer boundaries surveyed, demarcated, and registered by the MLHSD in order to obtain a certificate of village land (CVL). The individual villagers could then apply to have their private parcels surveyed and registered. Only at the end of that process can villagers receive their CCRO document. It is also necessary that the village has

¹² The Unit Titles Act No. 16 of 2008 was enacted to provide for the management of the division of buildings into units, clusters, blocks, and sections owned individually and designated areas owned in common; to provide for issuance of certificate of unit titles for the individual ownership of the units, clusters or sections of the building, management and resolution of disputes arising from the use of common property; to provide for use of common property by occupiers other than owners; and to provide for related matters.

¹³ See The Village Land Act (1999), sections 18(1)(a) and 22–25, on procedures for application of CRO and the issuance of the CCRO by the village council thereof, under section 25.
issued a land use plan identifying what part of the village land could be individually titled, what part could be used communally, and what part could be ‘reserved’ for further as-yet undefined uses. In the absence of such regularisation, landholdings on village land are based on the ‘deemed right of occupancy’, which may result from inheritance or clearance of unsettled land.\(^\text{14}\)

The CCROs are meant to provide land occupiers on village land with the same advantages and protection as the owners of GROs in general land. This is not completely the case because of some specific constraints in the case of the CCROs. One such constraint is the impossibility of transmitting CCROs, through sales, donation or bequest, to somebody outside the village community without the approval of the village council.\(^\text{15}\) Of course, this is to make sure that the land of a village does not end up being controlled by people foreign to the village. Yet it seriously reduces the collateral value of the CCROs for potential lenders, undermining one of the objectives of CCROs – to allow holders to access the credit market.

### 3.2 Land transformation by the state and the issue of compensation

The Village Land Act allows for the transformation of village land into general land.\(^\text{16}\) The initiative may come from the government needing to acquire land for some public purpose, in which case a standard expropriation procedure is followed, including compensation of evicted people. Askew suggests that determining what land can be transferred to the general land category is one motivation for mapping and certifying village land areas, which necessarily raises the spectre of widespread dispossession among the native communities in the wake of commercial agricultural expansion (Boudreaux K. 2012, p. 3).

The Land Acquisition Act of 1967, Land Act Cap. 113,\(^\text{17}\) Village Land Act,\(^\text{18}\) and the Land Acquisition Act Cap. 118\(^\text{19}\) provide for rights of people whose land has been expropriated or acquired and the procedures for expropriation. The right to compensation is assessed according to the concept of opportunity, which takes into account the market value of the real property, which relies on land transactions within the neighbourhood (excluding use being made of land, crops being grown, yields, and prices); disturbance allowance; transport allowance; loss of profits or accommodation; cost of acquiring the land; and any other loss or capital expenditure incurred in development of the land. Interest at the market rate is

\(^{14}\) The Land Act provides that CRO includes deemed right of occupancy. ‘Deemed right of occupancy’ is defined under section 2 as meaning the title of a Tanzanian citizen of African descent or a community of Tanzanian citizens of African descent using or occupying land under and in accordance with customary law. Customary law under the Interpretation Act 1996 Cap 1 R.E. 2002 means any rule or body of rules whereby rights and duties are acquired or imposed, established by usage in any African community in Tanzania and accepted by such community in general as having the force of law, including any declaration or modification of customary law made or deemed to have been made under section 9A of the Judicature and Application of Laws Ordinance.

\(^{15}\) See section 18(1)(g) and (h) on the attributes of the CRO, which includes transferable, inheritable, and transmissible by will; however, section 31(3) requires that, unless otherwise provided for by the Act or regulations made under the Act, a disposition of a derivative right shall require the approval of the village council having jurisdiction over the village land out of which that right may be granted. See factors to be considered by the village council before approval on section 33.

\(^{16}\) What follows draws extensively from Makwarimba and Ngowi (2012).

\(^{17}\) Section 3(1)(g).

\(^{18}\) See for instance sections 3, 4, 6, 14(2), and 18(1)(i).

\(^{19}\) Sections 6–18 of the Act.

In practice, compensation is usually inadequate and rarely paid on time. There have been many cases in urban Tanzania where the payment of compensation has been effected many years after the assessment, without reflecting the decline in the value of money. As Shivji (1998) puts it:

> Compensation is hardly ever paid before dispossession. The amounts are paltry and have long been overtaken by inflation resulting in universal dissatisfaction with compensation.

The distribution of compensation also often ends up being inequitable within the households. Displacement often disturbs cultural and social values and norms as well as the composition and bonds of families, who may get dispersed in different locations, in opposition to human rights ideals. The far-reaching socio-economic impacts of compulsory land acquisition include income levels, land utilisation, land ownership structure, and farming practices.²⁰

It should be borne in mind that when the government is acquiring land, it both sets the rules for determining and paying compensation and actually determines and pays the compensation. This could be seen as violating legal rights, as landowners expect to have their land assessed by a non-interested party.

### 3.2.1 Compensation and market value dichotomy

Generally, compensation and market value for land have continued to be incongruent. Msangi, citing Ndjovu, argues that since there is no freedom of transaction in compulsory acquisition, there is no market as such for the compulsorily acquired property and that just compensation cannot be the same as market value (Msangi, D. E., (2011) p. 20; Kironde (2006); Ndlouvu (2003); Ngama (2006)). He considers market value as the estimated amount for which an asset should exchange on the date of valuation between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm’s-length transaction after proper marketing wherein the parties had each acted knowledgeably and without compulsion, which is not the case for compensation (Msangi, D. E. 2011, p. 20). In compulsory acquisition, where the transaction is not based on willingness from the seller in a free exchange, the market value cannot be said to have been attained because sellers have been compelled to sell against their will (Msangi, D.E. *ibid*).

As far as obtaining land market value based on crops is concerned, the government employs a formula for both perennial and seasonal crops. For a seedling crop it pays 30% per stem, for mature crop 60%, for optimum producing crop 100%, and for aged crop 15%. The price of an acre would stand between roughly US$180 and 1,500, depending on the age of the trees/plants (URT, 2013).

Under the Land Acquisition Act, vacant land is not to be considered in assessing compensation, but this situation changed under the Land Act 1999. The National Land Policy 1995 recommended an improvement to the compensation package. The Land Act

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1999, under section 3(1)(g), generally clarifies and improves on the nature and manner of the compensation package to be paid.

The government may give alternative land of the same value in the same local authority area in lieu of or in addition to compensation, if this is practicable (s. 11(1)(2); s. 12(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1967). Under section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act 1967, where land is compulsorily acquired the minister is required to pay compensation as may be agreed upon or as determined according to the provisions of the Act. In practice, however, the government has preferred to determine compensation than to negotiate.

In urban areas declared to be planning areas, where a grant of public land is made the value of land is not paid. Previous land owners may be asked whether they should be paid compensation in cash, in land of equivalent value, or a bit of both. In order for this to work, the market for land needs to be transparent and not administratively determined, as is the case.

As for village land, it has been argued that despite the supposed protection of village certificates (which constitutes the first stage of formalisation), villages are undergoing state-directed re-surveying of their boundaries for the purposes of cutting off large parcels for farmers and investors International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA, 2015). In Kilombero, state-directed re-surveying, branded re-formalisation, has permitted the acquisition of large tracts of land for the purposes of accommodating agriculture and rendering pastoralism untenable (Boudreaux K. 2012, p. 3).

3.2.2 TIC-led commercial land operations

The initiative to acquire land may come from the TIC, responding to the demand of local and foreign investors who are granted certificates of incentives (The Tanzania Investment Act, 1997, section 17) for the right to use land for specific purposes – cultivation, factories – judged to be in the Tanzanian public interest.21 Formally, the decision is validated by the Commissioner for Land, but the centralisation of the decision-making process depends on the size of the operation. Up to 50 acres / 20 hectares, the village assembly and village council are the final decision makers (Village Land Regulation GN No. 86, 2001). Above that limit, the process is in the hands of the district council, Commissioner, and Minister for Lands, with consultation of the village councils concerned (Village Land Regulation GN No. 86, of 2001, Reg. 76(2) and Reg. 76(3). Under section 5(12) of the Land Act, the land will have to be transferred to the general land category, upon which the Commissioner for Land will have general mandate.22

There also are less formal procedures in use. For instance, investors may identify the suitable land directly or through intermediaries. They then approach the relevant district

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21 See the context of public purposes under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, Cap. 118 R.E. 2002, which includes uses of general public nature such as land for mining minerals or oil; exclusive government use, for general public use, for any government scheme, for the development of agricultural land or for the provision of sites for industrial, agricultural or commercial development, social services or housing etc.

22 See the power of the commissioner under section 10(1) of the Land Act that the commissioner is the principal administrative and professional officer of, and adviser to, the government on all matters connected with the administration of land and is responsible to the minister for the administration of the Act and matters contained in it.
Council, which in turn deals with village councils and assemblies. Minutes of the meetings where the land acquisition is approved by those bodies are then submitted to the TIC, thus *ex post* rather than *ex ante* as in the official procedure, or the Commissioner for Land, for the effective transfer procedure to be launched.

Compensation is due to people whose CROs are extinguished. Although there is no uniform resettlement policy, there have been efforts at resettlement when the acquisition emanates directly from the government. For large operations, however, the evaluation of the Tanzanian public interest in the projects that require land acquisition by foreign investors plays a huge role in the decision-making process. Not surprisingly, despite the detailed procedures included in the law, land acquisition operations do not go without frictions and disputes. Examples of successful and unsuccessful land acquisitions can be seen in Boxes 3 and 4 below.

**Box 3: Examples of success stories of land acquisition**

**Case of New Forest Company Ltd (UK and Tanzania)**

The New Forest Company engaged in agroforestry in the Kilolo-Ihemi cluster of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT) area in Iringa region. The company was incorporated in 2006. It faced the challenge that, although the land was available, it was not in a single lot but in fragments owned by separate individuals. The company initially asked for 30,000 hectares of land for pine forest plantation and succeeded in obtaining 8,000 hectares through the following steps:

**Step 1: Land identification**

- The investor consulted TIC on the intended investment.
- The investor complied with the statutory requirement of capital threshold and obtained a certificate of incentives.
- The investor visited the Kilolo District Executive Director (DED) for possible investment in his district.
- The DED contacted prospective village councils with potential land.
- Notice was sent to the village council of the intention of the investor to inspect the available land.
- The investor was introduced by the DED to the village council for a site inspection.
- The investor and the village council discussed options for investment.
- The village council convened to discuss the investor’s request. The village assembly was convened to approve the village council’s decision.
- The amount of land that could be allocated was considered, bearing in mind land disposal limitations.
- For occupied land the investor negotiated with the occupiers on terms of surrender and compensation. The district council worked out the property valuation for the land that would be offered: an acre of land was compensated for TZS100,000 (approximately US$45). In addition, the investor was required to pay statutory compensation as per the Land Acts.

**Step 2: Land transfer process (conversion of land from village land to general land)**

- The village council informed interested parties as to the content of the notice.

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23 The ‘district’ is a local administrative layer above the ‘village’.

– Affected persons made representations to a village assembly meeting attended by the Commissioner for Land.
– The Commissioner for Land/Authorised Officer attended negotiations on the terms of compensation.
– The Land Officer submitted the agreements and the intention to transfer village land to general land to the Commissioner for Land (Form 8).
– The commissioner prepared a notice of transfer and submitted it to the minister.
– The minister submitted the notice for transfer to the president.
– The minister issued a transfer permit.
– The transfer of village land notice was gazetted and posted on places in the village for 30 days before it took effect.
– After the lapse of the notice period, the land was surveyed, and preparation for a certificate of GRO followed.

**Step 3: Grant of right of occupancy to TIC**
– The TIC applied to the commissioner for a GRO for investment purposes.
– The commissioner granted title to TIC for 99 years.
– The commissioner forwarded the title to the Register of Titles for registration.

**Step 4: Issuance of derivative right and registration of leasehold title**
– The TIC prepared a leasehold agreement for the investor, incorporating conditions and covenants, for 98 years.
– The TIC sent the leasehold agreement and the right of occupancy to the registrar for registration of the leasehold title (derivative right).
– The Registrar of Titles issued a leasehold title as an encumbrance to the GRO on 01 July 2011.

Currently, 10 villages are involved in the project: Kidabaga, Magome, Ndengisirili, Isele, Kisinga, Kiwalamo, Idete, Makungu, Ipalamwa, and Ukwega. The transfer of the land from the village and villagers was relatively smooth. There were some complications: although the company made promises, such as support for school renovation, local health services, and road maintenance, these were not put in enforceable contracts. Nevertheless, at present, there are no conflicts between the investor and the host communities.

**Case of Rungwe avocado project (Tukuyu, Mbeya region)**
Where land acquisition is not possible due to scarcity or tenure issues, there is room for contract farming or out-grower schemes. This has been the case for part of Rungwe (in Tukuyu district, Mbeya region), where an avocado project is being implemented.

The Rungwe avocado project is considered a success story. No land was taken from the community, avoiding the complex procedure of compensation, and a contractual agreement was reached quickly for the investor to provide farmers with seedlings and an assured market for their produce. The investor shares modern technology with farmers and conducts market research for the farmers.

Some weaknesses have been pointed out. In interviews, some of the farmers voiced concern that there was no room to verify the accuracy of the prices given or the possibility of suing in the case of losses attributable to market variations. Some complained that the seeds cannot be replanted, like indigenous species. Nonetheless, relationships between the investor and the host communities are generally good.
Box 4: Example of unsuccessful story of land acquisitions

Case of Sun Biofuels Africa Ltd (SBF) (UK)

SBF was set up in September 2005 and wanted to acquire land for agribusiness. The process – which involved identifying a suitable area of land; meeting with villagers; issuing letters to the government gazettes; engaging a consultant to carry out valuation on the land; identifying, mapping, and valuing areas that were occupied, farmed or otherwise utilised by the villagers; and satisfying the TIC that the whole process had been done – took four years (Kitabu, HAKIARDHI 2011, pp. 7–10). In January 2009 the village land was gazetted as general land and title granted to TIC. In May 2009 the TIC issued a leasehold title to SBF for 98 years.

SBF negotiated with village authorities with the support of local politicians. According to district officials, 12 villages in five wards gave part of their land, totalling about 20,000 hectares. The process involved village council and village assembly meetings, but villagers complain that it was not participatory. The SBF had no formal contract with villagers in Kisarawe, for example: the only document the village had was minutes of the village council, which contained promises by the investor – but no timeframe for implementation, or legal mechanism to ensure delivery. These promises included helping with the drilling of wells; providing modern farming implements, seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, and a milling machine; jobs; constructing buildings for a dispensary, extension officers, and teachers, classrooms, pit latrines, a technical school, student dormitories, secondary schools, library, sports facilities, and a land registry office; solar energy for schools; and compensation for those adversely affected.

Land officers from the district land office started the process of surveying and mapping the area to be acquired before discussions at the village level were concluded. The modality for determining the amount of compensation to be paid was not made open. The villages had no land use plans, which made it hard for village authorities to know the size of the land acquired. It was difficult for villages to prove ownership of some lands because the land was deemed unoccupied, although clearly it was being used and formed part of the village land that was not allocated to individual occupiers. The acquisition did not take into account prospects of future village population growth.

Eventually, the investor decided that his initial biofuel project was not viable, and sold the project to another private firm. However, the operation ultimately left many local farmers with no land and no job.25

4 The distribution of actual land tenure status in Tanzania

The previous section’s description of the law governing the rights of land occupancy in Tanzania might suggest that the absence of private ownership has been fully compensated for by an alternative system of essentially public land leases. However, there are land tenure statuses other than the GROs, the CCROs, and the derivative rights – i.e. subleases – in Tanzania. This is essentially because of the administrative burden of delivering GROs and CCROs, and also because of the difficulty of establishing precisely the boundaries of the

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25 See Carrington, D., Paul, J., Maurayi, T. and Sprenger R., 2011. Sun Biofuels have left us in a helpless situation: They have taken our land. [video online] Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/video/2011/nov/09/biofuel-tanzania-video> [Accessed 16. August 2018]. The collapse of Sun Biofuels has left hundreds of Tanzanians landless, jobless, and in despair for the future. Consider also the case of a Dutch firm called Bioshape in the southern Tanzanian district of Kilwa, where a large jatropha plantation went bankrupt, leaving locals complaining of missing land payments and the land not returned to its owners.
land that could be concerned by the delivery of additional formal titles. Surveying the occupation of land develops at a very slow pace.

It follows that informal land tenure statuses coexist with formal ones. Table 2, taken from Deininger et al. (2012), shows that in 2010 a large majority of Tanzanian citizens lived without a formal land occupancy status. In urban areas, roughly 50% of inhabitants have no formal title. In rural areas, if most villages now have a village land certificate, meaning their boundaries have been surveyed, only a few of them have elaborated their land use plan and are in a position to issue CCROs. It was estimated that 400,000 GROs and 57,000 CCROs would be issued in 2016/17, but by 15 May 2017 only 33,979 and 35,002 respectively had been issued, representing roughly 5% of the rural population (URT, MLHHSD, 2018; Schreiber, 2017).

Table 2: Tenure typology in Tanzania (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenure type</th>
<th>Area and population</th>
<th>Legal recognition and characteristics</th>
<th>Issues and potential overlaps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private individual use of urban land, formal (right of occupancy, for which a certificate is issued for 33, 66, or 99 years)</td>
<td>Area: 10,400 ha Population: 1.6 million Number: 350,000 titles. Number of open letters of offer: Unknown</td>
<td>Legal recognition: Recognised if development conditions are met and land rent is paid; eligible for compensation if expropriated registration: Rights recorded (registration starts by issuing a letter of offer for a right of occupancy; acceptance triggers issuance of a certificate of GRO) Transferability: Transferable with consent by the commissioner</td>
<td>Issues noted: Double allocations that lead to dispute, lack of service infrastructure, slow development of land after allocation, nonconformity with development conditions, long period to issue title or to transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private individual use of urban land, semi-formal (a derivative right with duration of 2–5 years [renewable], known as residential licence)</td>
<td>Area: 680 ha Population: 1.6 million owners Properties surveyed: 263,000 Applied for residential licence: 91,000 Residential licences issued: 86,000</td>
<td>Legal recognition: Recognised under section 23 of 1999 Land Act Registration/recording: Recorded as a result of a survey by MLHHSD Boundaries: Not definite, subject to regularisation Transferability: Yes, but subdivision without approval</td>
<td>Demand and renewal rates are limited Collateral has limited usefulness No process exists for upgrading residential licences to GRO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private individual use of urban land, informal (land obtained informally with no or limited involvement of public authorities)</td>
<td>Area: 51,350 ha Population: 6.4 million</td>
<td>Legal recognition: Tenure undefined; owners can be considered ‘deemed licensees’ as per section 23 of Land Act; taxes paid, compensation for expropriation; access to services.</td>
<td>Extension of urban boundaries into village land creates uncertainty of land tenure in such areas unless village land is converted into general land.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Land Rights and the Law in Tanzania: Institutional Issues and Challenges – Tanzania Institutional Diagnostic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Type</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Legal Recognition</th>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>Transferability</th>
<th>Conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal occupation of state urban land (both illegal and legal squatting by virtue of section 23 of Land Act)</td>
<td>2,600 ha</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Tenure undefined (owners can be considered deemed licensees per section 23 of Land Act). Registration: Recorded only in exceptional circumstances</td>
<td>Not recorded</td>
<td>Informal transfers only (no planning norms)</td>
<td>Conflicts are frequent when land is acquired for planned urban development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>General land</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private individual use of rural land</td>
<td>1.1 million ha</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>Right of occupancy up to 99 years by large-scale farmers or investors; recognised under 1999 Land Act; foreign investors’ land vested in tenancy in common or a joint venture</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, subject to consent by Commissioner for Land.</td>
<td>One concern is that current or potential village land will be passed to investors to the detriment of villagers. A second concern is about wide powers held by the Commissioner for Land to convert village land to general land without adequate consultation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village land</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private individual land use under CRO (customary individual tenure; indefinite duration; no conditions to develop)</td>
<td>4.1 million ha</td>
<td>26 million</td>
<td>Recognised under Village Land Act 1999</td>
<td>Hardly any CCROs issued (issuance is contingent on survey of village boundaries and issuance of a CVL)</td>
<td>Unrestricted within village; difficult outside</td>
<td>Recognition overlaps with general land in peri-urban areas. CVL must be issued to allow issuance of CCROs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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26 This has apparently made considerable progress since 2010. Schreiber (2017) reports the completion of 11,600 village land survey and CVL issues by early 2017.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communal use of rural land; customary communal tenure</th>
<th>Area: 35 million ha</th>
<th>Legal recognition: Recognised under 1999 Village Land Act</th>
<th>Overlaps with neighbouring individual villages and reserved land (parks, game reserves, conservation areas) are unclear. Many disputes between pastoralists and farmers occur. Pastoralists are frequently removed from ‘their’ land.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population: 3 million</td>
<td>Registration: Not recorded except for a few villages with land use plans</td>
<td>Boundaries: No demarcation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transferability: No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reserved land</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal occupation of reserved land (legal squatting)</td>
<td>Area: 7.6 million ha</td>
<td>Legal recognition: Much not surveyed and not titled</td>
<td>Reserved land overlaps with pastoral lands, village lands, and state lands. Conflicts occur with farmers and pastoralists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 300,000 to 1 million</td>
<td>Registration/recording: Recorded (gazetted)</td>
<td>Transferability: No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The government’s expected land use changes in both urban and rural areas may imply intensification of certain forms of tenure: in particular, there is expected to be a substantial shift to general land from village land. Table 3, from the National Land Use Planning Commission, summarises the expected changes.
### Table 3: Comparison of existing and planned land uses by 2029

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing land uses</th>
<th>Area in km²</th>
<th>% of total area</th>
<th>Planned land uses</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Change in land area (km²)</th>
<th>% of total area</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban settlements, agriculture, and grazing</td>
<td>161,572.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>(i) Areas for intensification of crop cultivation, grazing, and settlements</td>
<td>165,605.0</td>
<td>+4,033.0↑</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>No significant change: Intensification to offset the increased demand and optimise use of land resources, although, depending on the economic policy and national priorities, especially on large-scale farming, there could be agricultural land intensification – which in turn could require restructuring of the areas of cultivation. Various tenure typologies could apply as they apply in urban areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scattered village settlements, agriculture, and grazing</td>
<td>198,517.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>(ii) Areas for large-scale commercial crop cultivation and ranching</td>
<td>176,747.0</td>
<td>-21,770.0↓</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>Large-scale commercial farming could intensify land use, which in turn may require restructuring of the areas of cultivation, especially conversion of land from village land to general land, implying the rural tenure typologies will apply as well as formal land occupations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(iii) Coastal settlements and ecological functions</td>
<td>4,112.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>New land use separated from settlement and grazing and open land and ecological functions. Though not significant, it may require restructuring the areas of settlement as the land in question could involve village land transfer to general land. There is likelihood of both formal and informal land occupation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Grazing, hunting, and conservation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Change (%)</th>
<th>New Land Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community ranching areas</td>
<td>95,433.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>New land use for community ranching in specific areas (mainly from former Game Controlled Areas). This implies use intensification, which in turn may require restructuring the village land to general land, but there is also likelihood of informal settlements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Open lands and ecosystem maintenance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Change (%)</th>
<th>New Land Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open land uses and ecological functions</td>
<td>155,320.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>Although it is part of land use category number 3, it could still imply significant change, which may require restructuring the areas of cultivation and conservation. There could also be both formal and informal settlements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Water resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Change (%)</th>
<th>New Land Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water resources</td>
<td>63,329.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Although it could be assumed that water resources are included in land use category number 5, such category caters for ecological functions, which may not necessarily include water. The decrease could involve minor informal settlements on catchment areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Conservation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Change (%)</th>
<th>New Land Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community conservation</td>
<td>270,840.0</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>New land use, mainly the Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) created from former Game Controlled Areas. There could be some informal settlements by villagers in the reserved land, as has always been the case.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 **Institutional framework for land administration**

As the Land Act provides, all land in Tanzania is public land vested in the president, who is required to manage the land for the benefit of the citizens. The president can acquire land for public purposes or transfer land from one category to a different category (*The Land Act* (1999), section 4(7)). Aspects of this custodial duty are legally mandated to others, as summarised in Table 4 below, including the MLHHSD, the Commissioner for Land, supported by various authorised officers, land allocation committees, local government authorities, and the National Land Advisory Council (*The Land Act* (1999), sections 8–14 and 17).

The MLHHSD is responsible for sector management including policy, regulatory, support, and capacity building, as well as national functions such as national mapping, land use planning and record keeping that cannot be fragmented into district and village functions (*The Land Act* (1999), section 8). The National Land Advisory Council, whose chairperson is appointed by the president, reviews and advises the minister on all aspects of land policy (*The Land Act* (1999), section 17). The Commissioner for Land reports to the permanent secretary of the MLHHSD and is mostly responsible for operations of land acquisition, transfer, disposition, and revocation (*The Land Act* (1999), sections 9, 10, and 11).

The regional restructuring and local government reforms have also assigned much of the responsibility for land administration, particularly the interaction with land users, to local government authorities, which are under the authority of the President's Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG) (*The Land Act* (1999), section 14) Yet land allocation is ratified by the land allocation committees (*The Land Act* (1999), section 12). These committees deal with land other than village land. They consist of local representatives of the commissioner – or the commissioner himself at the national level – and local officers responsible for various tasks, including land surveying (*The Land Act* (1999), section 12(2)).

Other entities include the National Land Use Planning Commission, which advises the minister on land use issues and the practice of land use planning at local, regional, and national levels (*The Land Act* (1999), section 12(2)).

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27 See also the functions of the Land Allocation committees under the *Land (Allocation Committees) Regulations*, GN No. 72 (2001).

28 At the district authority level (excluding land within boundaries of an urban authority) in respect of: plots for central/local government offices; plots for residential, commercial/trade, and service purposes; plots for hotels, heavy and light/small industries; plots for religious and charitable purposes; farms not exceeding 500 acres subject to the approval of the minister; and land for other purposes not specified above. At the urban authority level in respect of: plots for central/local government offices; plots for residential, commercial/trade, and service purposes; plots for hotels, heavy and light/small industries; plots for religious and charitable purposes; land for urban farming; land for other purposes not specified above. At the ministry’s headquarters or central level in respect of: land for creation of new urban centres; plots for foreign missions; beach areas and small islands; plots for housing estates exceeding an area of five hectares; land for allocation to the TIC for investment purposes under the Tanzania Investment Act (1997); land for use of activities which are of national interest.
Figure 1: Institutional arrangements for land administration in Tanzania

Source: URT, Strategic Plan for the Implementation of the Land Laws (SPIILL), 2013

5.1 Institutional mandates on grant and allocation of land rights

As provided under the Constitution of URT (1977 as amended), citizens have the ‘right to own property’ (URT, 1977 (as amended), Art. 24(2)) in the sense of ‘rights of occupancy’. The laws regulate and administer land rights and concomitant duties. One of the core functions of the institutional framework is to facilitate delivery in terms of land acquisitions.

Land in Tanzania can be acquired in various ways, such as grant, purchase, and gift. For general land, the law provides that land rights can be acquired by both citizens and non-citizens. For citizens, the procedure is to make an application to the Commissioner for Land, who may grant in the name of the president. For non-citizens, the Act provides that the only kind of interest they can acquire is for investment approved by the TIC or EPZA. This implies that the TIC or EPZA are the authorities that can approve an investment and/or issue derivative right to an investor. The mandate of TIC and EPZA does not apply where the entity is a non-profit foreign or local corporation or organisation with the aim of the relief of

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29 Section 22 of the Land Act provides for the application for a GRO. The application must be: submitted on a prescribed form and accompanied by a photograph; accompanied by the prescribed fee; signed by the applicant or a duly authorised representative or agent of the applicant; sent or delivered to the commissioner or an authorised officer; contain or be accompanied by any information which may be prescribed or which the commissioner may in writing require the applicant to supply; accompanied by a declaration in the prescribed form of all rights and interests in land in Tanzania which the applicant has at the time of the application; where any law requires the consent of any local authority or other body before an application for a right of occupancy may be submitted to the commissioner, accompanied by a document of consent, signed by the duly authorised officer of that local authority or other body; if made by a non-citizen or foreign company, accompanied by a Certificate of Approval granted by the TIC under the Tanzania Investment Act, and any other documentation which may be prescribed by that Act or any other law.
poverty or distress, the public provision of health, or other social services for the advancement of religion or education under an agreement to which the Government of URT is a party (The Land Act (1999), section 19(3)(a)).

As far as village land is concerned, the institutional framework includes the minister, who is responsible for policy formulation (The Land Act (1999), section 8; The Village Land Act, (1999), section 8(11)), and the Commissioner for Land, who is the principal administrator of all land including village land (The Village Land Act, (1999), section 8(7); The Land Act, (1999), sections 9, 10, and 11). Village assemblies approve village land allocation or the granting of CROs by village councils (The Village Land Act, 1999, section 8(5)). The latter deals with the management of the village’s land (The Village Land Act, (1999), section 8). The ward development committee, the ward being the administrative level just above the village (The Village Land Act, (1999), section 8(6)(b)) can require reports from the village council on the management of the village’s land. (The Village Land Act, (1999), section 8(6)(b)). At the next level, the district council provides advice and guidance to any village council within its jurisdiction on the administration of its land (The Village Land Act, (1999), section 9).

Where the boundaries of the village’s land are not in dispute, i.e. after surveying, the Commissioner for Land is required to issue a CVL certifying the boundaries of the village land and giving a mandate to the village council to manage the village land (The Village Land Act, 1999, section 7(6)). The CVL is granted in the name of the president, affirming the occupation and use of the land by the villagers in accordance with the customary law applicable to land in the area. For pastoralists, the CVL affirms the use of land for depasturing cattle in a sustainable manner in accordance with the highest and best customary principles of pastoralism practised in the area (The Village Land Act (1999), section 7(7)(c), section 7(7)(d) and section 29). Together with the Land Use Planning Act, the Act also provides for the establishment of land use plans for villages and the creation of village-level committees under the village council that would oversee the implementation of the land use plans.

A study on how 90% of the citizens of Tanzania in rural areas acquire, hold, and dispose their lands has confirmed that customary landholding is still the prevalent mode (Kironde, 2009) for medium and smallholder farmers. Not all land in villages is allocated by village councils, since the Village Land Act generally recognises other forms of acquiring land such as purchase and inheritance. As a result, both the Land Act and the Village Land Act acknowledge ‘deemed rights of occupancy’ which emanate from occupation by villagers from time immemorial and allocations made by village councils upon application from villagers or non-villagers. Allocations by village councils are mainly on the land reserved for future use to needy applicants upon complying with certain formalities.

Since the deemed rights are not compulsorily registrable, they remain more precarious against the GROs (which are preferred by large-scale farmers) due to their weak protection

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30 On conditions of the CCRO see the Village Land Act (1999), section 7(7)(c) and section 29.
31 See generally on village land administration: Wily (2001); Larsson (2006); Geir (2005); Joseffsson and Aberg (2005); The National Land Use Planning Commission (2011).
32 See the power of the village councils to allocate land to applicants, (The Village Land Act, 1999, sections 22–2).
33 Case of Methusela Paul Nyagwaswa supra.
and lower competitive market status. Correcting this calls for pragmatic land use plans and issuance of CCROs to all landholdings on village land. There are also debates on uniform certificate of title for granted rights and customary rights in order to do away with the stigma associated with CROs. In the financial budget 2016/17, the MLHHSD planned to prepare land use plans for five districts comprising 1,500 villages. By 15 May 2017, however, the ministry and various stakeholders had managed to prepare land use plans for only 91 villages in 23 districts (URT, MLHHSD, 2018, pp. 49–50). This lack of success reflects that the plans were prepared unsystematically.

Village councils are constrained in various ways. They are supposed to seek approval of the village assembly for various decisions, in particular the portions of village land that can be set aside as communal village land and other purposes. They must consult with the district council on the exercise of their functions. To ensure proper record keeping, they are required to maintain a register of communal village land in accordance with any rules which may be prescribed. And, of course, they are constrained by the customary law in their area.

The Village Land Act provides that customary law governs CROs (The Village Land Act (1999), sections 18 and 20). Yet any rule of customary law and any decision taken in respect of land held under customary tenure must take into account the fundamental principles of national land policy and of any other written law (The Village Land Act (1999), section 20(2)) such as the URT Constitution. Any rule of customary law, customs, traditions, and practices of the community which conflicts with the fundamental principles or written law shall be deemed to be void and inoperative and shall not be given effect by any village council or village assembly or court of law (The Village Land Act (1999), section 20(2)).

Despite such a clear legal position, it is intriguing that some customary norms still disregard fundamental principles – including equality over land, which results in dispossession of women through customary inheritance rules.34 In particular, some discriminatory statutory laws conflict with the well-intentioned principles of the Land Act and the URT Constitution on equality on land rights. One such law is the Customary Law Declaration Order, Order No. 4 of 1963, which classifies heirs into three degrees with women holding the third position.

5.2 Institutional mandates on disposition

The Land Act defines disposition as follows:

‘disposition’ means any sale, mortgage, transfer, grant, partition, exchange, lease, assignment, surrender, or disclaimer and includes the creation of an easement, a

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34 Various judicial decisions have been registered on this, such as Ephrahim vs. Holaria Pastory and Another (2001) AHRLR 236. In this case a woman, Holaria Pastory, had inherited some clan land from her father by a valid will. Finding that she was getting old and senile and had no one to take care of her, she decided to sell the clan land to one Gervazi Kaizilege, a stranger and non-member of her clan. One Bernado Ephrahim, a member of the clan, filed a suit in the Primary Court at Kashasha, Muleba district, praying for a declaration that the sale of the clan land was void under the Haya Customary law – for females have no power to sell clan land. This was in accordance with the Haya Customary Law (Declaration) (No. 4) Order of 1963; specifically, its paragraph 20, which was to the effect that ‘women can inherit and acquire usufruct right but may not sell’. The Primary Court granted the prayer. She appealed to the District Court at Muleba. Here the decision of the Primary Court was quashed on the basis of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution which guaranteed equality for both men and women. Bernardo Ephrahim was not satisfied and appealed to the High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza. At the High Court, the decision of the District Court was upheld on the ground that the relevant Haya Customary Law was discriminatory on the basis of gender, thus inconsistent with Article 13(4) of the Constitution.
usufructuary right, or other servitude or any other interest in a right of occupancy or a
lease and any other act by an occupier of a right of occupancy or under a lease
whereby his rights over that right of occupancy or lease are affected and an
agreement to undertake any of the dispositions so defined; (The Land Act (1999),
section 2)

In other words, land can be exchanged, transferred, and subject to a variety of market
transactions. This is important as agribusiness investors need tools to raise capital, for
example mortgages. If the right of occupancy were not fungible, the raising of credit for
modern agriculture would be extremely limited (Tenga and Mramba, 2018, p. 10).

This is not always appreciated, as suggested by the antiquated phrase ‘land in Tanzania has
no value’ – in fact, there are various ways in which the right of occupancy is transferable for
value. That phrase often meant that since a right of occupancy is a grant for ‘use and
occupation’, the value to the landholder would only be value that is generated through his
investment on land – that is, ‘bare land’ has no value per se. But this kind of statement is
fraught with danger as it led to a lot of negative sentiment, which necessitated the
amendment of the Land Act to state clearly that land has value (Tenga and Mramba, 2018,
p. 10).

The Land Act, for instance, provides for the disposition of the GRO in three separate parts.
First, it provides for the administrative oversight, where one can make the necessary
applications to the Commissioner for Land or his authorised officers to approve and register
a disposition of land. Second, it deals with what one may consider to be a theory of land
transfers – the legal assumptions that underlie each disposition of land, such as that the
need for each disposition must be in writing and that certain conditions are implied in every
transfer, including that there are no latent defects in the land that have not been disclosed to
a purchaser. These ‘consumer protection’ provisions are essential in modern property
transactions; in the old days, the concept of caveat emptor or ‘buyer beware’ gave little
protection to the unwary purchaser.

Third, there are detailed regulations for certain major forms of dispositions, such as the sale,
mortgage or lease of the GRO. The Land Act contains separate parts for each form of
disposition. Previously consent to any kind of disposition was mandatory, but today there are
many exceptions – only for specific kinds of disposition is official approval mandatory,
otherwise a notice to the Commissioner for Land would suffice.

The president is the highest authority in the regulation and control of disposition of land in
Tanzania. His mandate includes overseeing transfers of land. Practically, however, this
function has been under the responsibility of the Commissioner for Land, assisted by
authorised officers, as detailed in sections 36–41 of the Land Act. These sections have been
referred to as mandate for oversight of the dispositions of GRO on general lands: disposition
which has not obtained the requisite approval from the Commissioner for Land is rendered
ineff ectual, unless it is of a kind that requires only the furnishing of notice to the
commissioner ((The Land Act (1999), sections 36 and 37). The cost is considered high, and
it can take from two to four months to get a registered title.35

35 See the URT, MKURABITA Program on Formalization of the Assets of the Poor in
The amendment of section 41 of the Land Registration Act, Cap. 334 on registration of disposition calls for disposition of land to be subject to registration with mere notification to the commissioner, mainly to facilitate disposition by way of mortgage. The initial position was that no disposition could be registered unless the Registrar received a certificate in writing from the Commissioner for Land signifying his approval, and only registered dispositions could create, transfer, vary or extinguish any estate or interest in any registered land. Under the amended section, the applicant can now simply submit for registration all relevant documents accompanied by a prescribed fee and the Registrar shall register the disposition and notify the Commissioner for Land.

For village land, the disposition of customary rights of occupancy requires approval of the village council. This is intended to protect village land against acquisition by non-villagers, but it is debatable if it has succeeded. A village council has exclusive decision power only if the land does not exceed 20 hectares. Where it exceeds 20 hectares, the approval of the district council is needed. If it exceeds 50, the approval of the Commissioner for Land is required (URT, MKURABITA Report, 2005). Such a provision seems to challenge the freedom of village councils and go against the principles of devolution and subsidiarity as expressed in the URT Constitution and reflected in Local Government Authorities Acts. Powers seem to be legally granted to the village council by one hand only to be taken away by the other hand.

There is thus a kind of dualism in the land disposition system: centralisation of control and management of general land, with devolution of control to customary law at the village level. Such dualism cannot go without frictions and incidents likely to affect the economic efficiency of the whole land sector and to produce social frustration, such as those detailed in Box 5.

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36 See Arts. 145 and 146 that the purpose of having local government authorities is to transfer authority to the people. Local government authorities shall have the right and power to participate, and to involve the people, in the planning and implementation of development programmes within their respective areas and generally throughout the country.

37 See The Local Government (District Authorities) Act, No. 7 of 1982 (1982), sections 26 and 142.
Box 5: Control of mandate of village councils

Luhanga Village, Mbarali district

The government in Mbeya returned 5,000 hectares of village land in Luhanga village Mbarali which had been taken from more than 200 villagers belonging to the Luhanga community for an investment project. The government directed the district council to take action against all village government officials who were involved in the process of allocating the land without respecting the legal procedure.

When handing back the land to the Luhanga community, the Regional Commissioner, Amosi Makala, said ‘the government had made such decision after discovering that the process of allocation contravened procedures under the Village Land Act and its Regulations… Act No. 5 of 1999 makes it clear that village councils have no mandate to allocate more than 20 or 50 hectares but, in that case, they allocated more than 5,000 without even consulting the district council… (Also) apart from the allocation lacking procedural compliance, the investors did not seem to be genuine due to their failure to honour their promises to facilitate socio-economic issues in the area’.

Lukenge village, Kibaha district

In January 2018 the government, through the Kibaha District Commissioner, ordered an investor who had taken 5,000 hectares from the village government without following legal procedures to return it to the community within 90 days. The investor had failed to develop the land for eight years, contrary to the contract of disposition agreed with Lukenge village, Magindu ward.

The District Commissioner took action after villagers complained to her about the land transfer. According to the commissioner, the investor took the land for the purpose of investing in livestock and fish farming but failed to commence the project. Instead the investor was using the land for other projects and did not support community socio-economic activities.

Data on the amount of land transfer in Tanzania are sketchy. Sule (2016), for instance, while cautious of the data, considers that:

there [have been over] 34 deals with about 1,000,000 ha owned by foreign investors (and joint ventures between the Tanzanian and foreign investors), whether announced, ongoing or concluded land acquisition processes. Out of these deals, only deals with a total of around 555,000 ha are reported by at least two different sources and can thus be considered as verified with certain reliability. Of the verified deals, only ten deals with a total area of 145,000 ha can be considered as concluded deals. The remaining reported area of 410,000 ha derives from deals that are so far only announced or that have land acquisition ongoing, but not concluded (including the contested AgriSol Energy deal with an area of 325,000 ha). [It is appreciated that] since these data are three years old, a number of new projects are likely in place and some projects have either ceased or become dormant (Sule, The New Harvest. Agrarian Policies and Rural Transformation in Southern Africa. 2016, p. 112).

In its assessment of investment in commercial agriculture, the MLHHSD found that out of 121 commercial farms in the country – amounting to 552,139.21 acres – in Tanga, Morogoro, Pwani, Njombe, and Kagera regions only 63 (about 52%) had been developed, while 58 (about 48%) had been abandoned (URT, MLHHSD, 2018, p. 22). This is quite alarming, and could point to a problem with the investment conditions or failure to closely monitor investors’ compliance with investment plans.

See for instance the case below.
Box 6: Centralisation of land management

In September 2006 the minister of MLHHSD banned sale of land by villagers to foreigners. The minister gave the stern directive in a public meeting in Magu district, Mwanza when resolving a land dispute that had lasted for 30 years between villagers and an investor. He said that ‘there is a habit by a majority of villagers of allowing the so-called investors to come in to buy land from separate villagers, resulting in the investor occupying land which exceeds the statutory limit. Worst still, instead of developing it, the investor uses it as collateral to borrow money from banks and afterward sell it by surveying and creating plots’. He directed that it is prohibited for the district council or officers in his ministry to approve any such transactions.

5.3 Institutional mandates on dispute settlement

The Land Acts provide for the establishment of a land dispute settlement mechanism in Tanzania. They assert the need for structures to be instituted at the lowest local level with room for accessing higher levels in case of no resolution. In 2002, the Land (Disputes Courts) Act was enacted. It provides for a dispute settlement system with five levels of hierarchy.

The lowest level is the village land council, followed by the ward tribunal, where procedures are mostly informal as advocates are not allowed and decisions are taken by lay judges. The next level is the District Land and Housing Tribunal (DLHT), where advocates are allowed so procedures are more formal. There are too few tribunals, so some serve an entire zone rather than a single district. In regions where DLHTs are scarce, citizens face high travelling costs to get their case settled in a tribunal. This renders the principle of equality before the law somewhat illusory.

The upper levels of the land judiciary hierarchy are the High Court (Land Division) and the Court of Appeal. Procedures in these courts may be cumbersome. For instance, a person whose dispute was first handled in the ward tribunal cannot appeal from the High Court to the Court of Appeal unless (s)he receives certification from the High Court that there is a point of law involved. Also, an appeal from the High Court for a matter that originated in a DLHT or High Court must seek leave before appealing to the Court of Appeal. These restrictions have been deemed to be challenges in the settlement of land disputes. Overall, it is an intricate institutional structure of land administration, the complexity of which reflects somewhat antinomic basic principles.

When presenting the MLHHSD budget in the financial year 2016/17 in Parliament, the Minister of MLHHSD outlined the status of land disputes in DLHT in the country from 30 June 2016 to 15 May 2017. Table 5 summarises.

Table 4: Land disputes in DLHTs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of pending land disputes by 30 June 2016</th>
<th>Total number of land cases filed from July 2016 to 15 May 2017</th>
<th>Total number of land cases decided from July 2016 to 15 May 2017</th>
<th>Total number of pending cases on 15 May 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13,890</td>
<td>26,245</td>
<td>18,571</td>
<td>21,564</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It would appear that the stock of pending cases is increasing at a vertiginous rate: up 60% in a year, equating to more than a full year of new cases. This clearly unsustainable if the judiciary capacity is not improved or the causes for disputes reduced.

6 Institutional issues and challenges

The Land Acts were passed in 1999 and began to be implemented in May 2001. Although they represented an improvement, they were quickly found to be unsatisfactory on several grounds. Major challenges are still present, as evidenced by the impressive number of reports that have since been produced on the persistent institutional weaknesses of the land rights system and land administration, and several partial reforms that have attempted to improve the situation. For example, only four years after implementation, the law was amended to repeal and replace Chapter 10 related to mortgages, under pressure from financial institutions which found that it inhibited bankable projects. Another amendment in 2005 changed provisions related to leases, followed by one in 2008 to promote mortgage financing.

More fundamentally, reports including MKURABITA (Property and Business Formalisation Programme) Report (2005), Big Results Now (2013), and Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) (2009 and 2015) pointed to major institutional challenges. The 2009 LGAF report proposed a systematic review of the National Land Policy of 1995 to explore the extent to which expected gains had materialised and what could be done to improve the performance of land management. Issues touched upon include: (i) land surveying, mapping, and registration; (ii) affirmative action to address gender issues; (iii) redefining institutional mandates; (iv) strengthening of decentralisation; (v) making land use planning more participatory; (vi) changing expropriation practices; and (vii) improving conflict resolution mechanisms. The same institutional issues were again stressed in the 2015 LGAF report. The government reacted by commissioning in 2016 a review of the National Land Policy 1995. A draft policy is presently under consideration.

The implementation of the Land Acts was sufficiently difficult to also give rise to two ‘Strategic Plans for the Implementation of Land Laws’, the first in 2005 (SPILL-I) and the second in 2013 (SPILL-II). A SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis undertaken in the latter pointed out positive but also numerous negative sides of land policies in Tanzania. The negatives are summarised in Table 6.
Table 5: Weakness and threats in land policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Inefficient and ineffective land administration</td>
<td>• Massive growth of irregular settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Institutional arrangements uncoordinated</td>
<td>• Unregulated land markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Land administration services concentrated in limited parts of Tanzania</td>
<td>• Limited housing/building mortgage market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shortage of staff, particularly in land disputes</td>
<td>• Underfunding of the land administration infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Implementation of new land law is slow</td>
<td>• Oversight of land dispute mechanisms questioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Key mechanisms (National Land Advisory Council, village land councils,</td>
<td>• Increasing land conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tribunals, etc.) not in place</td>
<td>• Lack of harmony with laws in other sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shortage of planned, surveyed, and serviced land</td>
<td>• Growing marginalisation of the poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Poor enforcement of rules and planning regulations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dispute settlement machinery not empowered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of maps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tarnished image of the land sector in the eyes of the public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: URT, MLHHSD, SPILL (2013)

Clearly, the weaknesses listed above result both from unsatisfactory institutional arrangements and limited state capacity – aspects which it is not really possible to completely disentangle. Despite the SPILL’s well-conceived analysis, and despite some, though unsatisfactory, progress over recent years, the main difficulties affecting the functioning of the land sector have not been resolved. The 2016 draft National Land Policy proposes to introduce some substantial changes in the National Land Policy 1995 and its implementation instruments. As the law is still at preparation stage, the next sections of this chapter describe the main present shortcomings of land management in Tanzania without consideration for the reforms considered in this new version of the law. The few debates organised about the draft of the National Land Policy 2016 do not suggest most challenges listed below will disappear, as the focus of these debates seemed to be mostly on the issue of the protection of smallholders against large-scale investors.38

6.1 Duality of tenure

There is little doubt that the duality of tenure introduced by the key distinction between general land and village land, and the associated difference between GROs (and derivative rights) and CROs, is the main source of friction and inefficiency in the institutional setting of land rights in Tanzania. Transforming village land into general land to facilitate large-scale investments, in agriculture as well as in other activities, is often an uneasy and unpopular

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operation, to such an extent that it may act as a disincentive for investors and lead to missed economic opportunities.

One of the objectives of the present land management system is clearly to protect indigenous smallholders from their land being acquired by large-scale operators who might use the land more productively but with lesser employment, a different output mix, and insufficient compensation for evicted people. This objective – so clearly expressed in Nyerere’s quotation at the beginning of this chapter – is justified, even though it implicitly means some strategic choices about agricultural development have been made that may not have been fully analysed, e.g. how much land for food crops in smallholdings and cooperatives and how much for commercial crops in large-scale plantations.

It is estimated that by 2017, more than 11,000 of Tanzania’s approximately 12,500 villages had mapped their outer limits, but only about 13% had adopted land use plans. Of the approximately 6 million households located in rural villages, only about 400,000 had obtained individual title documents (Schreiber, 2017, p. 1). This implies that more than half of Tanzania’s 12,500 villages still do not have CVLs and very few rural citizens hold occupancy certificates to secure their individual land parcels.

The problem is that, within the present institutional setting, this protection is often elusive. This has two consequences. On the one hand, smallholders feel insecure and may not take the necessary steps to improve their land, increase yields, and respond to market incentives. On the other hand, large-scale operators may be discouraged from acquiring land by endless procedures and high transaction costs. Better defined, better implemented, and fairer administrative procedures for land transfers would provide efficiency gains on both sides.

From a sociological or political science point of view, however, there is much more to land than economics. At all levels, the choice of an institutional structure through which land rights are managed has major implications for the distribution of power in society and ultimately on control over land.

The frequency of incidents about rights of occupancy is high and rising. These incidents arise from the perceived violation of the principle of equality behind the intended comparable status of the GROs on general land and the CROs on village land (The Village Land Act (1999), section 18(1)). Although one could assert that the attributes of the CRO under section 18(1) of the Village Land Act are not realistic, since they depend on the administrative inclination of relevant authorities and judicial interpretation, they remain important features in the protection of customary right holders. Judicial trends before the enactment of section 18(1) of the Village Land Act relied on inquiries called upon by the Minister of MLHHSD in the case of land conflict which had shown disregard for customary right and the mandate of village councils.39

39 See cases such as Methusela Paul Nyagwaswa vs. Christopher Mbote Nyirabu (1985), Suzan Kakubukubu and two others v. Walwa Joseph Kasubi and the Municipal Director of Mwanza (1988), AG v. Lohay Akonaay and Joseph Lohay (1995), and Mwalimu Omary v. A. Bilali (1990), in which the CRO was in dispute against the GRO.
Box 7: Interference over mandate of village councils

In Mabwegere, village authorities had to defend their village boundaries all the way to the Court of Appeal, where they had won in September 2011. However, the regional and district authorities refused to implement the court order to respect the village boundaries, and instead maintained their intention to redraw the village boundaries to reallocate land to the neighbouring rice farming village of Mbigitari. On 30 May 2015, the Mabwegere village chairman was arrested and ordered to publicly announce his support for the redrawing of his village boundaries in order to be released. As he refused to do so, he was jailed for a month. This was followed by a ruling of the Morogoro DLHT on 03 June 2015 to rescind the village certificate of Kambala village and reduce the village land from 48,650 ha. to 16,104 ha – a reduction of 66% (Source: ITV, 2015).

Many incidents have also arisen from the acquisition of customary land rights for the public interest. Since 98% of land in Tanzania is village land or reserved land, village land is the main source of land acquisition for other purposes, in particular development needs. Nonetheless, conflicts may also be due to overlap between individual villages’ land and reserved land (parks, game reserves, conservation areas). Schreiber, for instance, notes that villagers have faced pressure from government officials and conservationists, who wanted more land allocated to conservation and lucrative tourist lodges (Schreiber, 2017, p. 2). Within villages there have also been many disputes between pastoralists and farmers, with pastoralists often removed from their habitual or traditional grazing lands, as for instance in Kilosa-Morogoro.40

6.2 Immense powers of eminent domain41

The concept of public land has given the state immense power, because land is deemed to be controlled by the state and thus akin to state property. Yet the power of eminent domain, and the state’s policing and managing capacity – which allow it to regulate land use in the public interest through planning and granting of planning permission – have not always been used judiciously and in the public interest.

What constitutes ‘public interest’ has remained a matter of contention. In the recent history of Tanzania, for instance, public interest included acquiring land for private investors. On the management side, large-scale allocation of land by the state was often undertaken with no consultation of the affected communities. In effect, customary landholders are not protected by fair information and consultation procedures. Free, prior, and informed consent for the allocation of customary lands is not obligatory when the public interest is involved. There is also no assurance that evicted customary landholders or those deprived of parts of their lands will be able to find jobs or other livelihoods to compensate for their losses. Needless to say, the losses endured by local communities can be very great, including the commercial value of the land or, in the absence of well-functioning markets, its recurrent-use value and its potential for a commercial enterprise.

Commons in communities under customary tenure have particularly been vulnerable, on the argument that they are unowned, or idle, or simply that they belong to the state. Often the

40 See Mkomazi Game Reserve in the case of Lekengere Faru Purut and 52 others vs. Minister for Tourism, Natural Resources and Environment and three others.
41 ‘Eminent domain’ formally refers to the power of the state to take private property for public use while requiring ‘just’ compensation to be given to the original owner.

Occasionally, compensation has been paid to evicted communities, but they complain it is grossly inadequate. Promises made about employment opportunities and the improvement of rural infrastructure often do not materialise (LEAT, 2012). Expected tax revenues at the local level also fail to be realised as investors demand and get exemptions. This has the effect of rising up host communities against investors. It has been suggested that the government should adopt alternative models which engage more of the existing producers, such as contract farming and out-grower schemes, rather than displacing them (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010; Tenga and Kironde, 2012).

6.3 Limited formalisation

In rural areas, land surveys and issuance of CCROs are still done sporadically and on an ad hoc basis. In most cases land CCROs have depended on pilot projects that have not managed to cover a large part of the country. As also noted in Table 2 above, informal urban tenure outpaces formal tenure – a clear indication that unplanned settlements are increasing fast. This is due to a high rate of urbanisation and arbitrary expansion of city boundaries, which has even eaten into self-governing villages.42

Even when land occupancy rights have been granted at one level or another, procedures and standards for formalisation are characterised by being bureaucratic, unrealistic, expensive, and time-consuming. Only a minority of land records are found in the land registers. Registry records are often unclear and cases of multiple titles for the same piece of land are not uncommon. Automated land recording and documentation systems are rare. Land administration is often centralised. Possibly because of this, it is characterised by non-transparency and lack of accountability. This scares low-income households, as well as potential investors.

6.4 Gender discrimination

Gender inequality in access to and control of land remains a serious problem. As noted by Shivji, while people can have access to land through various means including allocation and purchase (Shivji, 1998, p. 84), control of the proceeds from the land is another matter. The Food and Agriculture Organization notes that rural women in particular are responsible for half of the world’s food production and produce between 60 and 80% of the food in most developing countries, but they lack effective decision-making power as individuals under traditional law (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2002, p. 26). Often, women are left

holding whatever rights they have at the will of male relatives (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2002, p. 26).

One of the major remaining obstacles to increasing the agricultural productivity and incomes of rural women is insecurity in their land tenure, reflected in rules of access and control. Traditional or customary systems that might protect women’s access to land have failed to promote their full control over the land they operate. While land may be considered valuable collateral by credit institutions, the marginalisation of women excludes them from obtaining loans and making important investments.

Although the Village Land Act provides for the illegality of discriminatory practices in customary law (in section 20), there are still complaints about the mistreatment of women in terms of land rights. Improving access and security for women will require changes in cultural norms and practices.

6.5 Institutional overlaps

Land administration is affected by potential overlaps in implementation of land-related laws and policies due to the multiplicity and diversity of land-related institutions. Overlap of responsibilities, and the complexity of the relationships between the various public entities in the land management system, undermines efficiency and sometimes threatens basic principles such as the separation of powers.

For example, land officers in the local government authorities – village, ward, and district – are under the responsibility of the MLHHS. While they are paid by and report to superiors in the ministry, they execute functions for local governments, which are themselves under the responsibility of the President’s Office (PO-RALG). Another example is that sectoral ministries have their say on swaths of land under the MLHHS – the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism deals with reserved lands, for instance.

Problems of overlap and lack of coordination are also acute in the land dispute settlement system. At the lower level of the system, the village land councils and the ward tribunals are under local government authority responsibility, which falls under PO-RALG. Right above them, the DLHTs are under the MLHHS. At the top, however, the High Court (Land Division) and the Court of Appeal are under the judiciary. This institutional set-up creates problems of accountability and contravenes the principle of separation of powers (Gastorn, 2009, pp. 583–584 and Kironde, 2009). It also creates unnecessary problems in the delivery of justice, hence the need for reform.

6.6 Corruption and inefficient land administration

Much as institutional framework is crucial in land governance, Askew notes that:

[weak land governance and property rights systems can lead to opaque land deals, which facilitate corruption and undercut responsible actors seeking access to land for productive investment. Weak governance […] allows unproductive land speculation and undermines agricultural productivity (Askew, Maganga, and Odgaard, 2017, p. 5)
Kironde points out that corruption challenges in the land sector are partly blamed on lack of an efficient land records system. Falsifying or hiding land information has led to long delays in getting approvals for land use plans, land surveying, and change of use (Kironde, 2014, p. 12). He notes that although the government discourages informal payments, through public notices in offices and public education campaigns, they are paid all the same. Mechanisms to detect and deal with illegal staff behaviour exist in some registry offices, such as use of the Prevention and Combat of Corruption Bureau, but it has proved difficult to eliminate rent-seeking and the general public does not have the incentive to report it. Indeed, rent-seeking is condoned through intermediaries as it seems to speed up delivery.

Transparency International (2017) has indicated a slight overall improvement in the fight against corruption: from 2016 to 2017 the country’s score increased from 32 to 36, and it climbed by three places from a global rank of 106 to 103. In a more focused study, AfroBarometer noted some likelihood of corruption-related practices to facilitate land registration, with rich people very likely to offer bribes (AfroBarometer, 2017, p. 7). Ordinary people also seem to be used to making informal payment, which indicates that institutional practices still need further reform (AfroBarometer, 2017, p. 7). It could also demonstrate that many people are not aware of their entitlements, and there is need for more efforts on awareness raising on land rights. The Information Land Management Integrated System is expected to minimise the avenues of corruption and fast-track land delivery.

**Figure 2: Corruption Index on Land Transactions**

![Corruption Index on Land Transactions](source)

Source: AfroBarometer (2017)

### 6.7 Ineffective land dispute settlement framework

The dispute settlement machinery is complex, straddling the judiciary and the executive, and disputes are on the rise. The nature of the disputes varies – some result from conflicting land uses such as agriculture and pastoralism, agriculture and conservation, or pastoralism and
conservation, and others result from transfer of village land to general lands or dubious land deals by investors on village lands.

Despite some government efforts to improve both formal and informal mechanisms, weaknesses persist. As seen above, most DLHTs are located far away from local communities. On top of that, filing fees and legal representation are expensive; there are language barriers, as the language used in legal matters is English; jurisdictions may be limited; DLHTs’ chairpersons may lack independence; there is an excessive multiplicity of land disputes settlement authorities; and, because of ineffective voluntary mediation, most matters end up in full trial (Massay, 2013, pp. 167–182).

A report by the Law Reform Commission acknowledges that the legal system governing settlement of land disputes has not met the desired standard. Problems such as delay in settlement of land disputes, backlog of cases, inaccessibility of institutions, inadequate financial and human resources, and multiplicity of institutions contribute to a huge degree of inefficiency and ineffectiveness (URT, Law Reform Commission, 2014).

6.8 Inadequate resources

Even if existing policy and laws were fully satisfactory, inadequate human, material, and financial resources would frustrate their successful execution. For instance, there was little progress on many of the actions set out in SPILL (2005) due to lack of funds outside the Government Medium Term Expenditure Framework. This was the case in particular for the establishment of a Land Administration Infrastructure Fund and District Compensation Funds. The cost of creating these institutions was estimated in SPILL (2005) to be roughly US$300 million (URT, SPILL 2013, p. 20).

Addressing administrative capacity is a lengthy process. For instance, as of March 2013, the MLHHS had a total of 2,451 approved positions but only 1,086 were budgeted for and filled. The remaining gap was 386 in headquarters and 979 in the outposts. The filling of these positions is irregular, depending on the state of the economy and available budget. In one report, the MLHHS mentioned that the government’s attention was focused on the education and health sectors, leaving much of the land sector’s manpower needs unfilled (URT, SPILL, 2013 p. 20) The staffing figures in Table 6 below make it obvious that the MLHHS is operating below capacity. Although these figures relate to 2013 and efforts to fill positions are being made, the situation has not changed substantially, due to attention focusing more on immediate socio-economic demands.

Table 6: MLHHS staffing by March 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MLHHS staffing</th>
<th>Filled positions</th>
<th>Approved positions</th>
<th>Deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Outposts</td>
<td>HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>1,093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SPILL (2013)

As for training capacity, it has been considered that the output from Ardhi University and other institutions can go a long way to satisfying the staffing requirements for high-level land sector professionals. Ardhi Institute Tabora (ARITA), and Ardhi Institute Morogoro (ARIMO),
which are under the MLHHSD, have been useful in training manpower at technician and certificate levels. ARITA offers certificate courses in Cartography, Land Management, Valuation and Registration, and Graphic, Arts and Printing, as well as a Diploma Course in Cartography. ARIMO offers certificate and diploma courses in Geomatics (URT, MLHHSD, SPILL, 2013, p. 30).

These two institutions can play an important role, working with Ardhi University, in outputting staff suitable for manning the land sector at district, ward, village and mitaa\(^{43}\) levels (URT, MLHHSD, SPILL, 2013). Since there are some 12,000 villages, 3,337 wards, and 2,651 mitaa in the country, which may go up in the near future, it would be necessary to train 20,000 land administration auxiliaries in at least one cadre in support of the land sector for about five years (URT, MLHHSD, SPILL, 2013). Enrolment at the Morogoro and Tabora land institutes in 2015–16 was 495, and in 2016–17 it rose to 559 (URT, MLHHSD, SPILL, 2013, p. 65).

Although the ministry through SPILL projected training of 474 staff at a total estimated cost of TZS 803.99 million (about US $0.5 million) (URT, MLHHSD, SPILL, 2013), funding has remained a challenge. In the 2017/18 budget speech by the Minister of MLHHSD, it was established that in the financial year 2016/17, the ministry had planned to build the capacity of 150 employees, and by 15 May 2017, it had supported training to 491 employees. In the financial year 2017/18 the ministry planned to provide training to 70 employees and employ 291 new employees, besides improving working facilities (URT, MLHHSD, 2018 p. 64). This is a positive trend, but it remains to be seen whether the kind and level of training offered is adequate to meet the current demands.

### 7 Concluding remarks and recommendations

This chapter has assessed the land tenure system, the way it is implemented, and how it is supposed to work. It has analysed how the administrative and judiciary apparatus may help the economy exploit its comparative advantage in agriculture. It has shown that while the legal framework has put in place essential principles for land governance, these principles are not self-executing – their success depends on a vibrant and capable institutional framework.

Among the key recommendations which emerge from this chapter: there is a need for more effective coordination, collaboration, and capacity building at the various governance levels; procedures for large-scale investment in land need to be streamlined; there is a need to scale up land use programmes in rural areas to address village land conflicts and demarcate land available for occupation and investment; in urban areas, also, large-scale regularisation schemes need to be rolled out; and more efforts are needed to raise awareness on land rights to tackle corruption.

The existing political economy situation is a source of conflict between large-scale farmers holding CROs and small-scale farmers holding CCROs. The gaps in the land registration system for village land, i.e. CCROs, make it difficult for smallholder farmers to access credit. CROs are not accepted as collateral by banks. Also, the slow and complicated process of transferring village land into general land undermines investment in agriculture. If one is

\(^{43}\)Sub-location.
It takes three to five years to complete the process and receive the CCRO from the MLHHSD. The powers of the commissioner to grant the transfer could be on paper only but applicant investors are often told that their certificates could not be issued in time because of the awaited approval from the President's Office.

The TIC's approval is also complex, largely because it does not have a land bank. It therefore has to go through the same process of transferring village land. It has proved to be very difficult for TIC to establish its own land bank, for whatever reason. Better institutional arrangements between village councils and TIC could solve this. How to protect indigenous smallholders' land from acquisition by large-scale farmers has surfaced over time. This can, however, be addressed by identifying vacant land and demarcating it for use by large-scale operators. Contract farming and out-grower schemes are a good approach to address the problem as is currently being demonstrated in the SAGCOT area. The establishment of a Tanzania commodity market could address the price-fixing issues.

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Improving land tenure in Tanzania

The legal basis for land ownership and access in Tanzania is provided by the Land Act and the Village Land Act, both passed in 1999 as the result of a process involving a Presidential Commission in 1991 and formulation of a national land policy in 1995. When they were passed, these laws were lauded as among the most advanced in Africa (Alden-Wily, 2003). Yet, for several reasons, many laid out in the chapter by Mramba, Tanzania failed to realise this potential and, with a ranking of 132 in the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business: registering property’ indicator, is close to the bottom of this indicator globally.

Four elements illustrate the gaps in Tanzania’s land registration system and the costs these impose on the broader economy. First, Tanzania has not computerised even the textual part of its land administration system and relies on a manual paper-based system that offers few advantages but provides ample opportunity for processes to get delayed and documents to be ‘lost’ or forged. Second, there is no integration between spatial and textual records, something that not only increases the costs of registering, but also reduces the security provided by land documents. Third, the system for formalising transfers is inefficient and cumbersome, with some of the associated requirements (such as official consent) unnecessary, so that even formal properties risk falling back into informality. Finally, coverage is extremely limited, with the number of new CROs created annually (see Mramba) likely to be less than the number of new plots created so that in percentage terms coverage is decreasing rather than increasing.

At the time Tanzania was debating its land policy, Rwanda, one of its neighbours, experienced one of the most traumatic periods in its history. Yet a desire to never again let the state’s failure to secure land rights for all trigger violence at this scale led this country to develop a set of land laws and policies and subsequently implement the most comprehensive land regularisation programme in Africa so far, which, by 2013, had registered all of the country’s 11.5 million parcels (Ali et al., 2014) at a total cost of about US$6 per parcel. With 86.6% of land formally registered in the name of women (either jointly or individually) and rapid activation of mortgage-based credit (Ali et al., 2017), this allowed realisation of tangible social and economic benefits. It also provides the basis for land valuation to ensure fairness in case of expropriation, for raising revenue through land taxes, and for forward-looking land use planning including urban expansion.

Below, we suggest several concrete next steps that could allow Tanzania to improve land tenure security at a scale similar to that in Rwanda without giving up some of the distinctive characteristics of land tenure in Tanzania.

Improving land tenure in urban areas

*Improve registry efficiency and integration:* Despite efforts to modernise the system, most of Tanzania’s land registry is still paper-based and not integrated with the cadaster or land-related databases maintained by local governments. To address this, action will be needed in four areas, as follows:

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44 The views expressed in this note are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the member countries they represent.
a) Make digitisation of records mandatory to reduce petty corruption, generate audit trails, and allow workflow monitoring. Experience with digitisation projects globally suggests that the key to success is to get buy-in from the mid-level bureaucracy and experience in how to do so can be drawn on from several successful cases.

b) Agree on time-bound targets and measurable outcome indicators for system improvement (including the level of digital coverage) that can be routinely generated from administrative data available to the MLHHS (possibly linked to other administrative datasets) and regularly report to the public and to high-level decision makers on progress.

c) Provide banks with online access to an authoritative and fully electronic register to allow them to verify the absence of competing registered claims to the same land, a piece of information that will have far-reaching consequences for their ability to repossess the land in case of default. Similarly, establish online links to tax administration, courts, the national ID, and the civil registry to ensure that every change in a person’s civil status automatically triggers a change in all parcels to which this person has a right.

d) Empower local government by ensuring that parcel data from the land registry can be used by them for the processes they are responsible for, such as planning, permitting, and property taxation and that information already contained in databases maintained by local government is systematically taken into account in efforts to expand coverage with CROs.

Adjust regulations for low-cost first-time registration: First-time registration in Tanzania is unsustainable due to three factors, namely:

a) An emphasis on upfront payment of a premium that is unaffordable to poor credit-constrained households who, as clearly demonstrated in the literature, could benefit from secure land documentation and are interested in obtaining and willing to pay for it.

b) A requirement for highly accurate boundary demarcation that transfers large rents to surveyors (who often operate using outdated technology rather than making use of advances that allow acquisition of highly accurate imagery via drones or satellites as survey regulations have not been updated). Global experience demonstrates that, while a spatial description that allows any parcel to be identified unambiguously on a map is essential for a public registry to function, high-precision surveys are a private good and should be treated as such.

c) A complex paper-based and manual process that involves numerous formal and informal steps with opportunities for rent extraction and hold-up that led to emergence of intermediaries to help land owners navigate the process.

Regulatory action will be needed to (i) collect revenue for titled properties on an ongoing basis rather than the current focus on prohibitive upfront fees that just increase informality; (ii) opening the door for use of modern low-cost surveying methods as the norm and allow land owners to acquire high-precision surveys at their own cost; and (iii) streamlining and digitising the workflow for first-time registration to reduce the amount of time and resources required and define parameters for workflow management for any efforts to expand coverage with land title to make an impact.

Complete CRO issuance in urban areas: Pilot experience in Dar es Salaam (Ali et al., 2016) suggests that even poor slum-dwellers are interested in and willing to pay for documents to provide them with secure tenure. The potential benefits from doing so, in terms of investment and credit access as well as planning and effective service provision, are undisputed.
Therefore, once the above steps are completed (which, on the basis of initial steps having been accomplished, could be done in the context of pilots with the explicit goal of refining workflows together with software to implement them), efforts to expand coverage with CROs to all urban areas will be a high priority. Counts of all built structures in Tanzania that have recently been produced using machine learning together with high-resolution imagery can indicate the overall volume of work to be covered and should be used to set milestones in terms of monthly targets, and the cost of doing so must not exceed US$10 per parcel.

**Improving rural land tenure**

While Government spent considerable resources on issuance of CCROs to rural dwellers, the literature suggests that the impact of such documents remains limited (Stein et al., 2016). This is not too surprising as village land cannot be transferred to outsiders. As long as this restriction remains in place, CCROs offer little increment in terms of tenure security. Demarcating village land, together with establishment of clear rules of how to manage land internally in the village, would, in such a situation, be a lower-cost option to guarantee tenure security. Introduction of CCROs has many parallels to unsuccessful attempts to introduce a lower level of tenure (in the form of ‘residential licences’) in urban areas. While these were promoted with great fanfare, they provided no tangible benefits and thus fell into disrepair (Ali et al., 2016). To move forward with rural land tenure, the following steps would be desirable:

*Complete issuance of CVLs:* The fact that, some 20 years after the coming into force of the Village Land Act, only a fraction of villages have received a CVL is puzzling. It not only undermines the basis for Tanzania’s rural land tenure system, but also raises questions about the government’s seriousness in implementing its stated policy. Complete issuance of CVLs based on boundaries surveyed using modern low-cost technology – with disputes that cannot be resolved in the process marked on the record – and publicly accessible through a web portal would be a fundamental step towards ensuring that external support to Tanzania’s rural land sector will have the desired impact.

*Clarify content and status of village land use plans:* Conceptually, village land use plans should be the main instrument to address informational asymmetries between villages and potential investors, providing a basis for villages to attract investors with a profile that would most effectively contribute to local development. The *de facto* prohibition of direct deals between villagers and investors precludes this and undermines villages’ incentives to systematically identify investment opportunities and put them on public notice using village land use plans. It is thus not surprising to find that, despite large amounts of resources invested in establishing such land use plans, a lack of clarity regarding their status and level of publicity prevails.

To address these issues and improve clarity in land management for investors and local government, a regulatory framework to clarify the status of village land use plans is urgently needed. It should contain provisions (i) regarding responsibilities and standards for elaboration, approval, and public availability of relevant documents to prevent plans being changed at the whim of local officials; (ii) ensuring compliance with such land use plans or for aggrieved parties (including herders) to seek redress in case of violation; (iii) resolving
inconsistencies with higher-level plans and the modality and frequency with which such plans should be updated (as well as the resources available for doing so).

**Allow local decisions on transferability of CCROs:** Experience from other countries suggests that a one-size fits all approach to indiscriminately restricting transferability without considering local conditions or allowing ways for villages to adjust these by weighing local opportunities and risks may fail to contribute to greater equity and instead lead to widespread informality and underuse of land. As Tanzania has decision-making structures at village level available, it would not be difficult to allow village assemblies transferability of land (with or without restrictions in terms of either the size of individual land transactions to prevent landlessness or the amount of land that can be acquired by any individual to prevent concentration) to outsiders, similar to what has been done in Mexico with great success (de Janvry et al., 2015; Valsecchi, 2014; Deininger et al., 2002), though at some political cost (de Janvry et al., 2014). This should be contingent on a parcel-level land information system being in place and thus could also help to direct resources for CCRO demarcation in the right direction.

**Mandatory conversion to general land:** The conceptual basis for the mandatory conversion from village to general land in case of investment is typical of an ‘enclave approach’ to agricultural investment that is not consistent with the need for such investment to benefit local farmers through market- or technology-related spillovers (Ali et al., 2018) or social services. Given that most successful agricultural investments started rather small and expanded subsequently, and that success is often contingent on collaboration between locals and investors to achieve shared benefits, the fact that land given to investors would permanently be removed from village control (including in case an investment fails) pitches both against each other. It thus creates strong incentives for stakeholders to use the many opportunities provided by the complex and duplicative process for land conversion to slow down transfers, in the process frustrating (or bankrupting) investors who attempt to acquire land in the legally prescribed way. If options are in place for villages to decide on transferability of land as suggested above, there is no need for such conversion to general land as villages can make land available to investors directly in ways that ensure such investment is undertaken gradually and generates local benefits.

**Use rural land taxation to discourage speculative landholding:** Anecdotal evidence suggests that owners of holdings who managed to get their land converted to general land are very large, with many using only a small fraction of the land they own. Land taxes at a meaningful rate that would be levied on, say, all holdings above the 50-hectare limit that villagers are currently allowed to acquire would provide a strong incentive to either use such land more productively or transfer it to those who may be able to do so, thereby activating rental or sales markets.
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