

# **CHILD MARRIAGE LAW, GENDER NORMS AND MARRIAGE CUSTOMS**



Amrit Amirapu<sup>†</sup>, M Niaz  
Asadullah<sup>‡</sup>, Zaki Wahhaj<sup>†</sup>

April 2019

<sup>†</sup> University of Kent, <sup>‡</sup> University of Malaya

## Abstract

The negative welfare consequences of child marriage are well established, but the phenomenon is still ubiquitous in developing countries, where one in three girls is married before the age of 18. Although most countries have a legal minimum age of marriage set at 18 years, in practice marriage age in developing countries is determined by social norms. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that formal laws can influence social norms – even when the laws are not enforced. We do this by administering a randomized video-based information treatment that accelerates knowledge transmission about a new child marriage law in Bangladesh which contains separate progressive and regressive components. We find evidence that our information treatments led to a change in participants’ own attitudes and behaviour (including reported attitudes regarding appropriate marriage age and willingness to contribute to a charity that campaigns against child marriage), but did not substantially influence their beliefs about attitudes or practices prevalent in their community. We use these findings to distinguish between alternative hypotheses for how the formal law may influence behaviour, arguing that they are consistent with “focal point” theory and “whistle-blowing”, but are inconsistent with the law having an “expressive effect”.

**JEL Classification:** J12,J16, K36

**Keywords:** age of marriage, social norms, formal institutions, legal change

We would like to thank participants at the EDI conference at the University of Namur, Belgium, in October 2017 and the University of Kent economics research workshop for many useful comments and feedback. The authors would also like to acknowledge funding and support of UK aid from the UK government through the EDI research programme.

---

Institutions matter for growth and inclusive development. But despite increasing awareness of the importance of institutions on economic outcomes, there is little evidence on how positive institutional change can be achieved. The Economic Development and Institutions – EDI – research programme aims to fill this knowledge gap by working with some of the finest economic thinkers and social scientists across the globe.

The programme was launched in 2015 and will run for five years. It is made up of four parallel research activities: path-finding papers, institutional diagnostic, coordinated randomised control trials, and case studies. The programme is funded with UK aid from the UK government. For more information see <http://edi.opml.co.uk>.



# 1 Introduction

In developing countries, one in three women marry before the age of 18, typically in their adolescence (UNFPA 2012). This phenomenon has adverse consequences both for the women who experience it and for their families, in the form of lower educational investments (Field and Ambrus 2008), lower human capital investments in the next generation (Sekhri and Debnath 2014, Chari et al. 2017), adverse health effects from early childbearing (Amin et al. 2016), and worse social networks (Asadullah and Wahhaj 2018).

Most countries have a legal minimum age of marriage set at 18 years but exceptions are allowed, typically when parents, a judge or a community elder give consent (UNFPA 2012, Pew Research Center 2016). Furthermore, the implementation of the formal law is often lax, especially in poor countries, because of the absence of strong formal institutions for enforcing the law. In South Asia – as well as in other parts of the world with patriarchal norms – there are strong social pressures to marry from the onset of puberty (Ortner 1978, Dube 1997) and it is this custom rather than the law which often dictates the age at which a woman marries. In this setting, early marriage decisions potentially entail negative externalities for other adolescents and contribute to long-term persistence in the practice (Wahhaj 2018). This provides a strong rationale for policies and programmes aimed at lowering the incidence of early marriage.

In recent years, international development agencies, national governments and NGOs have attempted to address the issue using a variety of interventions, including educational incentives and skills training for adolescent girls, community awareness programmes aimed at highlighting the adverse consequences of early marriage, and conditional cash transfer programmes (Amin, Asadullah, Hossain and Wahhaj 2017). A number of countries have introduced harsher penalties for early marriage and/or raised the minimum age of marriage. However, given the problem of weak law enforcement capacity in developing countries, it is not clear whether such legal changes can be effective. This is particularly difficult in situations where laws conflict with social norms,

depriving them of the support and cooperation of the local population (Platteau and Wahhaj 2014; Acemoglu and Jackson 2017).

In this paper, we address the question of whether a change in child marriage law can itself influence social attitudes towards the practice. Following the recent literature, we hypothesize that there are four different mechanisms through which this may occur. The new law may (i) have an “expressive effect”, by “sending a message about society’s values” (Sunstein 1996; McAdams 2000a; Benabou and Tirole, 2012) when people learn about the law; (ii) serve as a focal point for coordinating behaviour even if it does not affect individual attitudes (Mackie 1996, 2000; Mackie & LeJeune 2009; McAdams 2000b; Auriol, Camilotti and Platteau 2017); (iii) induce people to engage in or support “whistle-blowing” against those who violate it (Acemoglu and Jackson 2017); (iv) impact the views expressed by – and rulings given by – customary authorities who are motivated by strategic concerns (Aldashev, Chaara, Platteau and Wahhaj 2012a, 2012b).

To test for, and distinguish between, these alternative hypotheses, we make use of (a) a new child marriage law in Bangladesh with separate progressive and regressive components which was approved in the national parliament in March 2017; (b) an existing nationally representative survey on women in Bangladesh with information on attitudes towards traditional marriage practices conducted in 2014, immediately before the start of public debates that led to the new child marriage law; and (c) a randomised video-based information treatment conducted in June 2018, aimed at accelerating knowledge transmission about the new law in rural areas.

These treatments were motivated, in part, by evidence from the United States that providing individuals information about the formal law may be sufficient to shift their attitudes towards moral or social norms (Chen and Yeh 2014) as well as by evidence from a developing country documenting the impact of a video-based information intervention on social attitudes towards another marriage custom – female genital mutilation (Vogt et al. 2016). To our knowledge, ours is the first study to investigate whether providing information about the formal law can affect social attitudes and behaviour even when the formal law is not widely applied. Moreover, our experimental design aims to shed

light on the potential mechanisms underlying these effects.

Following the information intervention, we measured a range of outcomes for study participants, including their views on appropriate marriage customs (female age of marriage, agency of the bride and groom in their marriage decisions, ideal age gap between the spouses, attitudes towards traditional gender roles) and their beliefs about attitudes towards early marriage in their own community (social attitudes towards young versus older brides, appropriate marriage age). The participants were also read out three vignettes relating to hypothetical scenarios involving the prospect of early marriage of an adolescent girl and asked questions relating to the vignettes to infer their support for the practice, and beliefs about the extent to which others in the community support it. At the end of each individual interview, the study participants were given the opportunity to contribute part of their remuneration for participation to a prominent charity in Bangladesh that works on child marriage prevention. The charity relies on whistle-blowing within the community for its activities and also uses whistle-blowing to law enforcement authorities as a final recourse. As such, contributions by respondents to the charity provide a measure of their support for whistle-blowing activities.

We find a large effect on contributions to the charity for the treatment in which participants are only informed about the progressive elements of the new child marriage law (specifically, the introduction of harsher punishments for facilitating early marriage). In particular, average contributions increase by about 6 Taka (equal to 25% of the average contribution in the control group). By contrast, we find no effect, on average, for the treatment in which participants are informed about both the progressive and regressive elements of the new child marriage law (the regressive element refers to the introduction of a special clause in the law which permits child marriage in cases where the court gives its approval). We find no effect of the first treatment on the appropriate female marriage age stated by respondents, but those exposed to the second treatment report a lower appropriate marriage age (by 0.2 years on average). We find little effect from either treatment on participants' beliefs about attitudes within their own community towards child marriage. We use the findings to argue against the

presence of an expressive effect of the law, but conclude that the behaviour is consistent with focal point theory and whistle-blowing.

## 2 Study Context and Theory

### 2.1 Contextual Background

Bangladesh has one of the highest rates of female child marriage in the world: according to a recent survey, 59% of women aged 20-24 were married before the age of 18 (NIPORT 2016). Based on this measure, only Chad and Niger have a higher incidence (UNFPA 2012).

In the last three decades, there has been a substantial decline in the prevalence of very early marriage among women in Bangladesh: While close to half of women born in the 1970s were married by the age of 15, the proportion was close to 20% for women born in the early 1990s (Wahhaj 2018). However, a significant proportion of adolescent girls continue to marry at 16 or 17, below the legal minimum age. Raj, McDougal and Rusch (2012) estimate, using data from the Demographic and Health Surveys that there has been an increase in marriage among girls aged 16-17 years from 15.2% in the early 1990s to 20.6% in the mid-2000s.

In contrast to girls, marriage below 18 is very rare for boys. In the 2005 Bangladesh Adolescents Survey, based on a representative survey of adolescents and young adults (see Gani 2007 for further details), only 3% of men aged 20-24 years were married below the age of 18, compared to 70% of women in the same age group.

Until recently, the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 set the legal minimum age of marriage at 18 for women and 21 for men. The law specified that taking part in or facilitating a child marriage was a punishable offense but the punishment itself was relatively mild – imprisonment up to one month or a fine of 1000 taka (USD 12.50).<sup>1</sup> This law was in place for nearly 90 years before being revised in February 2017. There

---

<sup>1</sup>The Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 is available here: [http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print\\_sections\\_all.php?id=149](http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=149)

are two key changes in the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 2017. First, the punishment has been made much more severe – 2 years’ imprisonment or a fine of 100,000 taka (USD 1,250) or both for any adult who marries an under-aged person. For the first time, the underage boy or girl also face punishment – 1 month’s imprisonment or a fine of 50,000 taka (USD 625) or both. On the other hand, an “exception clause” has been introduced that would enable parents or guardians to marry off boys and girls before they reach the legal minimum age if a court rules that this is “in the best interest of the child”. No age limit has been specified for the exception clause.<sup>2</sup> In the debates leading up to the passage of the new law, child rights activists repeatedly argued that the clause would make it more socially acceptable to marry off underage girls, perpetuate gender inequality in child investments and facilitate forced marriages.

Using data from the Bangladesh Women’s Life Choices and Attitudes Survey conducted in 2014 (described in greater detail below), we find that 88% respondents were able to state correctly the legal minimum age of marriage at that time – i.e. 18 years and 81% were able to state the nature of the punishment for violating the legal minimum age (“the guardian or father would be jailed or fined”). Those who correctly stated the legal minimum age were nearly twice as likely to indicate 18 as the appropriate age of marriage for a girl (67%) compared to those who did not (34%). Therefore, women in Bangladesh had a high level of awareness of the previous minimum age law, and it served as an important reference point, at least when answering questions about the appropriate age of marriage. Furthermore, 70% of the respondents reported receiving information about child marriage in the preceding 12 months from the print media, radio, television, posters or community programmes. These figures are suggestive that Bangladeshi women will eventually become informed of the revisions to child marriage law.

---

<sup>2</sup>Further details about the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 2017 are provided in this article: <http://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/bill-passed-okaying-underage-marriage-special-cases-1368451>

## 2.2 Conceptual Framework

How can information about the new child marriage law affect beliefs or behaviour? In the first instance, knowledge about the new law can have an “expressive effect”, i.e. “sending a message about society’s values” (Benabou and Tirole, 2012; see also Sunstein 1996, McAdams 2000a). In the present context, the new law signals to the respondents how the government, legislators, child rights activists, et al view child marriage, which may affect their own attitudes towards the practice or lead them to believe that it would affect the attitudes of others in their community when they get to hear of it.

Secondly, the new law can serve as a new focal point (Auriol, Camilotti and Platteau 2017; see also Mackie 1996, 2000; Mackie & LeJeune 2009; McAdams 200b). More precisely, respondents may believe that it will serve as alternative focal point, and thus lead them to change their behaviour (e.g. their stated opinions, their support for early marriage versus further education for adolescent girls within the community, marriage decisions of their own daughters, etc.) even if it does not affect their beliefs.

When formal law enforcement is weak, agents in the community can have an important role in shaping the custom; e.g. in the form of whistle-blowers (Acemoglu and Jackson, 2017) and in the form of a customary authority (Aldashev, Chaara, Platteau and Wahhaj 2012a, 2012b). Both agents are important in the context of child marriage practices. The whistle-blowers can be the adolescent girl’s school friends, teachers, neighbours, etc. who contact paralegal organisations or law enforcement authorities. The customary authority would be the elder within the extended family whose blessing is deemed necessary for decisions regarding marriage, schooling, etc. These agents may be more supportive of the formal law when it is close to the custom as compared to when it is very distant.

To summarise, there are a number of mechanisms by which the law may affect behaviour in the absence of strong state enforcement capacity:

1. The “expressive effect”: The declaration of the law may cause individuals to update their beliefs about the attitudes of others towards the practice that is endorsed or



prohibited by the law. They may respond to these updated beliefs by adapting their behaviour to maintain or win the approval of their peer group or individuals in positions of authority. In this case, one would expect the law to affect both respondents' beliefs about the community's attitude as well as respondents' own (stated) attitudes.

2. The “focal point” effect: The law may serve as a focal point for coordinating behaviour even if it does not affect own attitudes – or beliefs regarding the attitudes of others – towards the practice that is endorsed or prohibited by the law.
3. The “whistle-blowing” effect: The law may induce people to engage in or support “whistle-blowing” activities against those who violate it. This requires that the intent of the law is in accordance with the attitudes of the potential whistle-blowers.
4. The “customary law” effect: The law may affect the views expressed by, and rulings given by customary authorities, who have a strategic interest in ensuring that members of his or her community seek recourse in customary law rather than the formal law to have their interests protected.

To distinguish between these potential mechanisms, we measure a variety of outcomes for participants in the experiment. To test for the expressive effect, we investigate whether the information treatments affect the participants' beliefs about attitudes towards early marriage among others within their own community. To test for the whistle-blowing effect, we give participants the opportunity to make contributions to a charity that works on child marriage prevention. Specifically, the charity relies on whistle-blowing by community members to identify and prevent potential cases of child marriage, and uses whistle-blowing to law enforcement authorities as a last resort. Thus, contributions to the charity constitutes a measure of support for whistle-blowing activities.

We argue that the head of the extended family has an important role in setting

the norm in marriage practices with the the family, and thus acts as the 'customary authority' in this context. As such, providing the information treatment to the head of the extended family can change his views and rulings, and consequently affect the expressed attitudes and behaviour of other respondents. Therefore, in future work, we plan to use treatment of the head of the extended family as a test of the "customary law" effect.

Even in the absence of a 'customary authority' within the extended family, individuals who deviate from the norm in their expressed opinions or behaviour may be subject to social disapproval by the rest of the family. In this case, an information treatment applied to multiple family members may have a focal point effect, producing a coordinated shift in expressed attitudes and behaviour. In future work, we plan to test for this effect by investigating whether treatment of others within a respondent's extended family has an added effect on the respondent's own outcomes.

## **3 Data and Study Design**

### **3.1 Description of the Survey**

The Women's Life Choices and Attitudes Survey (WiLCAS), conducted in 2014 by the investigators of the proposed study, is a nationally representative survey of Bangladeshi women aged between 20 to 39 years with detailed information about their marital histories, child-related investments, attitudes towards marriage customs and traditional gender roles, access and use of information media, social networks, as well as knowledge about child marriage laws. It was conducted immediately before the start of the public discussions that culminated in the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 2017 (CMRA 2017). Therefore, it provides an important (and to our knowledge unique) snapshot of marriage-related social norms before the move to revise child marriage laws was initiated.

To study how the passage of CMRA 2017 may affect social attitudes, a new round

of data collection was conducted in the subsample of WiLCAS households in May-June 2018. At the time of the new survey, the CMRA 2017 had been approved in parliament but courts were still awaiting instructions from the government on how the new law should be applied in court cases. The new survey was conducted in 80 village clusters, selected from the original 391 WiLCAS rural clusters. The selection of survey clusters followed a two-stage randomisation process. At the first stage, 24 of the 61 districts covered under WiLCAS were randomly drawn. At the second stage, 80 village clusters were randomly picked from the WiLCAS rural clusters located in these districts. All female respondents to the original WiLCAS survey found in these clusters were selected for individual interviews. This procedure produced a sample of 971 female respondents.

The survey team also conducted parallel interviews with other members of the extended family who belong to the same household or are living in the same neighbourhood. The number of additional interviews per respondent was randomised, with an equal probability of 0, 1 or 2 additional interviews.<sup>3</sup> The additional respondents were chosen from the following list, starting with the first relative present at the time of the interview, and continuing down the list till the required number of additional interviews had been obtained: (a) father-in-law; (b) mother-in-law; (c) eldest brother of father-in-law; (d) uncle-in-law; (e) husband's elder brother; (f) husband; (g) husband's elder brother's wife. A total of 786 interviews with relatives of the WiLCAS female respondents were conducted during the survey.

At the start of the interview, respondents were informed that (i) the survey was being conducted as part of a study "to understand how much people know about the law in Bangladesh regarding child marriage and their beliefs and attitudes regarding the practice"; (ii) that the study was not related to any government or NGO programme and that their responses would have no direct impact for them.

In all interviews, we collected information on the respondents' parental background, schooling, own marriage history, exposure to information on child marriage through the media; knowledge of child marriage law; beliefs and attitudes regarding child marriage

---

<sup>3</sup>This randomisation provided the basis of another experiment to study peer effects.

practices; beliefs and attitudes regarding traditional gender norms. In interviews with female respondents, we also collected information on the marriage of their adolescent daughters. Henceforth, we refer to the 2018 survey as CiMLAS (Child Marriage Law and Attitudes Survey).

## 3.2 Field Experiments

During the interviews, the respondents were shown a video of a short drama of a hypothetical case of marriage of a girl of 15. There were small variations in the story across different respondents such that some were provided with information about the new law while others were not. Specifically, a control group (C) received information about the minimum age limit for marriage and the punishment for violating the minimum age limit under the old (CMRA 1929) law. A treatment group (T1) received information about the age limit and punishments specified in CMRA 2017 but not the exception clause. A second treatment group (T2) received information about the new law (CMRA 2017) including the exception clause. The respondents were randomised into the T1, T2 and C groups with an equal probability of being assigned to any one of the groups. The additional respondents received the same treatment as the main female respondents to whom they were related. The videos were displayed on a handheld electronic device that the enumerators used to collect the survey data. For each respondent, the enumerators initiated the video by tapping on a designated link embedded into the questionnaire. The enumerators were not aware of the treatment/control assignment of the respondents they interviewed and the video behind each designated link.

Towards the end of the interview, the respondents were read out 3 vignettes regarding child marriage where an adolescent girl and her family are faced with a dilemma involving an offer/opportunity of marriage for the girl. In the first vignette, Vignette A, an adolescent girl in grade 9 receives an offer of marriage from a man from a neighbouring village. Vignette B describes a similar situation except that the girl's father has passed away, she has younger unmarried sisters, and the offer comes from a man

who has good economic prospects (a career in the civil service). In Vignette C, the girl has a secret engagement with a boy from her school, which her parents learn about from a neighbour. The vignettes were followed by questions on what the respondent would do in the same situation and whether the respondent believed others within the village would approve of his/her decision, and what they themselves would do. The text of the vignettes and the follow-up questions are included in the appendix.

Following the vignettes, the respondents were also subject to an Implicit Association Test to measure their implicit attitudes towards the practice of female child marriage; i.e. to what extent do they make positive or negative associations with the custom.

At the end of the interview, the respondents were provided with a token gift of Taka 200 (approximately 2.50 USD) and the option of contributing all or part of this amount to a charity that works on child marriage prevention. The portion of the gift that was due to the respondent was awarded to him or her using an existing mobile money transfer service in Bangladesh.

The charity in question acts on reports about planned marriages of adolescents below the legal minimum age to provide legal counselling to the families involved. This counselling takes place against the backdrop that the law enforcement authorities would be informed if the parents decide to go ahead with the marriage in spite of the information provided about the legal minimum age of marriage. As such, the NGO relies on whistleblowing within the community for its activities and uses whistleblowing to law enforcement authorities as a final recourse. We use the amount that respondents chose to contribute to the charity as a measure of their approval and support for whistleblowing activities regarding child marriage.

### **3.3 Description of the Data**

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the female respondents from the WiLCAS sample, while the corresponding tables for the additional respondents are provided in Table 2. According to the figures in Table 1, the main female respondent is, on average,

about 33 years old, with 5 years of schooling. The vast majority (94%) are married and about two in three married before the age of 18, i.e. below the legal minimum age of marriage. Their parents had little education – on average, 3 years of schooling among their fathers and less than 1.5 years of schooling among their mothers. About one in three have an adolescent daughter below the age of 18 and thus the change in the minimum marriageable age law is pertinent for them.

Table 2 shows that the additional respondents are, on average, about 50 years old. About 62% of the sample – which includes the spouses, fathers-in-law and brothers-in-law of the main female respondent – are male. The vast majority (about 86%) are married and a third of them married below the age of 18. The parents of the additional respondents had little education – on average, 2.23 years of schooling among their fathers and about 0.93 years of schooling among their mothers.

The ‘Traditional Norms Index’ in Tables 1 and 2 are constructed on the basis of the respondents’ responses to 5 statements designed to elicit their attitudes towards traditional gender norms.<sup>4</sup> Specifically, the respondents were read out five statements on the allocation of resources between boys and girls, such as “Boys require more nutrition than girls to be strong and healthy” and “School education is more important for boys than for girls”. For each statement, they were asked whether they “strongly agreed”, “somewhat agreed”, “somewhat disagreed”, “strongly disagreed” or “did not know”. We combine the responses to the five statements to construct two indices. For the first index, responses to individual questions were coded as 1 if the respondent ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement and 0 otherwise. For the second index, responses to individual questions were coded as 1 if the respondent ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘somewhat agreed’ with the statement. We construct the indices following a procedure described by Filmer and Pritchett (2000) using Principal Components Analysis. Higher values of the indices reflect attitudes more in line with traditional gender roles. Each index is normalised such that the variable has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

---

<sup>4</sup>Asadullah and Wahhaj (2018) use a similar index to investigate the effects of early marriage on attitudes towards traditional gender roles.

The tables also provide a snapshot of the respondents' knowledge about the law prior to the intervention. A large majority of respondents are aware that there is a legal minimum age of marriage and most were able to state it correctly (88% for the female respondents and 83% for the additional respondents). About four out of five respondents were able to state the nature of the punishment for violating the legal minimum age ("the guardian or father would be jailed or fined").

When asked about exceptions to the law, about 10% of the female respondents (7% of the additional respondents) answered that there was an exception. Only five respondents, however, were able to name the special exemption clause in the 2017 Child Marriage Law, and two other respondents mentioned the possibility of "a court marriage"; 13% of the sample of female respondents (6.7% of additional respondents) mentioned that an exception was possible "if the parents wanted it" or "if the family wanted it".

Respondents were asked when they had first heard about the current law regarding the minimum age of marriage. About 5% of the female respondents (4% of additional respondents) reported hearing about it in 2017 – the year when the new law came into effect – or later. Another 13% of respondents (both in the sample of female and additional respondents) reported hearing about it in 2015 or 2016, the two years during which various versions of the new law were widely discussed and debated in the media. These numbers put an upper bound of 18% for the proportion of respondents who might have prior knowledge about the 2017 Child Marriage Law.

Finally, the respondents were asked whether they knew of any instances in which the current law on child marriage had been implemented. About 35% reported knowing of at least one such case.

Based on these responses, we can conclude that the respondents had good knowledge of the pre-2017 law regarding child marriage: specifically, knowledge of existence, the minimum age and the consequences of violating the minimum age law. On the other hand, given that few respondents knew about the exception clause in the new child marriage law, and the fact that most had learnt about the 'current' child marriage law

before the new law was proposed or legalised, it appears that very few had knowledge of the 2017 Child Marriage Restraint Act before the information intervention. Nearly half of our respondents (47.6% of female respondents and 47.3% of the additional respondents; figures not shown in the tables) report reading/hearing about child marriage issues at least once during the previous 12 months from the radio, television, posters, newspapers or community programmes, which suggests that information about the new law is likely to reach them from one or more of these sources in the near future.

The variables included in Tables 1 and 2 are based on responses to questions addressed to the respondents before they were shown the video on child marriage. Therefore, a comparison of means provides an indication of whether the randomisation achieved balance across the three groups. Tables 3 and 4 include, respectively, p-values for a t-test of equality of means, for the full sample of respondents, between the control group and the first treatment group and between the control group and the second treatment group. In almost all instances, we find that the variable means are similar across the groups, with p-values above conventional levels for detecting statistical significance, indicating that balance was achieved in assigning the respondent to the control or treatment groups. The one exception occurs in the case of the variable “respondent knows of a child marriage case that went to court” which has a mean value, for the female respondents from the WiLCAS sample, of 0.311 for the first treatment group, and values of 0.385 and 0.383, respectively, for the control group and the second treatment group. To ensure that these differences do not bias our estimates, we control for the full set of variables relating to prior knowledge of child marriage law in our regressions.

It is worth noting that we find substantial differences between the mean values of our respondents’ stated beliefs about appropriate marriage rules and their beliefs about these norms in the rest of the community. For example, Table 6 shows that the mean value of “appropriate marriage age” is 18.7 years for respondents in the control group, while the corresponding mean value for “appropriate marriage age in the village” is 17.3 years. Similarly, in the case of the three vignettes describing hypothetical scenarios in-



volving a prospective child marriage, the proportion of respondents who would support delaying the marriage is consistently higher than the proportion who believe that “most other parents in this village” would also support delaying the marriage.

We hypothesize three possible reasons for the disparities between stated views and beliefs about the views of others: (i) individuals have incorrect (biased) beliefs about the overall support within their village for female early marriage; (ii) the survey respondents exaggerated their support for marriage postponement among adolescent girls; (iii) the views of the survey respondents are not representative of the views of the wider population within their villages. Our regression estimates in the next section provide clear evidence for (i). We argue that (iii) is also plausible given that our village samples do not constitute a random sample of the adult village population. Rather, our sample design ensures that the majority of respondents are women in the age range 24-43 years (55% of the overall sample). We address (ii) in Section 7, after presenting our estimated effects of the intervention.

### **3.4 Truthful Reporting by Survey Respondents**

Before reporting on the effects of the treatment, we consider whether respondents in the survey were truthful in their answers and whether biased reporting may affect the treatment effects we obtain. There are a number of reasons why the respondents may have withheld their true opinions regarding traditional marriage practices: (i) they aimed to please the enumerator and, therefore, provided answers that they believed to be aligned with the enumerator’s own views; (ii) they avoided providing answers that were contrary to the law because out of fear of the consequences of expressing such opinions in a survey; (iii) they interpreted the information provided in the videos as a signal of the kind of answers that were expected of them. We address each one of these possibilities in turn.

It is conceivable that respondents expressed views that they anticipated would be consistent with the enumerator’s own opinions regarding child marriage practices. How-

ever, it would not have been obvious to the respondents from the appearance of the interviewers what these opinions were. The enumerators were, in all cases, women of a similar age to the main respondents who had been advised to adopt a style of clothing consistent with the norms in rural areas.

It is worth noting we find strong evidence of gender bias in responses to questions on social norms asked during the survey. For example, 34% of the female respondents ‘strongly agreed’ with each of the statements ‘Boys require more nutrition than girls to be strong and healthy’ and ‘School education is more important for boys than for girls’. In the case of the family members of the main respondents, these proportions rise to 47% and 45% respectively. Given that government and NGO campaigns in rural Bangladesh routinely emphasize the importance of investing in girl children, these proportions suggest that at least a substantial portion of respondents were not motivated to answer the interview questions with the objective of pleasing the interviewer.

It is plausible that the answers provided during the survey were influenced by the respondents’ knowledge of the law relating to child marriage. However, it seems unlikely that they feared the consequences of providing certain answers in the survey as their answers also indicate a high frequency of underage marriage among their own daughters. For example, when asked to provide information about the marital status and marriage age of their daughters, the main respondents reported 159 married daughters between them, and a marriage age below the legal minimum age (18 years) for 69% of them.

Regarding the possibility that respondents may have used the information provided in the videos as a signal of the kind of answers expected of them, it is worth noting that both the control and treatment groups were given information about the fact that the legal minimum age of marriage is 18 years. As explained in Section 4, the enumerators were not aware of the treatment/control assignment of their respondents, to minimise the risk that they inadvertently provide additional cues to their respondents based on this assignment. The differences in information content related to the severity of the punishment and the exceptions permitted, which do not map readily to specific answers to the questions that they were subsequently asked.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Empirical Specifications

To investigate whether and to what extent the intervention affected beliefs and attitudes towards child marriage practices, we take three approaches: (i) a comparison of means across the two treatment groups and the control group; (ii) a simple regression model where the outcome variable of interest is regressed on binary variables indicating which treatment, if any, the respondent was exposed to, together with village fixed-effects; (iii) an alternative regression model where we include additional controls, including parental characteristics, education, and prior knowledge regarding child marriage laws.

Our baseline specification takes the following form:

$$y_{ihv} = \alpha + \beta T_{hv} + d_v + \varepsilon_{ihv} \quad (1)$$

where  $y_{ihv}$  is the outcome variable for respondent  $i$  in household  $h$  in village  $v$ ;  $T_{hv}$  is the treatment status of household  $h$  in village  $v$  and  $d_v$  is a village-level dummy. We calculate standard errors using the Eicker-Huber-White method.

The outcome variables are as follows: (i) appropriate age of marriage; (ii) whether a girl should have any say in choice of partner; (iii) ideal age gap between a husband and a wife; (iv) respondents' beliefs about social attitudes towards young versus older brides and parental expectations about daughters' marriage timing, within their own community; (v) attitudes towards traditional gender roles based on a composite index; (vi) response to vignette-related questions including own choice regarding hypothetical marriage decision; beliefs about what choices others would make and approval or disapproval of a particular choice; (viii) contribution of money (from a token gift) towards a charitable organisation that works to discourage child marriage. The outcome variables, together with their definitions, are listed in Table 5.

In alternative specifications, we additionally control for the respondents' characteristics, including age and gender, and introduce binary variables for primary school

completion, primary school completion by the respondent's mother, parental ownership of half an acre of land or more, experience of marriage before 18, and one or more daughters between the ages of 13 and 17. We also control for the respondents' prior knowledge of child marriage law by adding binary variables for whether the respondent previously knew of the minimum age law, the punishment for marriage below the legal age, and the exceptions allowed to the legal minimum age under the law; also whether the respondent learnt about the current law after 2014 (when the government first put forward its plans to change the previous child marriage law) and have heard of child marriage cases where the current law has been applied.

## 4.2 Results

The mean values, together with p-values for t-tests of equality of means, are shown in Tables 6-8. Estimates from the basic regression model are shown in Tables 9-15. Estimates from the alternative regression model are shown in Tables 16-22. Tables 23-29 present results from the basic regression model including interactions of the two treatments with gender.

We obtain a negative effect of the second treatment on the respondent's stated appropriate age of marriage. The average effect is about 0.2 years and statistically significant (at the 5% level) in both the basic regression and the alternative regression. By contrast, there is no effect on appropriate age of marriage in the case of the first treatment. The first treatment also reduces agreement with traditional gender norms (significant at the 10% in both the basic regression model and in the alternative model) while the effect of the second treatment is close to zero and statistically insignificant. There is weak evidence that the second treatment reduces belief that the bride and groom should have say in their own marriage decision, with a statistically significant negative effect (at the 10% level) in the basic regression mode. We do not find an effect on the ideal marriage age gap from either treatment.

We find no effect of either treatment on what the respondent thinks is the preferred

age of marriage in their village. We also find no effect from either treatment on agreement with the statement that other parents in their community expect their daughters to marry before 18; but the second treatment lowers agreement with the statement that others in the community think worse of girls who do not marry by 18.

We find little effect of either treatment on response to the vignette-related questions except that the second treatment lowers support for delaying marriage in the second vignette.

In the case of financial contributions, we find that the first treatment increases average contributions by about 6 BDT (control group average equals 24 BDT), consistent across the two regression models (Tables 15 and 22, column 2) and the mean comparison. By contrast, there is no effect on contributions from the second treatment. We obtain consistent estimates when we use the natural logarithm of contributions as the dependent variable (using the subsample of positive contributors; Tables 14 and 21, column 3).

Our estimated effects also point to some important gender differences in the way that treatments influence outcomes. In particular, the average negative effect of Treatment 2 on appropriate marriage age appears to be driven by men, with the treatment lowering their responses by 0.5 years on average. Men also drive the positive effects of Treatment 1 on average financial contributions to a child marriage NGO. On the other hand, the negative effect of providing information about the special clause on contributions is due primarily to the effect of the treatment for women, with no significant effect on average contributions (from Treatment 2) by men. We hope to explore the theoretical and practical implications of these and other sources of treatment heterogeneity in future work.

It is worth noting that prior knowledge about child marriage law – which respondents were quizzed on before being shown the videos – are strongly correlated with the practice. For example, knowledge of the age exception clause in the current law is associated with less support for agency of the bride and groom in marriage, weaker support for marriage postponement in vignettes B and C, and increased likelihood of donating

to a charity working on child marriage prevention. Although these correlations do not automatically imply a causal relation, they are suggestive that knowledge of the law plays an important role in forming beliefs and attitudes.

## 5 Discussion

Next, we consider whether and to what extent the results described above support any of the alternative hypotheses regarding the potential effects of the formal law on attitudes and behaviour.

It is helpful to first summarize the broad patterns which characterize the findings above. We document that receiving information about the new child marriage law affected certain of the respondent attitudes (stated opinions regarding appropriate marriage age and traditional gender norms) as well as certain types of respondent behaviours (willingness to contribute to an NGO that works on child marriage prevention). Moreover, these effects occur in the expected directions: Treatment 1 (information about the harsher punishments in the new child marriage law) leads to higher contributions to NGOs, while Treatment 2 (information about both the harsher punishments and the exception clause) leads to lower stated opinions regarding appropriate marriage age. In contrast, neither treatment arm had a robust effect on respondents' beliefs regarding attitudes or practices prevalent in their community.

We argue that these findings are not consistent with the “expressive effect” of the law. The “expressive effect” involves, in theory, a shift in people’s beliefs about attitudes towards child marriage within their community. We find little evidence of such shifts in response to our information treatments. A “focal point effect” would result in the respondents expressing – and acting in accordance with – their own beliefs when informed that the law is in line with these beliefs; but would not necessarily involve a shift in beliefs regarding community attitudes. Our findings are consistent with these predictions.

Our findings are also, arguably, consistent with the “whistleblowing” effect. Recall

that Treatment 1 leads to increased giving to an NGO that works on child marriage prevention, while Treatment 2 has no significant effect. The NGO in question relies on whistle-blowing to identify potential cases and uses whistleblowing to law enforcement authorities as a last resort. Thus, increased giving to the NGO in response to Treatment 1 can be interpreted as increased support for whistleblowing activities when the respondent is informed about the harsher punishments specified in the new law. The change in behaviour we document may be due to reduced fear of reprisals within their community against such behaviour.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper, we addressed the question of whether a change in the formal law regarding child marriage can influence social attitudes towards the practice in a situation characterized by weak law enforcement. For this purpose, we made use of a new child marriage law in Bangladesh, with separate progressive and regressive components, which was recently approved by the national parliament and conducted a randomised information treatment aimed at accelerating knowledge transmission about the new law in rural areas. This setup provides a means to distinguish between alternative hypotheses for how the formal law may influence behaviour, including the “expressive effect” of the law, focal point theory, whistle-blowing effect, and influence over the behaviour of customary authorities.

We find some evidence that the information intervention led to a change in participants’ own attitudes and behaviour, but did not substantially influence their beliefs about attitudes or practices in their community. The effect sizes we estimate are relatively small but noteworthy given that it is based on a single information intervention about the new child marriage law. Given that nearly half of our respondents reported hearing about child marriage issues from media sources or community programmes in the preceding 12 months (see Section 5), it is likely that our information intervention is likely to be reinforced by other sources in the near term, thus providing the possibility

that the new law has a more sustained effect on attitudes and behaviour.

We use the findings to argue against the presence of an expressive effect of the law, but conclude that the behaviour is consistent with focal point theory and whistleblowing. The implications of our results for the effect of the law via customary authorities are as yet uncertain, but we hope to explore these implications further in future work.

## References

Acemoglu, D. and M. Jackson (2017), "Social norms and the enforcement of laws". *Journal of the European Economic Association*, Vol. 15(2), pp. 245-295.

Aldashev, G., I. Chaara, J-P. Platteau, Z. Wahhaj (2012a), "Modern Law as a Magnet to Reform Unfair Customs", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 60(4), pp. 795-828.

Aldashev, G., I. Chaara, J-P. Platteau, Z. Wahhaj (2012b), "Using the Law to Change the Custom", *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 97(2), pp. 182-200.

Amin, Sajeda, Saha, Jyotirmoy and Ahmed, Johana (2018) "Skills-building programs to reduce child marriage in Bangladesh: A randomized controlled trial," *Journal of Adolescent Health*, 63(3):293-300.

Amin, Sajeda, M Niaz Asadullah, Sara Hossain and Zaki Wahhaj (2017), "Can Conditional Transfers Eradicate Child Marriage?", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 52, Issue No. 6.

Asadullah, M. Niaz & Z. Wahhaj. (2018). "Early Marriage, Social Networks and the Transmission of Norms," *Economica*, 31 August.

Auriol, E., G. Camilotti and J-P. Platteau (2017), "Eradicating Women-Hurting Customs: What Role for Social Engineering?", *CEPR Discussion Paper in Development Economics* DP12107.

Benabou, R. and J. Tirole (2012), "Laws and Norms", *IZA Discussion Paper* No. 6290.

Chari, A.V., R. Heath, A. Maertens, F. Fatima (2017). "The Causal Effect of Maternal Age at Marriage on Child Wellbeing: Evidence from India", *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 127, pp. 42-55.



Chen, D.L. and Yeh, S., 2014. "The construction of morals". *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, Vol. 104, pp.84-105.

Dube, L. (1997). *Women and Kinship: Comparative Perspectives on Gender in South and South-East Asia*. United Nations University Press Ltd. Tokyo.

Field, E. and A. Ambrus (2008). "Early Marriage, Age of Menarche and Female Schooling Attainment in Bangladesh", *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 116(5), pp. 881-930

Filmer, D. and Pritchett, L.H. (2001), "Estimating wealth effects without expenditure data—or tears: an application to educational enrollments in states of India", *Demography*, Vol. 38(1), pp. 115-132.

Gani, M.S. (2007). "Geographical and Socio-economic Differences and Determinants in Knowledge and Occurrence of Sexually Transmitted Infections of Adolescents in Bangladesh." Masters Thesis in Public Health, Umea University, Umea, Sweden.

Green, D.P., A. Wilke, A. and J. Cooper (2018), "Silence Begets Violence: A mass media experiment to prevent violence against women in rural Uganda", mimeo, Columbia University.

Mackie, G. (1996). "Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account". *American Sociological Review* Vol. 61 (6), pp. 999-1017.

Mackie, G. (2000). "Female Genital Cutting: the Beginning of the End". In B. Shell-Duncan and Y. Hernlund (Eds.), *Female Circumcision in Africa: Culture, Controversy, and Change*, pp. 253-282. London: Lynne Reiner Publishers.

Mackie, G. and J. LeJeune (2009). "Social Dynamics of Abandonment of Harmful Practices: a New Look at the Theory. Special Series on Social Norms and Harmful Practices", *Innocenti Working Paper*.

McAdams, R.H., 2000a. "A focal point theory of expressive law". *Virginia Law Review*, pp.1649-1729.

McAdams, R.H., 2000b. "An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law". *Oregon Law Review*, 79(2), pp. 339-390.

NIPORT (2016). *Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 2014 Final Report*. NIPORT, Mitra and Associates and ICF International. Dhaka, Bangladesh, and Rockville, Maryland, USA: NIPORT, Mitra and Associates, and ICF International.

Ortner, S.B. (1978). "The Virgin and the State", *Feminist Studies*, Vol. 4(3), pp. 19-35.

Pew Research Center (2016). "Many Countries Allow Child Marriage". *Pew Research Center Report*. Available at <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/12/many->

countries-allow-child-marriage/.

Platteau, J-P. and Z. Wahhaj (2014). "Strategic Interactions Between Modern Law and Custom". *Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture*, Vol. 2, pp. 633-678.

Sekhri, S. and Debnath, S. (2014): "Intergenerational Consequences of Early Age Marriages of Girls: Effect on Children's Human Capital," *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol 50, No 12, pp 1670-1686.

Sunstein, C.R. (1996). "On the expressive function of law". *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 144(5), 2021–2053.

UNFPA (2012). *Marrying Too Young: End Child Marriage*. United Nations Population Fund.

Wahhaj, Z. (2018). 'An Economic Model of Early Marriage', *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, Vol. 152, pp. 147-176.

Vogt, S., Zaid, N.A.M., Ahmed, H.E.F., Fehr, E. and Efferson, C. (2016). "Changing cultural attitudes towards female genital cutting". *Nature*, Vol. 538(7626).

## Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Female Respondents

---

	mean	sd	min	max	obs
Age	33.36	6.07	20.00	58.00	971
Male	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	971
Schooling	4.99	4.04	0.00	16.00	971
Married	0.94	0.24	0.00	1.00	971
Married before 18	0.65	0.48	0.00	1.00	971
Employed	0.15	0.35	0.00	1.00	971
2014 Norms Index 2	-0.00	1.00	-1.10	1.33	971
Father Schooling	3.02	4.06	0.00	16.00	971
Mother Schooling	1.42	2.53	0.00	15.00	971
Mother works	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00	971
Father low pay	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00	971
Half Acre Land	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00	971
Adol. girl 13-17	0.34	0.58	0.00	3.00	971
Knows min age	0.88	0.32	0.00	1.00	971
Knows punishment	0.81	0.39	0.00	1.00	971
Knows age exception	0.10	0.29	0.00	1.00	971
Learnt law after 2014	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00	971
Knows CM court case	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00	971

---

Source: 2018 CiMLAS

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Additional Respondents

	mean	sd	min	max	obs
Age	50.37	11.30	24.00	75.00	786
Male	0.62	0.48	0.00	1.00	786
Schooling	2.80	4.06	0.00	19.00	786
Married	0.87	0.34	0.00	1.00	786
Married before 18	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00	786
Employed	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00	786
2014 Norms Index 2	0.00	1.00	-1.08	1.35	786
Father Schooling	2.23	3.70	0.00	19.00	786
Mother Schooling	0.93	2.22	0.00	19.00	786
Mother works	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00	786
Father low pay	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00	786
Half Acre Land	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00	786
Adol. girl 13-17	0.06	0.28	0.00	2.00	786
Knows min age	0.83	0.38	0.00	1.00	786
Knows punishment	0.78	0.41	0.00	1.00	786
Knows age exception	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00	786
Learnt law after 2014	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00	786
Knows CM court case	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00	786

Source: 2018 CiMLAS

Table 3: Baseline Comparison: Control vs Treatment 1

	control	treatment #1	difference	p-value
Age	41.356	40.709	0.647	(0.358)
Male	0.292	0.282	0.010	(0.717)
Schooling	4.111	4.027	0.084	(0.737)
Married	0.904	0.906	-0.003	(0.874)
Married before 18	0.520	0.482	0.038	(0.190)
Employed	0.349	0.349	0.000	(0.995)
2014 Norms Index 2	0.006	-0.014	0.020	(0.738)
Father Schooling	2.682	2.622	0.060	(0.797)
Mother Schooling	1.237	1.246	-0.010	(0.945)
Mother works	0.093	0.074	0.019	(0.236)
Father low pay	0.225	0.243	-0.018	(0.476)
Half Acre Land	0.457	0.491	-0.034	(0.242)
Adol. girl 13-17	0.204	0.232	-0.028	(0.323)
Knows min age	0.847	0.872	-0.026	(0.209)
Knows punishment	0.794	0.813	-0.018	(0.427)
Knows age exception	0.093	0.074	0.019	(0.236)
Learnt law after 2014	0.178	0.196	-0.018	(0.425)
Knows CM court case	0.374	0.338	0.035	(0.207)

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: N = 613 for the control group and 556 for Treatment 1.

Table 4: Baseline Comparison: Control vs Treatment 2

	control	treatment #2	difference	p-value
Age	41.356	40.823	0.532	(0.456)
Male	0.292	0.264	0.028	(0.273)
Schooling	4.111	3.895	0.216	(0.367)
Married	0.904	0.912	-0.008	(0.641)
Married before 18	0.520	0.519	0.002	(0.953)
Employed	0.349	0.338	0.011	(0.698)
2014 Norms Index 2	0.006	0.008	-0.002	(0.972)
Father Schooling	2.682	2.699	-0.017	(0.939)
Mother Schooling	1.237	1.119	0.117	(0.393)
Mother works	0.093	0.071	0.022	(0.175)
Father low pay	0.225	0.231	-0.006	(0.799)
Half Acre Land	0.457	0.459	-0.002	(0.933)
Adol. girl 13-17	0.204	0.213	-0.009	(0.757)
Knows min age	0.847	0.855	-0.009	(0.669)
Knows punishment	0.794	0.791	0.004	(0.877)
Knows age exception	0.093	0.085	0.008	(0.629)
Learnt law after 2014	0.178	0.204	-0.026	(0.247)
Knows CM court case	0.374	0.355	0.018	(0.514)

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: N = 613 for the control group and 588 for Treatment 2.

Table 5: Description of Outcome Variables

Variable	Description
Approp. marriage age	Appropriate age of marriage for girls/women reported by respondent
Approp. marry b/f 18	= 1 if Approp. marriage age < 18, 0 otherwise
Approp. age gap	Appropriate age gap between husband and wife reported by respondent
Marriage Agency	= 1 if respondent believes the bride and groom should choose their own marriage partners, 0 otherwise
Vill. approp. marr. age	Respondent's belief about appropriate age of marriage for girls/women within his/her village
Vill. approp. marry b/f 18	= 1 if Vill approp. marr. age < 18, 0 otherwise
Marr a/f 18 bad	= 1 if respondent believes his/her village thinks worse of girls who marry above age 18, 0 otherwise
Traditional Norms Index	Alignment of respondent's views with traditional gender norms, composite index based on strong agreement only
Traditional Norms Index 2	Alignment of respondent's views with traditional gender norms, composite index based on strong or moderate agreement
Vignette A support	= 1 if respondent supports marriage postponement in Vignette A, 0 otherwise
Vignette A others support	= 1 if respondent believes other parents in village would support marriage postponement in Vignette A, 0 otherwise
VA oth. approve support	= 1 if respondent approves decision to postpone marriage in Vignette A
Vignette B support	= 1 if respondent supports marriage postponement in Vignette B, 0 otherwise
Vignette B others support	= 1 if respondent believes other parents in village would support marriage postponement in Vignette B, 0 otherwise
VB oth. approve support	= 1 if respondent approves decision to postpone marriage in Vignette B
Vignette C support	= 1 if respondent supports marriage postponement in Vignette C, 0 otherwise
Vignette C others support	= 1 if respondent believes other parents in village would support marriage postponement in Vignette C, 0 otherwise
VC oth. approve support	= 1 if respondent approves decision to postpone marriage in Vignette C
Make Contribution	= 1 if respondent make positive contribution to charity, 0 otherwise
Contribution Amount	Contribution amount in Bangladesh Taka

Table 6: Comparison of Outcomes: Control vs Treatment 1

	control	treatment #1	difference	p-value
Approp. marriage age	18.741	18.790	-0.049	(0.611)
Approp. marry b/f 18	0.039	0.031	0.009	(0.426)
Approp age gap	5.463	5.509	-0.046	(0.769)
Marriage Agency	0.217	0.210	0.007	(0.786)
Vill. approp. marr. age	17.305	17.315	-0.010	(0.937)
Vill. approp. marry b/f 18	0.361	0.390	-0.030	(0.294)
Marr a/f 18 bad	0.307	0.288	0.019	(0.480)
Vill expect marr b/f 18	0.457	0.428	0.029	(0.324)
Vill marr a/f 18 bad	0.496	0.484	0.012	(0.679)
Traditional Norms Index	-0.010	-0.049	0.038	(0.511)
Traditional Norms Index 2	0.035	-0.059	0.094	(0.110)
Vignette A support	0.912	0.915	-0.004	(0.829)
Vignette A others support	0.680	0.682	-0.001	(0.959)
VA oth. approve support	0.522	0.469	0.053	(0.073)
Vignette B support	0.620	0.581	0.039	(0.174)
Vignette B others support	0.315	0.313	0.002	(0.944)
VB oth. approve support	0.299	0.299	-0.000	(0.999)
Vignette C support	0.701	0.700	0.002	(0.946)
Vignette C others support	0.437	0.412	0.025	(0.382)
VC oth. approve support	0.335	0.313	0.022	(0.423)
Make Contribution	0.395	0.432	-0.037	(0.201)
Contribution Amount	24.189	30.072	-5.883	(0.058)

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: N = 613 for the control group and 556 for Treatment 1.



Table 7: Comparison of Outcomes: Control vs Treatment 2

	control	treatment #2	difference	p-value
Approp. marriage age	18.741	18.566	0.174	(0.061)
Approp. marry b/f 18	0.039	0.051	-0.012	(0.321)
Approp age gap	5.463	5.556	-0.093	(0.573)
Marriage Agency	0.217	0.194	0.023	(0.323)
Vill. approp. marr. age	17.305	17.378	-0.072	(0.518)
Vill. approp. marry b/f 18	0.361	0.347	0.014	(0.623)
Marr a/f 18 bad	0.307	0.321	-0.015	(0.583)
Vill expect marr b/f 18	0.457	0.437	0.020	(0.493)
Vill marr a/f 18 bad	0.496	0.449	0.047	(0.104)
Traditional Norms Index	-0.010	0.057	-0.067	(0.247)
Traditional Norms Index 2	0.035	0.020	0.015	(0.791)
Vignette A support	0.912	0.906	0.005	(0.743)
Vignette A others support	0.680	0.682	-0.002	(0.949)
VA oth. approve support	0.522	0.514	0.008	(0.771)
Vignette B support	0.620	0.541	0.079	(0.005)
Vignette B others support	0.315	0.315	0.000	(0.993)
VB oth. approve support	0.299	0.299	-0.001	(0.976)
Vignette C support	0.701	0.696	0.006	(0.824)
Vignette C others support	0.437	0.466	-0.029	(0.317)
VC oth. approve support	0.335	0.318	0.017	(0.532)
Make Contribution	0.395	0.403	-0.008	(0.770)
Contribution Amount	24.189	22.143	2.046	(0.449)

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: N = 613 for the control group and 588 for Treatment 2.

Table 8: Comparison of Outcomes: Treatment 1 vs Treatment 2

	treatment #1	treatment #2	difference	p-value
Approp. marriage age	18.790	18.566	0.223	(0.019)
Approp. marry b/f 18	0.031	0.051	-0.020	(0.082)
Approp age gap	5.509	5.556	-0.047	(0.793)
Marriage Agency	0.210	0.194	0.017	(0.486)
Vill. approp. marr. age	17.315	17.378	-0.063	(0.615)
Vill. approp. marry b/f 18	0.390	0.347	0.043	(0.129)
Marr a/f 18 bad	0.288	0.321	-0.034	(0.217)
Vill expect marr b/f 18	0.428	0.437	-0.009	(0.759)
Vill marr a/f 18 bad	0.484	0.449	0.035	(0.238)
Traditional Norms Index	-0.049	0.057	-0.105	(0.076)
Traditional Norms Index 2	-0.059	0.020	-0.079	(0.181)
Vignette A support	0.915	0.906	0.009	(0.594)
Vignette A others support	0.682	0.682	-0.000	(0.991)
VA oth. approve support	0.469	0.514	-0.044	(0.135)
Vignette B support	0.581	0.541	0.040	(0.172)
Vignette B others support	0.313	0.315	-0.002	(0.951)
VB oth. approve support	0.299	0.299	-0.001	(0.978)
Vignette C support	0.700	0.696	0.004	(0.881)
Vignette C others support	0.412	0.466	-0.054	(0.065)
VC oth. approve support	0.313	0.318	-0.005	(0.854)
Make Contribution	0.432	0.403	0.029	(0.327)
Contribution Amount	30.072	22.143	7.929	(0.008)

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: N = 556 for Treatment 1 and 588 for Treatment 2.

Table 9: Attitudes towards Early Marriage

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Appr marr age	Marr b/f 18 appr	Marriage Agency
treatment 1	0.012 (0.103)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.024)
treatment 2	-0.226** (0.100)	0.009 (0.012)	-0.040* (0.024)
Observations	1757	1757	1757
p-value	0.021	0.152	0.109

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01  
p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.

Table 10: Beliefs about Community Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Vill. approp. marr. age	Vill expect marr b/f 18	Vill marr a/f 18 bad
treatment 1	0.024 (0.117)	-0.018 (0.029)	-0.015 (0.029)
treatment 2	0.131 (0.109)	-0.033 (0.028)	-0.061** (0.028)
Observations	1757	1757	1757
p-value	0.360	0.598	0.109

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01  
p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.

Table 11: Traditional Gender Norms

	(1) Traditional Norms Index	(2) Traditional Norms Index 2
treatment 1	-0.061 (0.059)	-0.098* (0.059)
treatment 2	0.018 (0.058)	-0.037 (0.058)
Observations	1757	1757
p-value	0.187	0.304

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.

Table 12: Vignette A

	(1) Vignette A support	(2) Vignette A others support	(3) VA oth. approve support
treatment 1	0.013 (0.017)	-0.022 (0.028)	-0.056* (0.030)
treatment 2	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.030)
Observations	1757	1757	1757
p-value	0.320	0.709	0.100

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.

Table 13: Vignette B

	(1) Vignette B support	(2) Vignette B others support	(3) VB oth. approve support
treatment 1	-0.038 (0.029)	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.028)
treatment 2	-0.063** (0.029)	0.002 (0.027)	-0.002 (0.027)
Observations	1757	1757	1757
p-value	0.400	0.620	0.852

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.

Table 14: Vignette C

	(1) Vignette C support	(2) Vignette C others support	(3) VC oth. approve support
treatment 1	0.013 (0.028)	-0.023 (0.030)	-0.024 (0.028)
treatment 2	0.012 (0.028)	0.021 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.028)
Observations	1757	1757	1756
p-value	0.955	0.151	0.775

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.

Table 15: Financial Contribution

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Make Contribution	Contribution Amount	Log of Contribution Amount
treatment 1	0.017 (0.028)	5.851* (3.157)	0.145* (0.083)
treatment 2	-0.018 (0.027)	-1.191 (2.668)	-0.076 (0.082)
Observations	1757	1757	719
p-value	0.212	0.017	0.008

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.

Table 16: Attitudes towards Early Marriage

	(1) Appr marr age	(2) Marr b/f 18 appr	(3) Marriage Agency
treatment 1	0.027 (0.102)	-0.007 (0.011)	0.005 (0.024)
treatment 2	-0.202** (0.099)	0.008 (0.012)	-0.034 (0.024)
Age	0.003 (0.004)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Male	0.083 (0.107)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.025)
Married before 18	-0.118 (0.085)	0.003 (0.011)	0.039* (0.022)
Primary Educ.	0.162* (0.088)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.106*** (0.023)
Mother primary	0.419*** (0.132)	-0.028*** (0.010)	0.030 (0.030)
Half Acre Land	-0.152* (0.079)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.026 (0.020)
Adol. girl 13-17	0.040 (0.072)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.039** (0.019)
Knows min age	-0.271** (0.129)	-0.055*** (0.020)	0.028 (0.027)
Knows punishment	0.412*** (0.108)	-0.034** (0.016)	0.025 (0.025)
Knows age exception	-0.209 (0.134)	0.001 (0.012)	-0.075* (0.039)
Learnt law after 2014	0.000 (0.098)	0.004 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.024)
Knows CM court case	0.098 (0.092)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.007 (0.022)
Observations	1757	1757	1757
p-value	0.025	0.189	0.104

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.

Table 17: Beliefs about Community Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Vill. approp. marr. age	Vill expect marr b/f 18	Vill marr a/f 18 bad
treatment 1	0.012 (0.117)	-0.017 (0.028)	-0.010 (0.029)
treatment 2	0.126 (0.109)	-0.032 (0.027)	-0.060** (0.028)
Age	0.002 (0.004)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Male	0.079 (0.117)	0.067** (0.031)	0.028 (0.031)
Married before 18	-0.298*** (0.097)	0.047* (0.026)	0.018 (0.026)
Primary Educ.	0.009 (0.103)	-0.047* (0.027)	-0.033 (0.027)
Mother primary	0.066 (0.137)	-0.021 (0.032)	-0.026 (0.033)
Half Acre Land	-0.010 (0.095)	0.027 (0.024)	-0.031 (0.024)
Adol. girl 13-17	-0.072 (0.090)	-0.027 (0.023)	-0.036 (0.025)
Knows min age	-0.018 (0.158)	0.028 (0.036)	-0.036 (0.039)
Knows punishment	-0.086 (0.128)	0.018 (0.031)	0.015 (0.032)
Knows age exception	-0.449** (0.176)	-0.028 (0.042)	0.080* (0.044)
Learnt law after 2014	0.081 (0.130)	0.026 (0.030)	0.070** (0.031)
Knows CM court case	-0.072 (0.109)	0.006 (0.026)	0.035 (0.027)
Observations	1757	1757	1757
p-value	0.327	0.580	0.077

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.



Table 18: Traditional Gender Norms

	(1) Traditional Norms Index	(2) Traditional Norms Index 2
treatment 1	-0.070 (0.059)	-0.114* (0.059)
treatment 2	0.007 (0.058)	-0.053 (0.057)
Age	0.004* (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Male	-0.033 (0.063)	0.011 (0.062)
Married before 18	-0.029 (0.052)	-0.009 (0.052)
Primary Educ.	-0.224*** (0.055)	-0.280*** (0.056)
Mother primary	-0.085 (0.068)	-0.179** (0.070)
Half Acre Land	-0.055 (0.049)	0.015 (0.050)
Adol. girl 13-17	-0.072 (0.050)	-0.007 (0.050)
Knows min age	0.056 (0.073)	0.023 (0.074)
Knows punishment	0.082 (0.065)	0.082 (0.065)
Knows age exception	-0.261*** (0.092)	-0.011 (0.094)
Learnt law after 2014	-0.004 (0.061)	0.004 (0.062)
Knows CM court case	-0.060 (0.053)	-0.126** (0.054)
Observations	1757	1757
p-value	0.193	0.294

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.

Table 19: Vignette A

	(1) Vignette A support	(2) Vignette A others support	(3) VA oth. approve support
treatment 1	0.013 (0.017)	-0.025 (0.028)	-0.060** (0.030)
treatment 2	-0.002 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.027)	-0.009 (0.030)
Age	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Male	0.037* (0.020)	0.050* (0.029)	-0.002 (0.032)
Married before 18	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.052** (0.025)	-0.050* (0.027)
Primary Educ.	0.036** (0.016)	-0.014 (0.026)	-0.029 (0.028)
Mother primary	0.019 (0.017)	0.021 (0.032)	0.033 (0.034)
Half Acre Land	0.008 (0.014)	0.053** (0.023)	0.024 (0.025)
Adol. girl 13-17	0.006 (0.015)	-0.013 (0.024)	0.002 (0.025)
Knows min age	0.036 (0.025)	0.034 (0.034)	0.061 (0.038)
Knows punishment	0.050** (0.021)	-0.015 (0.029)	-0.032 (0.032)
Knows age exception	-0.001 (0.022)	-0.053 (0.044)	-0.061 (0.046)
Learnt law after 2014	-0.003 (0.018)	0.048* (0.029)	-0.007 (0.031)
Knows CM court case	0.025* (0.015)	0.032 (0.026)	0.027 (0.027)
Observations	1757	1757	1757
p-value	0.387	0.656	0.089

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.

Table 20: Vignette B

	(1) Vignette B support	(2) Vignette B others support	(3) VB oth. approve support
treatment 1	-0.035 (0.029)	-0.013 (0.027)	-0.012 (0.028)
treatment 2	-0.060** (0.029)	0.002 (0.028)	-0.007 (0.027)
Age	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Male	0.033 (0.032)	0.048 (0.030)	-0.010 (0.030)
Married before 18	-0.038 (0.027)	-0.035 (0.025)	-0.067*** (0.025)
Primary Educ.	0.035 (0.028)	0.011 (0.026)	0.006 (0.026)
Mother primary	0.053 (0.035)	0.014 (0.033)	0.054* (0.033)
Half Acre Land	-0.040 (0.025)	-0.002 (0.023)	0.029 (0.024)
Adol. girl 13-17	-0.027 (0.025)	0.011 (0.023)	-0.005 (0.022)
Knows min age	0.078** (0.039)	-0.002 (0.035)	0.010 (0.035)
Knows punishment	0.007 (0.033)	0.021 (0.031)	-0.007 (0.031)
Knows age exception	0.048 (0.043)	-0.085** (0.041)	-0.125*** (0.042)
Learnt law after 2014	0.031 (0.031)	0.064** (0.030)	0.104*** (0.031)
Knows CM court case	0.007 (0.027)	0.049* (0.026)	0.009 (0.025)
Observations	1757	1757	1757
p-value	0.400	0.589	0.836

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.

Table 21: Vignette C

	(1) Vignette C support	(2) Vignette C others support	(3) VC oth. approve support
treatment 1	0.012 (0.028)	-0.029 (0.030)	-0.034 (0.028)
treatment 2	0.016 (0.027)	0.018 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.028)
Age	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Male	0.021 (0.031)	0.009 (0.032)	0.048 (0.031)
Married before 18	-0.090*** (0.025)	-0.076*** (0.027)	-0.076*** (0.025)
Primary Educ.	0.066** (0.026)	0.001 (0.028)	-0.025 (0.026)
Mother primary	0.023 (0.031)	-0.018 (0.036)	0.003 (0.033)
Half Acre Land	-0.041* (0.023)	-0.017 (0.025)	0.020 (0.024)
Adol. girl 13-17	0.048** (0.021)	0.034 (0.025)	0.072*** (0.024)
Knows min age	0.039 (0.037)	0.064 (0.039)	0.065* (0.035)
Knows punishment	0.071** (0.032)	-0.011 (0.033)	-0.004 (0.031)
Knows age exception	-0.021 (0.038)	-0.187*** (0.043)	-0.164*** (0.040)
Learnt law after 2014	-0.033 (0.029)	0.004 (0.031)	0.027 (0.030)
Knows CM court case	0.043* (0.025)	0.038 (0.028)	0.031 (0.026)
Observations	1757	1757	1756
p-value	0.888	0.119	0.625

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.

Table 22: Financial Contribution

	(1) Make Contribution	(2) Contribution Amount	(3) Log of Contribution Amount
treatment 1	0.023 (0.028)	6.328** (3.136)	0.161* (0.083)
treatment 2	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.435 (2.645)	-0.070 (0.082)
Age	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.019 (0.106)	-0.002 (0.003)
Male	-0.017 (0.030)	0.986 (3.135)	0.119 (0.085)
Married before 18	-0.018 (0.025)	-2.388 (2.695)	-0.084 (0.071)
Primary Educ.	0.056** (0.026)	7.204*** (2.570)	0.147* (0.078)
Mother primary	0.055* (0.032)	13.998*** (4.045)	0.165* (0.095)
Half Acre Land	-0.018 (0.023)	1.503 (2.434)	0.032 (0.068)
Adol. girl 13-17	-0.047** (0.023)	-3.071 (2.487)	-0.030 (0.075)
Knows min age	0.073** (0.036)	6.138* (3.325)	0.151 (0.117)
Knows punishment	0.034 (0.030)	0.343 (3.115)	-0.107 (0.106)
Knows age exception	0.096** (0.042)	0.937 (3.991)	-0.099 (0.111)
Learnt law after 2014	-0.069** (0.028)	-5.748* (2.944)	-0.034 (0.100)
Knows CM court case	-0.022 (0.025)	-1.456 (2.527)	-0.123 (0.075)
Observations	1757	1757	719
p-value	0.222	0.021	0.006

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

p-value reports a Wald test for a difference in coefficients between T1 and T2.

Table 23: Attitudes towards Early Marriage (Male Interaction)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Appr marr age	Marr b/f 18 appr	Marriage Agency
treatment 1	0.123 (0.111)	-0.018 (0.013)	0.009 (0.029)
treatment 2	-0.113 (0.112)	0.010 (0.015)	-0.032 (0.028)
Male	0.387** (0.154)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.035)
treatment 1 × Male	-0.388* (0.228)	0.036 (0.025)	-0.037 (0.050)
treatment 2 × Male	-0.393* (0.213)	-0.006 (0.026)	-0.032 (0.050)
Constant	18.658*** (0.077)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.224*** (0.020)
Observations	1757	1757	1757
T1 = 0 (inter)	0.202	0.424	0.507
T2 = 0 (inter)	0.008	0.838	0.136
T1 = T2 (base)	0.038	0.032	0.149
T1 = T2 (inter)	0.235	0.564	0.412

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Bottom rows report p-values from corresponding Wald tests.

Table 24: Beliefs about Community Attitudes (Male Interaction)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Vill. approp. marr. age	Vill expect marr b/f 18	Vill marr a/f 18 bad
treatment 1	0.094 (0.136)	-0.026 (0.033)	0.003 (0.034)
treatment 2	0.137 (0.123)	-0.048 (0.032)	-0.073** (0.033)
Male	0.342** (0.163)	0.069* (0.042)	0.070 (0.043)
treatment 1 × Male	-0.245 (0.243)	0.032 (0.061)	-0.062 (0.061)
treatment 2 × Male	0.014 (0.232)	0.067 (0.059)	0.053 (0.062)
Constant	17.182*** (0.087)	0.437*** (0.023)	0.481*** (0.023)
Observations	1757	1757	1757
T1 = 0 (inter)	0.472	0.910	0.260
T2 = 0 (inter)	0.461	0.710	0.702
T1 = T2 (base)	0.753	0.495	0.024
T1 = T2 (inter)	0.158	0.807	0.463

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Bottom rows report p-values from corresponding Wald tests.

Table 25: Vignette A (Male Interaction)

	(1) Vignette A support	(2) Vignette A others support	(3) VA oth. approve support
treatment 1	0.015 (0.020)	-0.038 (0.033)	-0.042 (0.035)
treatment 2	0.001 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.032)	-0.007 (0.034)
Male	0.022 (0.024)	0.056 (0.038)	0.024 (0.043)
treatment 1 × Male	-0.008 (0.035)	0.059 (0.055)	-0.049 (0.063)
treatment 2 × Male	-0.019 (0.036)	-0.002 (0.057)	0.002 (0.062)
Constant	0.902*** (0.014)	0.676*** (0.022)	0.516*** (0.024)
Observations	1757	1757	1757
T1 = 0 (inter)	0.816	0.644	0.091
T2 = 0 (inter)	0.559	0.822	0.927
T1 = T2 (base)	0.485	0.391	0.301
T1 = T2 (inter)	0.438	0.515	0.121

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Bottom rows report p-values from corresponding Wald tests.



Table 26: Vignette B (Male Interaction)

	(1) Vignette B support	(2) Vignette B others support	(3) VB oth. approve support
treatment 1	-0.023 (0.034)	-0.020 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.032)
treatment 2	-0.029 (0.034)	-0.002 (0.031)	0.008 (0.031)
Male	0.107*** (0.041)	0.045 (0.041)	0.048 (0.041)
treatment 1 × Male	-0.051 (0.061)	0.033 (0.060)	-0.011 (0.060)
treatment 2 × Male	-0.121** (0.061)	0.020 (0.060)	-0.034 (0.058)
Constant	0.583*** (0.024)	0.304*** (0.022)	0.288*** (0.022)
Observations	1757	1757	1757
T1 = 0 (inter)	0.154	0.802	0.771
T2 = 0 (inter)	0.004	0.728	0.599
T1 = T2 (base)	0.866	0.552	0.708
T1 = T2 (inter)	0.178	0.921	0.829

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Bottom rows report p-values from corresponding Wald tests.

Table 27: Vignette C (Male Interaction)

	(1) Vignette C support	(2) Vignette C others support	(3) VC oth. approve support
treatment 1	-0.002 (0.033)	-0.022 (0.035)	-0.017 (0.033)
treatment 2	-0.004 (0.032)	0.018 (0.035)	-0.024 (0.032)
Male	-0.015 (0.041)	0.022 (0.044)	0.054 (0.042)
treatment 1 × Male	0.055 (0.060)	-0.004 (0.064)	-0.024 (0.060)
treatment 2 × Male	0.059 (0.059)	0.012 (0.064)	0.035 (0.061)
Constant	0.695*** (0.022)	0.433*** (0.024)	0.320*** (0.023)
Observations	1757	1757	1756
T1 = 0 (inter)	0.311	0.634	0.431
T2 = 0 (inter)	0.288	0.578	0.838
T1 = T2 (base)	0.951	0.258	0.841
T1 = T2 (inter)	0.967	0.321	0.337

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Bottom rows report p-values from corresponding Wald tests.

Table 28: Traditional Norms (Male Interaction)

	(1)	(2)
	Traditional Norms Index	Traditional Norms Index 2
treatment 1	-0.047 (0.069)	-0.078 (0.070)
treatment 2	0.009 (0.068)	-0.060 (0.068)
Male	0.090 (0.085)	0.090 (0.083)
treatment 1 × Male	-0.047 (0.125)	-0.068 (0.123)
treatment 2 × Male	0.044 (0.123)	0.100 (0.119)
Constant	-0.013 (0.047)	0.017 (0.048)
Observations	1757	1757
T1 = 0 (inter)	0.377	0.160
T2 = 0 (inter)	0.619	0.693
T1 = T2 (base)	0.419	0.797
T1 = T2 (inter)	0.179	0.079

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Bottom rows report p-values from corresponding Wald tests.

Table 29: Financial Contributions (Male Interaction)

	(1) Make Contribution	(2) Contribution Amount	(3) Log of Contribution Amount
treatment 1	0.010 (0.033)	3.606 (3.695)	0.058 (0.092)
treatment 2	-0.028 (0.031)	-3.733 (3.177)	-0.153 (0.094)
Male	-0.030 (0.040)	-4.684 (3.854)	-0.129 (0.120)
treatment 1 × Male	0.022 (0.059)	7.958 (6.369)	0.339* (0.177)
treatment 2 × Male	0.033 (0.059)	9.290* (5.437)	0.309* (0.171)
Constant	0.418*** (0.022)	25.252*** (2.344)	3.674*** (0.064)
Observations	1757	1757	719
T1 = 0 (inter)	0.516	0.034	0.012
T2 = 0 (inter)	0.909	0.224	0.295
T1 = T2 (base)	0.238	0.034	0.024
T1 = T2 (inter)	0.610	0.270	0.121

Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Bottom rows report p-values from corresponding Wald tests.

# Appendix: Vignettes

## Introduction to Vignettes

Next I will tell you several stories about people living in villages similar to this one. I would like you to listen to the stories carefully and answer the questions that follow each one. Some of the questions will ask you to agree or disagree with a statement.

### Vignette A

Jesmin is a 14 year-old girl attending grade 9 in secondary school. She lives with her mother, father, and two older brothers. Two months ago, her parents received a marriage proposal for Jesmin. The groom is a 32 year-old man from a neighbouring village. Jesmin told her parents that she would like to finish her schooling before getting married, but her uncles are pressuring her to accept the marriage offer immediately.

52

SL	Questions	Answer	Answer code
VA_01	What would you do if you were Jesmin's parent?	<input type="text"/>	support your daughter's decision to delay marriage..... 1 seek more information about the groom,with the goal of arranging the marriage ..... 2
VA_02	What do you think most other parents in this village would do if they were in this situation?	<input type="text"/>	support their daughter's decision to delay marriage ..... 1 seek more information about the groom,with the goal of arranging the marriage ..... 2
VA_03	What do you think most other parents would advise Jesmin's parents to do regarding their daughter's request to postpone marriage?	<input type="text"/>	support their daughter's request ..... 1 seek more information about the groom,with the goal of arranging the marriage ..... 2

Let's return to the story. Imagine that Jesmin's parents listen to her and refuse the marriage proposal so that Jesmin can finish school before marrying.

SL	Questions	strongly approve	somewhat approve	somewhat disapprove	strongly disapprove	Response Code
VB_04	To what extent would you approve or disapprove of Rokeya's mother's decision?	1	2	3	4	<input type="text"/>
VB_05	To what extent do you think the neighbours and extended family would approve or disapprove of Rokeya's mother's decision?	1	2	3	4	<input type="text"/>

### Vignette B

Rokeya, aged 15, is the eldest of three sisters. She is enrolled in class 10 in secondary school and lives in a village like this with her mother. Her father passed away a year ago. One day her paternal uncles speak to her mother about an offer of marriage from a young BCS officer. Rokeya firmly announces that she is not interested in marrying any time soon.

SL	Questions	Answer	Answer code
VB_01	What would you do if you were Rokeya's mother?	<input type="text"/>	Support your daughter's desire to delay marriage ..... 1 Request Rokeya's uncles to seek more information about the prospective groom, with the goal of arranging the marriage ..... 2
VB_02	What do you think most other mothers in this village would do in this situation?	<input type="text"/>	Support their daughter's desire to delay marriage ..... 1 Request Rokeya's uncles to seek more information about the prospective groom, with the goal of arranging the marriage ..... 2
VB_03	What do you think most other parents in this village would advise Rokeya's mother to do regarding her daughter's refusal to the proposal?	<input type="text"/>	Support her daughter's desire to delay marriage ..... 1 Request Rokeya's uncles to seek more information about the prospective groom, with the goal of arranging the marriage ..... 2

Let's return to the story. Imagine that Rokeya's mother listens to her daughter and supports her desire to delay the marriage.

SL	Questions	strongly approve	somewhat approve	somewhat disapprove	strongly disapprove	Response Code
VB_04	To what extent would you approve or disapprove of Rokeya's mother's decision?	1	2	3	4	<input type="text"/>
VB_05	To what extent do you think the neighbours and extended family would approve or disapprove of Rokeya's mother's decision?	1	2	3	4	<input type="text"/>

Vignette C

Rita is a 16 year-old girl attending grade 10 in secondary school. Her mother works in the local primary school, and her father owns a small dry goods store. One day Rita’s parents hear from a neighbour that Rita has been spending a lot of time with a local boy from her school, and that certain people in the village are gossiping about this. When asked, Rita admits to a secret engagement with the boy but she wants to finish school before she is married.

SL	Questions	Answer	Answer code
VC_01	What would you do if you were Rita’s parents?	<input type="text"/>	Act quickly to arrange the marriage..... 1 Avoid your daughter’s marriage till she is older..... 2
VC_02	What do you think most other parents would do in your village?	<input type="text"/>	Act quickly to arrange the marriage..... 1 Avoid their daughter’s marriage till she is older ..... 2
VC_03	What would most other parents advise Rita’s parents to do regarding their daughter’s situation?	<input type="text"/>	Act quickly to arrange the marriage..... 1 Avoid their daughter’s marriage till she is older ..... 2

54

Let’s return to the story. Imagine that Rita’s parents accept Rita’s decision to postpone her marriage till she has finished school.

SL	Questions	strongly approve	somewhat approve	somewhat disapprove	strongly disapprove	Response Code
VC_04	To what extent would you approve or disapprove of Rita’s parents’ decision?	1	2	3	4	<input type="text"/>
VC_05	To what extent do you think the neighbours and extended family would approve or disapprove of Rita’s parents’ decision?	1	2	3	4	<input type="text"/>