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RESTORING POLICE/COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN UGANDA

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October 2020

Oxford Policy Management

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Restoring Police/Community Relations in Uganda

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October 22, 2020

Reducing crime and improving personal and communal security are crucial policy goals. The task of achieving these goals naturally falls first and foremost on a country's police force. There is a widespread consensus that police forces are most effective in preventing and solving crime when they establish close, cooperative, and mutually respectful relationships with citizens. Against a backdrop of general distrust of the police, especially in areas plagued by crime, community oriented policing (COP) has been touted as a key reform to build trust and increase collaboration between officers and citizens. There is a growing body of evidence from consolidated industrial democracies that COP works. By contrast, the effectiveness of COP in low-income countries—especially those ruled by authoritarian or electoral authoritarian regimes—is an open question with important theoretical and policy implications.

Uganda offers an important test case for the effectiveness of community policing in a low-income country setting. On one hand, community policing has been formally adopted as a guiding principal by both the country's political leadership and the Uganda Police Force (UPF), even though prior to our study, the implementation of a grassroots COP model had been uneven and haphazard. As is the case with any politically sensitive reform, leadership buy-in is indispensable for success. On the other hand, as in virtually all authoritarian and electoral authoritarian regimes, the UPF lacks independence from political influence, and the ruling party has not been shy about misusing UPF's coercive capability to advance its partisan goals. In addition, UPF officers have

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been documented engaging in routine acts of malfeasance and petty corruption. Unsurprisingly, trust in the police is low, and UPF is consistently described as the most corrupt public institution in the country (Kewaza 2016).[1]

Uganda is also an instructive setting for evaluating a community policing program due to the country's similarities with many other low-income countries. Uganda is in the mid-range of the World Bank's ranking of low-income countries in terms of economic development (as captured by GDP per capita) and human development (as captured by HDI). In addition, electoral authoritarian regimes like the one in Uganda are common in low-income countries around the world, and are the modal regime type in sub-Saharan Africa. These parallels suggest that lessons learned in Uganda may be applicable to other African countries, and potentially to other low-income countries more generally.[2] Moreover, while baseline levels of trust in UPF leave much room for improvement, they are close to the average among African countries, as Figure 1 shows, and they are not so low as to make COP futile.

In this chapter, we report results from an experimental evaluation of a low-cost, scalable COP program designed by the UPF in collaboration with the Youth Integrated Development Organization (YIDO), a civil society group with many years of experience training Ugandan police officers. The program was inspired in part by Uganda's earlier attempts at community policing, described in the next section. YIDO trained UPF officers in sampled police stations in 13 districts spanning four regions of the country (north, central, east, and west). These officers then conducted recurring town hall meetings and sporadic foot patrols in randomly selected treatment communities over a period of more than a year. We evaluate the impact of the program using a combination of survey, behavioral, and administrative data.

Disappointingly, we find that the COP program in Uganda had little to no effect on most of

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[1] See 2008, 2012, and 2015 Afrobarometer surveys.

[2] We note, however, that at least in 2014 (the last year with comparable data), the size of Uganda's police force, 122 police personnel per 100,000 residents, was somewhat lower than the average among African countries (209 per 100,000). Data on comparative crime rates in sub-Saharan Africa are spotty and unreliable, but according to UNODC, the homicide rate in Uganda (11.2 per 100,000 residents) is somewhat above the mean in Africa, while serious assaults (14 per 100k) are below the mean rates in Africa. See https://dataunodc.un.org/crime for police personnel and global crime data.

Trust in the police across Africa

Figure 1: Trust in the police across Africa. Nationally representative samples in 34 African countries were asked *How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?* Responses were recoded on a four point scale: 0 "Not at all"; 1 "Just a little"; 2 "Somewhat"; and 3 "A lot." See AfroBaromter (merged) round 7.

the outcomes we measured. Most notably, our results suggest that the program did not reduce the prevalence of crime, nor did it improve citizens' perceptions of personal safety or their assessments of the UPF's intentions, capacity, or responsiveness. We do find, however, that the COP program increased the frequency of interactions between civilians and the police, both in the context of the program itself and (more suggestively) as a result of more frequent crime reporting. The program also improved Ugandans' understanding of the criminal justice system. This may help explain the

increase in crime reporting, since misunderstandings of criminal law arguably discourage victims and witnesses from reporting cases to the police.

Finally, and contrary to our expectations, we find some suggestive evidence of a modest increase in the incidence of "unofficial payments" made to UPF officers. 9.8% of respondents in treatment villages reported having made an informal payment to UPF officers in the last six months, compared to 7.3% of respondents in control villages. This raises the possibility that Uganda's COP program had the adverse unintended consequence of exacerbating petty corruption. We also note, however, that the statistical significance of this result does not survive a multiple comparisons correction, and that it may be an artifact of a more benign (perhaps even beneficial) improvement in citizens' understanding of what does and does not constitute an unofficial payment under Ugandan law.

The study's (mostly) null results run counter to our (publicly pre-registered) hypotheses, and any attempt to explain them is inevitably *post-hoc*. With this caveat in mind, we note that the the program suffered from low levels of treatment compliance, compounded by frequent turnover, inadequate top-down supervision, and, relatedly, the absence of incentives for rank-and-file police officers to participate more actively in the program. While we cannot be sure, we speculate that these problems may help explain the program's generally underwhelming results.

1   CRIME AND POLICING IN UGANDA

1.1   CRIME IN UGANDA

According to UPF's 2018 Annual Crime Report, the most common crime in Uganda in the year we launched our study was theft (61,533 reported cases), followed by assault (36,323 cases), sex-related crimes (17,521 cases), economic crimes (15,099 cases)—including public and private sector fraud and other white collar crimes—and child-related crimes (11,589 cases), especially child neglect. Aggregating across all categories, the crime rate in Uganda (59 reported crimes per 100,000 inhabitants) is similar to Tanzania (59) and Kenya (62), and significantly lower than South

Africa (77).[3] Importantly, per capita reported crime rates are higher in urban than rural Uganda: while the total number of reported crimes in 2018 was evenly distributed between urban and rural areas, about 75% of Ugandans live in rural areas.

The distribution of crime by category in the 288 villages in our sample is similar to the distribution nationwide. At baseline, we asked our survey respondents if they or any member of their household had been a victim of a crime in the past six months. By far the most common crime was theft and burglary (19.6% of respondents), followed by child neglect (11.4%), assault (7.8%), and armed robbery (1.8%). We also asked respondents about crimes that they may have witnessed or heard about elsewhere in the village. A majority of respondents (65.1%) had witnessed or heard about at least one crime in the village in the past six months, and in all 288 villages there was at least one respondent who had witnessed or heard about at least one crime in the past six months, with an average of 4.1 reports per village.

1.2 POLICE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

UPF is a centralized, hierarchical police force under the leadership of the Inspector General of the Police (IGP). The IGP is a cabinet-level position, handpicked by (and loyal to) the president. Community policing falls under the Directorate of Political Commissariat, one of 18 Directorates that report directly to the IGP and are headed by Assistant IGPs (AIGPs) who are also political loyalists. During the study's inception phase, Uganda's IGP was Kale Kayihura, who fought alongside Museveni during the 1980s Bush War. In March 2018, IGP Kayihura was replaced by Martin Okoth Ochola in an unexpected reshuffle. Unfortunately for our study, the new IGP showed little interest in programs he inherited from his predecessor.

Outside Kampala, the capital, where UPF headquarters is located, the force is divided into regional and district units. UPF's 27 regions do not map onto either political or administrative units. Regions are further subdivided into districts, which coincide with the highest-level political unit within Uganda's decentralized government system. Each district has a central police sta-

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[3]For global crime rate statistics, see https://bit.ly/3eCIc8X.

	Police Stations ($N = 31$)			Police Posts ($N = 41$)		
	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
Number of officers	5.5	2	26	3.3	2	13
Number of motor cycles	1.1	0	2	0.5	0	1
Receive monthly fuel allowance	10%	-	-	0%	-	-
Crime registration book available	55%	-	-	29%	-	-
Station diary in good condition	90%	-	-	78%	-	-

Table 1: Resources available at police stations and posts in study sample

tion that provides supervision and enhanced capacity to sub-district police stations and posts (i.e. beats). While beat-level officers can investigate misdemeanors, only stations have the personnel and expertise to investigate more serious felonies such as rape, assault, armed robbery, and murder.

With the country's per-capita GDP hovering around USD 700, Uganda's police force operates under tight resource constraints. As one indicator of these constraints, at the start of our study UPF's Kampala headquarters did not posses updated information on the exact location or number of personnel assigned to police stations and posts around the country. To fill this gap, in summer of 2017 the research team dispatched enumerators to collect detailed information on each police unit in the study area. This included geocoded information on the location of police stations and posts, as well as information on stations' personnel and jurisdiction area.

This exercise revealed that in our study area, the average Ugandan police station supervises 1.3 posts (with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 8), and covers about 39 villages (with a standard deviation of 25). The average number of officers deployed to stations and posts is 5 and 3, respectively. Only 10% of police stations in our sample receive a monthly fuel allowance. None of the police posts do. The average police station in our sample has just 1 motorbike. The average police post has 0.5. Only about one-half of all police stations and one-third of all police posts in our sample have a book where they register crimes in a systematic way (though most have a "station diary").

1.3   POLICE–COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN UGANDA

Police–community relations in Uganda have long been strained by political bias and excessive use of force against civilians. While Uganda holds periodic elections, their credibility has deteriorated over time.[4]   Since 1986, the country has been ruled by the same party (the National Resistance Movement, or NRM) and president (Yoweri Museveni).   And while the NRM ruling party undoubtedly enjoys pockets of popular support, to retain power it resorts to manipulation of state resources, intimidation by security forces, and politicized prosecutions of opposition leaders.

The UPF thus serves a dual purpose (Curtice and Berhlendorf 2020).   On the one hand, like any police force, UPF is responsible for protecting the life and property of Ugandan citizens, and for maintaining security and enforcing the laws (*The Police Act* 1994, Article 4).   On the other hand, UPF has also been made responsible for quelling dissent and unrest, and intimidating the political opposition—especially during election periods—in the service of Museveni and the ruling NRM party (Kagoro 2015).[5]   Indeed, international human rights watchdog groups have documented numerous cases of police abuse, including arbitrary arrests and attacks on non-violent public demonstrations, especially targeting opposition parties and their supporters.[6]   UPF also engages in more routine acts of malfeasance. In our baseline survey, 57% of respondents agreed with the statement that the police are corrupt and are primarily interested in pursuing their "personal interests" rather than serving their communities.

1.4   HISTORY OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN UGANDA

Against this backdrop of strained police–community relations, community policing was first introduced in Uganda in 1989, with the Kampala Police Station designated as a pilot site.   The UPF ostensibly expanded community policing throughout the country in 1993, but did not intro-

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[4]In 2019, Freedom House dropped Uganda's status from *Partly Free* to *Not Free*. See Freedom House's 2019 country report available at https://bit.ly/3fzCnu3.

[5]UPF, now formally subjected to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was created in 1906 by the British Colonial State. Many of the traits of the "Uganda Police Constabulary," in particular oppressive and reactive policing strategies, continue to manifest in the post-colonial era (Mohmeded 2017).

[6]See Amnesty International, *Uganda 2017/2018 Country Report*, available at https://bit.ly/2UCZoCI.

duce any formal mechanisms to ensure nationwide implementation, and take-up was inconsistent. While UPF drafted a community policing manual in 2011, it was not widely implemented beyond rudimentary training at the district level. In a qualitative evaluation conducted in 2013, Irish Aid concluded that "while there is strong political will and leadership by the [IGP] to implement community policing across the [UPF], the UPF has yet to develop a roll-out plan, a re-training program and a means of monitoring implementation" (Carton et al. 2013, p. 4).[7] A 2017 UPF report entitled "Strategy for Community Policing" similarly laments that the principles of community policing have yet to be translated into practice.

The UPF also experimented with initiatives that bore some resemblance to COP, but that deviated from its core principles in both design and implementation. In 2015, for example, UPF launched the "Crime Preventers" program, allegedly to elicit greater civilian cooperation with the police. As part of that program, the government oversaw the recruitment and training of thousands of civilian volunteers tasked with patrolling their communities, gathering information about security conditions, and reporting crimes to the police. Within a matter of months, the government claimed to have recruited over 1 million Crime Preventers nationwide (Tapscott 2017). But the program had no statutory basis in Ugandan law, and in practice many Crime Preventers turned out to be NRM loyalists who used their training and status to advance the NRM's agenda, often through threats, beatings, extortion, and other crimes (Kagoro 2019; Tapscott 2016).

Nonetheless, interest in community policing remains high within the UPF and among other government stakeholders, especially the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and the powerful Justice and Law Secretariat (JLOS). President Museveni reaffirmed the country's commitment to community policing at the UPF's centenary celebrations in October 2014, following implementation of a more structured community policing pilot project in the Muyenga suburb of Kampala beginning in 2010. The "Muyenga model" was subsequently expanded to cover four additional locations (Jinja, Wakiso, Oyam, and Mubende). As late as 2017, the Muyenga model was endorsed

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[7]The Irish Aid evaluation team found draft versions of a UPF Community Policing Strategy dated 2008 and 2011, but "the drafts were not officially printed and it is unclear what is the status of the drafts or whether they are approved and are formal policy. What is clear is that the drafts have not been widely circulated and there is little awareness of these documents amongst the rank and file."

by the leadership of the UPF, given its apparent success (Carton et al. 2013).[8]

As part of this pilot, UPF engaged in more frequent motorcycle and foot patrols, recruited and trained civilians to serve on community watch teams, and held occasional meetings with citizens and local leaders to exchange information about conditions in their neighborhood and develop strategies to address problems related to crime, conflict, and disorder. The Muyenga model also included a monthly health clinic and a computer training program for local youths.[9] But despite many (anecdotal) accounts of success, in 2018 the Muyenga police station was demolished, and UPF distanced itself from the project, most likely because of personal confrontations between UPF and Muyenga's firebrand local council chairperson.[10]

The visibility of the Muyenga pilot, combined with a 2011 Irish Aid-funded program to support community policing in Uganda, ensured that, at the start of our study, stakeholders in the UPF and JLOS already had a relatively clear idea of what community policing entails, and were already largely supportive of it. But critiques of the Crime Preventers program and problems with the Muyenga pilot that surfaced in 2018 also made community policing a sensitive subject for some high-ranking officials within the UPF hierarchy. This sensitivity, together with leadership rotation, posed a challenge as we managed our relationships with UPF and our implementing partners.[11] While UPF leadership continued to express its enthusiasm for community policing throughout the project, that rhetorical commitment was not always matched by a practical commitment of time or resources to ensure that COP principles were more widely adopted.

This mismatch between rhetoric and practice had several significant consequences for our study—among them, a delay in both implementation and endline data collection, and lower levels

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[8]See, for example, p. 12 of UPF's 2017 report "Strategy for Community Policing," available at https://bit.ly/3cIeDTu. See also a post on UPF's website from 2014, "Uganda Police Force on a fast positive stride," available at https://bit.ly/33i50ru, which cites the Muyenga pilot as a model for community policing in Uganda.

[9]See "We can reduce crime in Uganda through community policing," *The Daily Monitor*, October 14, 2014, available at https://bit.ly/2wqDvib.

[10]Yasin Omar, Muyenga's local council chairperson, has claimed he has received death threats from the head of the police station that services the Muyenga neighborhood. See, for example, https://bit.ly/36nEhfc. Importantly, the research team did not view the closing of the Muyenga police station as a repudiation of community policing more generally, but rather as a response to idiosyncratic political confrontations between Omar and UPF leadership.

[11]Specifically, our project suffered from the departure of Hadijah Namutebi, the Commissioner of Police who was in charge of community policing at UPF headquarters, and who moved to a new position in January 2019.

of treatment compliance than we might have achieved had UPF leadership been more willing to commit political capital to the project. Insufficient political will was exacerbated by severe resource constraints: because the UPF has only limited ability to supervise officers at the post and station level, the latter could ignore COP-related responsibilities with little fear of repercussions. While we convened several working groups to generate enthusiasm for the project, and while UPF leadership did issue multiple directives aimed at increasing take-up, treatment compliance was lower than we had hoped, as we discuss in further detail later in the chapter.

2 DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVENTION

2.1 PRIMARY TREATMENT ARM

The community policing program we evaluate was designed to create opportunities for more positive, mutually respectful interactions between civilians and the UPF. At the start of the intervention, we helped organize a working group comprising senior UPF officers and representatives of YIDO, a civil society organization connected to UPF. The working group's efforts resulted in an updated manual detailing requirements and standard operating procedures for community policing. The updated standard operating procedures were designed to be realistic, scalable, and sustainable, such that officers would be more likely to comply with the new requirements.

Compared with earlier community policing initiatives, the updated manual is more closely tailored to the structure and resource constraints of the UPF. YIDO conducted a series of 2-day training sessions for all participating UPF officers to introduce the new COP model and ensure standardized implementation across study sites. Officers were expected to participate in the training as part of their routine activities, and therefore were not compensated in cash or kind. Participating UPF officers did, however, receive certificates of completion.

The components of the intervention were "homegrown" in the sense that they were the result of recurring discussions between YIDO and UPF, and were informed by Uganda's previous experience implementing COP. Indeed, COP was already technically in place throughout the country

prior to the launch of our study, even if take-up was spotty. The research team played no role in writing the new standard operating procedures, which reflect what dedicated Ugandan police officers and civil society organizations believed would be most effective.

The intervention was originally designed to run for eight months, and to consist of three core components:

1. **Town hall meetings**. The purpose of town hall meetings was to establish more constant police presence in communities; educate citizens about police roles, responsibilities, obligations and constraints; build rapport between citizens and UPF; create opportunities for citizens to ask questions and get immediate responses from UPF officers; encourage reporting of crimes to UPF; and brainstorm local solutions to local problems. The target was for town hall meetings to take place once every two months, for a total of 4 meetings per community during the study period.

2. **Door-to-door visits.** Door-to-door ("meet and greet") visits were intended to create opportunities for more interpersonal interaction and direct dialogue between citizens and UPF officers than is typically possible in the context of a town hall meeting. The target was for door-to-door visits to take place once a month, for a total of 8 visits per community during the study period.[12]

3. **Formation of Community Watch Teams**. The goal of forming Community Watch Teams (CWTs) was to monitor crime, establish a more direct line of communication between civilians and the police, and create a cadre of residents that better understand police procedures and resources. This, in turn, was expected to increase the speed of crime reporting to UPF, and increase the likelihood that crimes would be reported in the first place. CWTs were also expected to help reduce UPF's caseload by referring petty crimes and non-violent domestic disputes to the local council (LC), the lowest level of communal government in Uganda. Im-

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[12]The intervention originally included night patrols as well. The goal of night patrols was to increase police presence and visibility during peak hours for crime, focusing in particular on crime "hot spots." Unfortunately this component of the intervention was beyond the UPF's capacity to implement, and was abandoned.

portantly, the CWTs were explicitly forbidden to effect arrests or adjudicate criminal cases on their own.

Table 2: Intervention design

Condition	Town hall meetings	Foot patrols	Problem oriented policing	Citizen feedback	Watch forum
Control	Never	Occasional	No	No	Some
Treatment	Bi-monthly	Occasional	No	No	Yes

As part of all three of these components, UPF officers were expected to disseminate information about UPF oversight and accountability mechanisms to citizens. UPF has developed a Professional Standards Unit (PSU) and a set of formal procedures for reporting abuses committed by UPF officers. While citizens often complain about police misconduct, few are aware of the existence of these mechanisms. To increase oversight and accountability, citizens would be provided with contact information for officers at the supervising station and the PSU, instructed on the procedures involved in reporting acts of abuse, and encouraged to use those procedures when such acts occur.

In practice, we believe the most important component of the intervention was the town hall meetings. While UPF conducted door-to-door visits in some communities, they did so infrequently, and—to the best of our knowledge—typically as a reactive response to criminal complaints, rather than a proactive attempt to build trust with civilians. The town hall meetings also became the primary mechanism for disseminating information about UPF oversight and accountability mechanisms. While CWTs were organized in most communities, our impression is that they generally remained dormant in the absence of additional training and resources (which we provided through our secondary treatment arm, described in the next section).

A total of 353 town hall meetings were held as part of the intervention between June 2, 2018 and November 17, 2019. The number of attendees ranged widely, from a low of five to a high of 224. Men tended to outnumber women, with a male-to-female ratio greater than 1 in roughly 75% of all meetings. The LC1 chairperson was present at roughly 93% of all meetings; women's group and youth group representatives were present at 41% and 25% of all meetings, respectively. Importantly, in many cases communities organized meetings to discuss recruitment and standard operating procedures for CWTs even without UPF facilitation. Our best estimate is that police were physically present at roughly two-thirds of all meetings.

Topics of discussion ranged widely as well. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most common topics related to the formation and functioning of CWTs. According to qualitative field reports compiled by our implementing partners, this topic was discussed in over half of all meetings. Other topics

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were variable and sometimes only indirectly related to issues of conflict, crime, and violence: truancy and the need to educate local youths (discussed in roughly one-third of all meetings); drug and alcohol abuse (roughly one-quarter of all meetings); health and sanitation (roughly one-fifth of all meetings); domestic abuse and sexual and gender-based violence (roughly one-fifth of all meetings); gambling (roughly one-seventh of all meetings); and a variety of other topics from traffic accidents to savings groups to stray dogs.

2.2 SECONDARY TREATMENT ARM

Successful community policing is typically assumed to require a high level of community engagement. In Uganda, however—like in many other countries around the world—COP programs focus primarily on the actions of police officers themselves. Community members are invited to attend town hall meetings and are encouraged to organize and sustain CWTs, but little else is "required" of them as part of the intervention. As a mechanism for increasing community engagement, in a randomly selected subset of treatment communities, CWT members received additional training from YIDO and UPF. YIDO offered an initial half day of training at the beginning of the intervention, followed by a half day of "refresher" training several months into the intervention.

During this refresher, UPF officers reiterated lessons delivered at the outset of the intervention, and addressed any problems or concerns that arose in the interim. Training for CWTs was designed to complement and strengthen the other components of the community policing model. As we describe in more detail below, this secondary treatment was randomly assigned at the village level, and only among villages that fell under the jurisdiction of police stations that also received the primary treatment arm. In this chapter, we focus on the effects of the primary treatment arm and do not distinguish between villages that did and did not receive additional training for CWTs.

2.3 ETHICS

Our primary treatment arm involved increased police presence in and around rural Ugandan communities. This had important ethical implications in a setting in which the police have a reputation

for petty corruption and bribe-seeking, and for intimidating and abusing the political opposition. Indeed, one goal of the intervention was to foster greater empathy and understanding between civilians and police officers, which we hoped would mitigate the incidence of corruption and abuse. While UPF has a reputation for advancing the interests of the ruling party, it is important to note that not all UPF officers are politicized. Politicization is much less of a problem in rural areas than in urban centers, where clashes between security forces and the political opposition tend to be most common, especially around election time.

To guard against the risk that increased contact would exacerbate abuse, we developed a robust monitoring and reporting system, described in further detail in the next section, which allowed us to observe many (though not all) of the interactions between civilians and police officers that occurred in the context of the intervention. It is possible, however, that "fee for service" requests and other forms of petty corruption may have occurred without our monitors noticing. We address this possibility in the discussion section.

Both our primary and secondary treatment arms involved strengthening the role that CWTs play in providing security for their communities. This component of the program had important ethical implications as well, especially given Uganda's experience with Crime Preventers, some of whom became embroiled in scandals involving political intimidation, vigilantism, and human rights abuses. In their efforts to organize CWTs, YIDO and UPF repeatedly emphasized that CWTs have no legal authority to arrest, adjudicate crimes, or otherwise act as substitutes for the police. YIDO and the UPF also explicitly distinguished CWTs from Crime Preventers, and framed the CWT initiative as an attempt to strengthen police/community partnerships while avoiding the adverse unintended consequences of the Crime Preventers program.

Finally, we wish to stress that the community policing program was designed and implemented by UPF with input from Ugandan civil society groups, as well as JLOS. The structure of the program represents what Ugandan stakeholders believed was the most effective model given local conditions, subject to tight budget constraints. The research team evaluated a program that was already endorsed by the UPF's leadership. Given the promising track record of COP in set-

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tings (like the United States) where relations between police forces and historically marginalized communities are severely strained, we (as well as many other local stakeholders) believed that community policing in Uganda had a genuine potential to build citizens' trust in, and willingness to cooperate with, the UPF, especially in rural areas where the UPF's overtly political role tends to be more muted.

2.4 IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

As we discuss in further detail later in the chapter, we encountered a number of challenges during implementation that may have weakened the impact of the program. First, police officers in Uganda tend to rotate in and out of rural police stations very frequently. Unfortunately we were unable to (re)train officers on community policing protocols with every one of these rotations, which was especially problematic given that newly deployed officers in most cases did not have an existing rapport with the communities in their jurisdiction. Second, while 92% of all treatment communities held at least one town hall meeting over the course of the intervention, only 69% held two, and only 34% held four or more. The share of treatment communities that reported door-to-door visits was even lower.

Potential sources of treatment non-compliance are myriad, though we believe the crux of the problem lies in the resource constraints under which UPF operates: officers had to exert more effort to participate in the program, with no additional funding. Of course, given that COP was technically already nationwide policy, the tasks required of officers as part of the intervention fell squarely within the scope of their existing duties. Nonetheless, prior to the intervention, our impression is that UPF officers in rural areas only rarely visited the communities under their jurisdictions, and then typically only when crimes were committed.

Given that we could not provide additional resources to facilitate implementation of the program, it is perhaps unsurprising that compliance was spotty, even among officers who made a good faith effort to participate. These dynamics were further compounded by principal-agent problems between rank-and-file officers in the field and their superior officers at district or regional

headquarters. Without reliable mechanisms for monitoring and sanctioning officers who shirk, those who did *not* want to make a good faith effort had little reason to do so.

3 RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1 SITE SELECTION

Uganda is divided into 134 districts, each of which is composed of (on average) 12 sub-counties. Each sub-county contains about 4-6 parishes, each of which comprises a cluster of 7-10 proximate villages with a common trading center, a health center, and shared governance structures. Police divisions at the district level are supervised by one of 27 regional police hubs. Each UPF district division is responsible for supervising police stations at the sub-county level, and police posts at the parish level. Posts are analogous to beats in the US, with 2-4 police officers deployed to each post. Criminal complaints are first recorded at the post level, at which point they are either dismissed, investigated by police officers at the post itself (for petty crimes), or referred up to the station level (for more serious cases).

UPF purposively selected 13 districts for inclusion in the study: Mbarara, Lira, Mbale, Gulu, Mityana, Kamuli, Jinja, Tororo, Iganga, Kabale, Rakai, Arua, and Ntungamo. UPF applied two inclusion criteria in selecting these districts: equal representation of Uganda's four regions (north, central, east, and west), and, within each region, relatively high crime rates, as displayed in Figure 2. Of the 23 highest-crime districts in the country, two were excluded because they were too close to Kampala and thus peri-urban;[13] six were excluded because they were located in regions that were over-represented in the sample;[14] and two were excluded due to high levels of insecurity, and correspondingly high military presence.[15] UPF determined that community policing would not be an appropriate strategy in these districts.

We then listed all police stations and posts within each of the 13 districts that UPF selected.

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[13]Luwero and Mpigi.

[14]Masindi, Mubende, Kamwenge (central region), Soroti, Palissa (eastern region), and Amuru (northern region).

[15]Masaka and Kasese.

Figure 2: Recorded criminal cases per capita based on UPF's 2015 crime statistics that were shared with the research team in 2017. District population figures are derived from Uganda's 2014 census. Study area districts are in dark blue. Horizontal red line is the country's global mean cases per capita.

Given UPF's financial and logistical constraints, we considered it unlikely that community policing would affect any of our outcomes of interest in urban locations. We therefore excluded central police stations (located in district capitals), and police stations covering parishes with populations greater than 90,000 (i.e., urban). In addition, we excluded police posts with peculiar jurisdictions: for example, those protecting universities, hospitals, or bus stations. Finally, we excluded posts that had only one officer assigned to them. We then randomly selected one post per station.[16] In places where the station had only one post under its jurisdiction (18 stations), we selected that one; in places where the station had no posts, we selected the station itself (32 stations). The result was a sample of 72 relatively rural, relatively high-crime police posts and stations spanning four regions of the country. For simplicity we refer to these as "police stations" from here on.

For each police station in our sample, we identified four villages for subsequent data collection. While some stations cover multiple parishes, we chose to focus on the parishes in which

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[16]There are 16 police stations with 2 posts, 3 stations with 4 posts, an 3 stations with 5 posts.

the 72 stations in our sample are physically located. We did this because we assumed UPF officers would face logistical constraints when traveling to more distant villages, and we wanted to maximize the likelihood of exposure to the intervention among the villages in our sample. We asked UPF to provide a list of villages (1) located in the same parish as the station and (2) under the jurisdiction of the corresponding station. Within each jurisdiction, we randomly selected four villages from this list. In parishes with fewer than four villages, we selected the closest village from an adjacent parish that still fell under the jurisdiction of the same station.

3.2 RANDOMIZATION

The unit of randomization for our primary treatment arm was the police station. We block randomized within each of the four regions of Uganda in order to maximize the degree of similarity between treatment and control units.[17] To do this, we used the 2014 census to construct 11 blocking variables at the station level:[18] population; % male; average age; % literate; average household size; average years of education; average number of meals eaten per day; % involved in an occupation other than subsistence agriculture; a standardized household asset index;[19] a standardized household quality index;[20] and a standardized index of social services available.[21] We also constructed six additional blocking variables indicating the number of posts, parishes, villages, and police officers under the jurisdiction of the station, as well as distance to Kampala and distance to the district capital.[22]

We used these 17 variables to organize stations into blocks of four using the blockTools package in R. We constructed weights using the Mahalanobis distance between covariates. Within

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[17]To ensure balance within regions, we recoded the northernmost station in the eastern region as belonging to the northern region, and the two central-most stations in the western region as belonging to the central region.

[18]Census data was collected at the parish level. We aggregate up to the station level, weighting by parish population (for variables recorded as percentages).

[19]Our standardized household asset index comprises a set of 15 assets, including bicycles, televisions, shoes, and blankets.

[20]Our standardized household quality index is composed of the materials used for the respondent's roof, walls, and floor, as well as the number of rooms in the household, and an indicator for whether the household has a toilet.

[21]Our standardized index of social services includes number of public and private health clinics, number of public and private schools, and an estimate for the distance to the nearest potable water source.

[22]We also used these latter six variables to impute missing values on the former 11 (census-based) variables.

each block of four, we randomly assigned two stations to the treatment group for the primary treatment arm, and two to control. We randomized assignment to the secondary treatment arm, additional training for CWTs, at the village (rather than station) level. Within each of the 36 police stations that were assigned to the primary treatment arm, we assigned two of the four study villages to receive our secondary treatment arm. Police stations thus served as the unit of random assignment for the primary treatment arm, and as blocks for the assignment of the secondary treatment arm.

3.3 SPILLOVER

Our research design assumes the absence of spillover from treatment to control communities. Criminologists typically distinguish between two types of spillover in the study of policing: displacement and diffusion. Displacement occurs when increased police presence in one location induces (potential) criminals to commit crimes in another location instead. Diffusion occurs when increased police presence in one location deters (potential) criminals in other locations as well.[23] Recent research suggests that diffusion is more common than displacement (Bowers et al. 2011; Guerette and Bowers 2009; Telep et al. 2014), though this is still a matter of debate (Getmanski, Grossman and Wright 2019; Chalfin and McCrary 2017).

Spillover would bias our treatment effect estimates. Fortunately, there are reasons to believe this problem is likely to be relatively minor in our case. Because we randomized at the post (or station) level, and because most posts have jurisdiction over an entire parish (or, in the case of stations, an entire sub-county), treatment and control communities are almost always located in different parishes. Indeed, in seven of the 12 districts in our study, all sample villages in the district are assigned *either* to treatment *or* to control.

Even in the remaining districts, our sample consists of police stations, posts, and villages that are generally quite far apart from one another. On average, stations in our sample are located approximately 14 km from one another. More to the point, the average distance between control

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[23]Diffusion of other outcomes is of course possible as well. For example, residents of a treatment community could share their increased knowledge of the criminal justice system with residents of control communities.

stations and the nearest treatment station in our sample is 16 km. (The shortest distance is 0.82 km.) The villages in our sample are located 1.5 km apart on average, and the average distance between control villages and the nearest treatment village is 14.2 km. (The shortest distance is 1.2 km.) 97% of treatment police stations are located at least 1 km from the nearest control station, 94% are located at least 2 km away, and 89% are located at least 3 km away. Similarly, 100% of treatment villages are located at least 1 km from the nearest control village, 93% are located at least 2 km away, and 87% are located at least 3 km away. These are long distances in rural Uganda, where roads are rough and few citizens have access to a vehicle. This should reduce the risk of bias from spillover effects.

3.4 DATA

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Like the other studies in this book, we collected data on our key outcomes of interest from multiple sources. Ultimately, the goal of community policing is to reduce crime and violence and thus improve civilian security. We measured crime and violence as reported to the police using UPF administrative data.[24] Before the intervention began, we collected baseline data on all crimes reported to all UPF stations from March 1 to May 27, 2018. These data include the type of crime, the date and location of the crime, the gender of the victim and perpetrator (when available), and the outcome of the resulting case (when available). We collected the same data at endline, after the intervention was complete. These data span the period from July 15, 2019 to January 15, 2020.[25]

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[24]Because UPF leadership knew which stations and posts were assigned to treatment and which were assigned to control, it is possible that they could have instructed officers to falsify their records to make it look like crime was decreasing in treatment communities. Given the UPF's resource constraints and its inability to closely monitor the behavior of rural police officers, we view this as extremely unlikely.

[25]Data collection in four police stations took place in December, 2019. Data for all other police stations were collected starting in late January, 2020. Data for the first four police stations span the period from June 1 to December 1, 2019.

CITIZEN SURVEY

Community policing is also intended to change the attitudes and behaviors of citizens, who may express greater trust in the police, more favorable opinions of the intentions and capacity of the police, and more willingness to cooperate with the police in criminal investigations and other activities. They may also report lower levels of crime victimization. We test for these possibilities using baseline and endline surveys, both of which were conducted in person by local enumerators from the Uganda office of Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), a research NGO.

The baseline took place between June and July 2018. We randomly selected 12 households in each village in our sample.[26] To ensure gender balance, we sampled six men and six women per village. Due to budget constraints, we replaced households in which the randomly selected respondent was unavailable to be surveyed at any point during the same day.[27] The result was a stratified random sample with 3,456 respondents in total. Wherever possible we interviewed the same respondents at endline, replacing them only when they were unavailable or had died or moved away. In total, we replaced 510 citizens out of 3,456 citizen respondents, for an attrition rate of about 15%. Table 3.4 provides descriptive statistics for our outcomes of interest based on the citizen survey.

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[26]In each community, mobilizers worked with the LC1 and the village health team to create a roster of all households in the community. From this roster, we randomly selected 12 households for surveying, as well as 24 replacements numbered 13 to 36.

[27]Replacement households were selected in order from the list of 24.

Table 2: Baseline Summary

Outcome Family	Outcome	Range	Mean	SD	Study Ranking				
Compliance	Foot patrol frequency	1-5	4.62	0.95	Lbr.	Col.	Phl.	Pak.	**Uga.**
	Vehicle patrol frequency	1-5	4.62	0.91	Lbr.	Pak.	Phl.	Col.	**Uga.**
	Community meeting awareness	0-1	0.29	0.46	Pak.	Col.	Lbr.	Phl.	**Uga.**
Crime victimization	Violent crimes (personal)	0-50	0.13	1.02	Phl.	**Uga.**	Pak.	Lbr.	
	Non-violent crimes (personal)	0-70	0.43	1.94	Phl.	Pak.	**Uga.**	Lbr.	
Perceived future insecurity	Feared violent crime	1-4	1.76	1.03	Lbr.	**Uga.**	Phl.	Pak.	Col.
	Fear non-violent crime	1-4	1.81	1.01	Lbr.	**Uga.**	Phl.	Pak.	
	Feared walking	0-4	1.03	1.32	Col.	Phl.	**Uga.**	Lbr.	Pak.
Overall perceptions of police	Trust in police	1-5	3.39	1.38	Pak.	Col.	Lbr.	Phl.	**Uga.**
	Trust in service of police	1-5	3.31	1.31	Pak.	Lbr.	Phl.	**Uga.**	
Police abuse	Police abuse	0-1	0.08	0.27	Phl.	**Uga.**	Col.	Pak.	Lbr.
	Bribe frequency	1-4	1.13	0.43	Phl.	Lbr.	**Uga.**	Pak.	
	Bribe amount	0-458	1.99	13.82	Phl.	Lbr.	**Uga.**	Pak.	
Crime reporting	Violent crimes reported (personal)	0-1	0.03	0.17	Phl.	Col.	**Uga.**	Pak.	Lbr.
	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0-1	0.05	0.21	Phl.	Col.	**Uga.**	Pak.	Lbr.
	Other non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0-1	0.01	0.08	Pak.	**Uga.**			
	Burglary resolution	0-1	0.54	0.50	Lbr.	Phl.	Col.	**Uga.**	Pak.
	Domestic abuse resolution	0-1	0.27	0.45	Lbr.	Phl.	**Uga.**	Pak.	Col.
	Armed robbery resolution	0-1	0.74	0.44	Lbr.	Phl.	**Uga.**	Pak.	
Crime tips	Contacted police for suspicious activity	0-1	0.15	0.36	Pak.	Lbr.	Phl.	Col.	**Uga.**
	Gave information to police	0-1	0.13	0.34	Col.	Phl.	Lbr.	**Uga.**	Pak.
Police abuse reporting	Reported drinking on duty	1-4	2.18	1.14	**Uga.**	Pak.	Lbr.	Phl.	
	Reported police beating	1-4	2.66	1.09	Pak.	**Uga.**	Lbr.	Phl.	Col.
	Reported police abuse	0-1	0.01	0.12	Phl.	**Uga.**	Col.	Pak.	Lbr.
Perceived police intentions	Police will investigate	1-5	3.99	1.03	Col.	Lbr.	Pak.	Phl.	**Uga.**
	Police will be fair	1-5	2.91	1.29	Lbr.	Pak.	**Uga.**	Phl.	
	Police are corrupt	1-5	2.54	1.49	Phl.	**Uga.**	Lbr.	Col.	Pak.
	Police serve equally	1-5	3.16	1.39	Lbr.	Col.	Pak.	Phl.	**Uga.**
Knowledge of criminal justice	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	0-1	0.54	0.50	Pak.	**Uga.**	Lbr.		
	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	0-1	0.68	0.47	**Uga.**	Pak.	Lbr.		
	Legal Knowledge (fees)	0-1	0.30	0.46	Pak.	**Uga.**	Lbr.		
	Legal Knowledge (domestic abuse)	0-1	0.86	0.35	Pak.	**Uga.**			
	Police Knowledge (followup)	0-1	0.77	0.42	**Uga.**				
	Police Knowledge (where is station)	0-1	0.98	0.14	Pak.	Lbr.	**Uga.**		
Cooperation norms	Reporting norm (theft)	0-4	3.09	1.10	Lbr.	Pak.	Col.	Phl.	**Uga.**

	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0-4	2.64	1.27	Lbr.	Pak.	Col.	**Uga.**	Phl.
	Obey police norm	0-4	1.43	1.35	Phl.	**Uga.**	Lbr.	Pak.	
Perceived police capacity	Police timeliness	0-4	2.34	1.32	Col.	Lbr.	**Uga.**	Pak.	Phl.
	Police investigation capacity	0-4	2.56	1.24	Col.	**Uga.**	Lbr.	Phl.	Pak.
Perceived police responsiveness	Perceived police responsiveness	0-4	2.51	1.32	Col.	Pak.	Lbr.	**Uga.**	Phl.
Community trust	Community trust	0-3	1.74	0.93	**Uga.**	Col.	Lbr.	Pak.	Phl.

POLICE OFFICER SURVEY

In addition to reducing crime and improving citizens' perceptions of the police, community polic-
ing aims to inform police officers about citizens' priorities, challenges, and concerns, and in this
way encourage them to become more empathetic toward the communities they serve. Community
policing may also increase officers' sense of accountability to civilians. Ideally these attitudinal
changes result in behavioral changes as well, with officers becoming more respectful towards cit-
izens not just in the context of COP-related activities (e.g. town hall meetings), but during more
routine activities as well.

We measure officers' attitudes and behaviors using a survey of officers deployed to the sta-
tions in our sample. We conduct two waves of surveys—at baseline and at endline. The baseline
survey took place between June and July 2018. In each of the 72 police stations and posts, we
interviewed the Officer in Charge (O/C) and, whenever possible, the Community Liaison Officer
(CLO) and Child and Family Protection Unit (CFPU) officer. Among the more junior officers, we
randomly selected as many as needed to reach a quota of 5 respondents per station or post, for a
total of 217 officers. We sought to interview the same officers at endline, though by that point many
had been reassigned to different locations. Among the 198 officers we interviewed at endline, only
44 were also interviewed at baseline (for an attrition rate of 80%). The rest were randomly selected
replacement officers.

MONITORING DATA

Finally, we used several mechanisms to monitor treatment compliance throughout implementation
of the COP program. To monitor town hall meetings, we provided UPF officers at each post with
a schedule to record the date and location of each meeting, as well as contact information for
the LC1 chairperson and any other individual(s) responsible for mobilizing residents to attend the
meetings. We also sent a staff member from IPA Uganda to attend all meetings and take detailed
notes, including the date, time, and location of the meeting, the number of attendees, the topics

discussed, and any questions asked and answers given. After each meeting, we asked officers to complete a separate form with the same information for purposes of validation, though compliance with this latter monitoring mechanism was low.

To monitor the activity of the CWTs, we provided them with a form that they were expected to complete and return to YIDO at the end of each month. The form included details on any incidents to which the CWT responded in the previous month, including whether or not the incident was reported to the police, whether or not the police responded, how long it took the police to respond, whether an arrest was made, and how satisfied the victim was with the police's response. Compliance with this latter monitoring mechanism was low. We also collected data on the names, age, and gender of all CWT members, as well as contact information for the leaders of each CWT.

4 RESULTS

4.1 PRIMARY HYPOTHESES

We present results for the Metaketa primary hypotheses in Figure 3. In general, we find no evidence that the community policing program affected most of the outcomes we measured. We do not find evidence that the program reduced the incidence of crime as captured by our survey (Hypothesis 1a). This finding is robust to aggregating multiple types of crime into a single index (as in the figure), to distinguishing between violent and non-violent crime, and to disaggregating crime by type (as in Table A3 in the appendix). As can be seen in Table A4 in the appendix, this conclusion does not change if we add three additional Uganda-specific proxies for crime victimization, related to property destruction and violent disputes over land use or boundaries. Unlike crime incidence, the program appears to have *increased* the number of crimes recorded by the UPF, though we interpret this as an increase in crime *reporting* rather than an increase in crime incidence, for reasons we discuss below.

Given that our program had no discernible effect on crime incidence—an objective indicator of personal safety—it is perhaps unsurprising that we find no evidence that the program

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improved subjective perceptions of personal safety either (Hypothesis 1b). This result again holds for the index, all components of the index, and two additional Uganda-specific measures related to perceptions of safety in the community at night (see Figure 3 and Tables A2 through A5 in the appendix). Nor do we find evidence that the program improved perceptions of the police (Hypothesis 2). Residents of treatment communities were no more likely to trust the police, no more likely to express satisfaction with the services the police provide, and no less likely to feel intimidated by police presence in their community, a Uganda-specific measure (see item "Not intimidated by police" in Table A5).

We similarly do not find evidence that the program improved empathy, accountability, or perceptions of the seriousness of misconduct among police officers themselves (Hypothesis 3a). Indeed, if anything police officers in treatment stations expressed a diminished sense of their own accountability: the coefficients on the index and its component parts are almost uniformly negative, and in some cases they are nearly statistically significant at conventional levels. This is especially true for index components related to corruption and accountability. Perhaps relatedly, the program also seems to have increased the incidence of police abuse (Hypothesis 3b), a result driven by a small but statistically significant increase in the reported frequency with which respondents made unofficial payments to police. We discuss this finding further below.

We find no evidence that the program increased crime reporting among victims and witnesses as measured in our survey (Hypothesis 4a). Interpretation of this result is somewhat ambiguous, since many items in our index conflate respondents who were not victims of crime with those who were victims but chose not to report to the police. That said, we also do not find any evidence of a treatment effect on constituent items that ask respondents whether they would want the police or another actor to resolve a hypothetical case of crime.

Figure 3: Effects of Community Policing in Uganda and Meta-Analytic Estimates

We similarly do not find evidence that the program increased direct reporting of crime prevention tips (Hypothesis 4b), though we do find some suggestive evidence that residents of treatment communities reported more tips *indirectly*, for example by reporting tips to the local council chairperson (LC1) in the expectation that they would be referred to the police (see outcomes "Share info indirectly" and "Assist investigation indirectly" in Table A5 in the appendix). While the coefficient on our index of crime reporting remains small and statistically insignificant once we add these (and two other) Uganda-specific measures, the coefficients on our proxies for indirect reporting are both positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. The program also increased reporting of police misconduct to the UPF (Hypothesis 4c), a result driven in particular by an increase in reports of misconduct in the UPF's own records.

4.2   HYPOTHESIZED MECHANISMS

Figure 3 also reports results for the Metaketa hypothesized mechanisms. Consistent with our finding that the treatment does not appear to have affected citizens' trust in and satisfaction with the police, we also do not find evidence that the program improved beliefs about police intentions (Hypothesis M1a). The program does, however, seem to have enhanced citizens' knowledge of the criminal justice system (Hypothesis M1b). This result is driven in particular by an apparent improvement in citizens' understanding of the rules and procedures involved with reporting crimes to the police (see Table A3 in the appendix).

Specifically, residents of treatment communities were more likely to know that the police are not required to investigate witnesses as suspects, more likely to know that the police are not allowed to charge fees to register cases, and more likely to know that the police will record criminal complaints even if they are reported by phone (rather than in person). Increased knowledge of the criminal justice system may have facilitated crime reporting, as we discuss in Section 5. Importantly, the positive treatment effect on knowledge cannot be attributed to social desirability bias: either respondents knew the correct answers to the questions we asked them, or they did not. Note, however, that the program's positive effect on the knowledge index is no longer statistically

significant once we include several Uganda-specific proxies (see Table A4 in the appendix).

We do not find that the program strengthened norms of citizen cooperation with the police (Hypothesis M1c). Indeed, if anything it appears to have weakened them: residents of treatment communities were (marginally) more likely to anticipate social sanctions for reporting burglaries to the police, and (also marginally) less likely to believe victims or bystanders will report armed robberies—two Uganda-specific outcomes (see table A5 in the appendix). That said, the treatment effect estimate for the index remains small and statistically insignificant, with or without Uganda-specific measures. We also find no evidence that the program improved beliefs about police capacity (Hypothesis M2a) or police responsiveness to citizen feedback (Hypothesis M2b). These findings are again robust to the inclusion of our Uganda-specific proxies.

4.3   SECONDARY HYPOTHESES

Results for our secondary hypotheses are similarly disappointing. Unfortunately, we were unable to ask survey questions about trust in the state (Hypothesis S1), since the UPF deemed these too politically sensitive. We did, however, ask two Uganda-specific questions about trust in the courts. We do not find any evidence of treatment effects on these two outcomes (see Table A5 in the appendix). The same is true for our measure of trust in the community (Hypothesis S2). This is perhaps unsurprising given our finding that the program did not increase trust in the police. In sum, at endline, residents of treatment communities were no more trusting than residents of control communities, regardless of the object of that trust.

Finally, despite low levels of treatment compliance, at least in some domains, we find that the program nonetheless increased the rate of interactions between civilians and the police (compliance). Residents of treatment communities were 45% more likely to recall at least one town hall meeting with police officers in their community during the preceding six months, from a base rate of 31% in control villages (Figure 4). They were also 19% more likely to report the existence of an active CWT in their community, and more likely to report observing CWT patrols—two Uganda-specific outcomes. However, they were no more likely to report police patrols in their community.

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Figure 4: Compliance: share of respondents who have heard of a community meeting in the past six months, by treatment group at both baseline (top) and endline (bottom panel).

This is consistent with data we collected from LC1 chairpersons to monitor treatment compliance while the program was in the field, and with the research team's (anecdotal) impressions of the program.

5 UNPACKING THE RESULTS

As shown above, we do not find evidence that the COP program in Uganda affected most of the hypothesized outcomes. Perhaps most important, we do not find evidence that it reduced the incidence of crime as measured in our survey (Hypothesis 1a), enhanced citizens' sense of safety (Hypothesis 1b), increased trust in or satisfaction with the police (Hypothesis 2), or improved perceptions of police intentions (Hypothesis M1a), capacity (Hypothesis M2a), or responsiveness to citizen feedback (Hypothesis M2b). Nor do we find evidence that it strengthened police officers' own sense of empathy or perceived accountability towards citizens (Hypothesis 3a).

Interestingly, we do find some suggestive evidence that the program *increased* the incidence of crime as captured in UPF's records (Figure 5). This result is unlikely to be an artifact of outliers: treatment effect estimates change little when the most outlying observations are excluded from the analysis. Nor is it likely to be an artifact of better record keeping in treatment police stations: we find no evidence that treatment police stations were more likely to maintain a crime log, or that they kept their crime logs in better condition than control group police stations. The effect does not appear to be an artifact of seasonality either, as it holds even when we exclude police stations that were visited first.[28]

How, then, to explain this discrepancy between the survey and the UPF crime data? It is of course possible that this seeming discrepancy is due to sampling variability. Another more likely explanation is that the positive treatment effect on crime in the UPF data is due to an increase in crime *reporting*, rather than an increase in crime itself. Most crimes in Uganda are never reported to the police, especially in rural areas. In our baseline survey, for example, only 26% of respondents

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[28]Since endline data collection took place over a relatively protracted period, crime rates, and correspondingly crime reporting, could have been affected by the specific date administrative data was collected from a given police station.

Figure 5: Effects of Community Policing on Crime Reporting

Estimated treatment effect with 95% confidence intervals

Meta-analysis estimates ◆ Uganda estimates ●

who indicated that their household had been the victim of a burglary over the past 6 months said that they reported the burglary to the police. Since we observe no corresponding increase in crime in the survey data, and no decrease in perceptions of personal safety, we interpret the increase in the UPF data as evidence that residents of treatment communities were more likely to report whatever crimes did occur to the police.

While we also do not observe a corresponding increase in crime reporting in the survey, recall that the interpretation of this result is ambiguous, since many of our items conflate respondents who did not report crimes with those who were not victims of crime in the first place. And while we find no evidence of a change in norms of citizen cooperation with the police, it is possible that residents of treatment communities became more willing to report despite heightened concerns about social sanctions. Indeed, in an experimental evaluation of a similar community policing intervention in Liberia, Blair, Karim and Morse (2019) find that residents of treatment communities reported crimes at higher rates despite being *more* rather than less fearful of social sanctions from their neighbors for engaging with the police. Our results are consistent with these findings.

This apparent increase in crime reporting is somewhat puzzling, given that we find no evidence of treatment effects on trust in the police or perceptions of police intentions and capacity. Criminologists have long argued that citizens will only report crimes to the police if they perceive

the police as "procedurally legitimate," meaning that they trust the police to treat them fairly and respectfully when they report (Tyler and Huo 2002; Tyler and Fagan 2008). This implies that if we observe an increase in crime reporting, then we should also observe an increase in trust in the police. But we do not.

One potential solution to this puzzle lies in the program's positive effect on both citizens' rate of interaction with police officers and their knowledge of the criminal justice system. As discussed in Section 4, residents of treatment communities expressed greater understanding of the rules and procedures associated with reporting crimes to the police. Misunderstanding of these rules and procedures can be an obstacle to reporting, for example if victims believe they will have to pay a fee or travel to the nearest police station to file a criminal complaint, or if witnesses believe they will be investigated as suspects if they share information with the police. The program may have increased reporting in part by correcting these misunderstandings. At the same time, more frequent interaction with police officers may have reduced at least some of the costs associated with reporting.

Consistent with this interpretation, we find that crime reporting in the UPF data is positively correlated with knowledge of the criminal justice system in the survey, and that changes in crime reporting are positively correlated with changes in knowledge as well, at least in the treatment group. These results are descriptive and correlational, but they nonetheless lend some credence to our intuition that crime reporting is increasing with knowledge of the criminal justice system. This combination of results is again consistent with Blair, Karim and Morse (2019), who find that an increase in crime reporting in treatment communities was accompanied by an improvement in understanding of the rules and procedures associated with reporting crimes, but no change in perceptions of the police.

Perhaps our most unexpected finding is that the COP program in Uganda increased unofficial payments to the police, albeit only modestly. While this result does not survive a multiple comparisons correction, it is consistent with some of our other findings, namely the increase in the rate at which citizens reported incidents of misconduct to the police, and the (suggestive) decrease

in perceived accountability on issues related to corruption in the police officers survey. One potential explanation for this finding (assuming it is not simply a type-I error) is the increased frequency of interactions between civilians and police that occurred as a result of the intervention. Some of these interactions were a direct (even mechanical) result of the intervention itself, which induced contact between civilians and the police in the context of town hall meetings. Other interactions may have occurred as an indirect result of the program. For example, if residents of treatment communities were more likely to report crimes to the police, then they were (presumably) also more likely to interact with whichever officers responded to their complaints. Increased interactions between civilians and the police may have created opportunities for bribe-seeking that would not have arisen in the absence of the program.

But there are other plausible (and less nefarious) explanations as well. As discussed above, Ugandan police officers operate under severe resource constraints, creating a pervasive culture of "fees for service" for registering cases and responding to criminal complaints. These are not necessarily obscene requests: in order to facilitate investigations and other activities, UPF officers are known to ask citizens to buy fuel, stationary, and other necessities, without which they would be incapable of doing their jobs. The combination of increased knowledge, increased crime reporting, and increased unofficial payments suggests the possibility that officers continued to solicit fees for service as before, but that residents of treatment villages were more likely to view these fees as "unofficial payments." In other words, the intervention may have failed to eliminate fees for service (much less the conditions that make those fees necessary), at the same time that it taught citizens to recognize that such payments are unofficial—i.e., not sanctioned or condoned by the police.

The increase in unofficial payments may, in turn, help explain why COP did not improve perceptions of the police: if community policing increased the frequency of interactions between civilians and the UPF, but UPF officers used those interactions to solicit unofficial payments, then it is perhaps unsurprising that perceptions did not improve. But again, this is only one potential explanation for the program's null effects on perceptions of the police and other outcomes. Another possible explanation lies in the frequent rotation of police officers into and out of treatment

police stations. Of the 72 stations in our sample, more than half (38) experienced a 100% respondent turnover rate between baseline and endline—meaning that none of the officers surveyed at baseline were still assigned to the station at endline—and most witnessed at least some respondent turnover.[29] It is possible that lessons from the COP training that all treatment group officers received at the start of the program were not transmitted as officers rotated in and out. It is also possible that frequent rotation prevented officers from establishing a rapport with citizens.

Another potential explanation lies in low treatment compliance. According to monitoring data that we collected over the course of the intervention, 132 of the 144 villages assigned to treatment reported at least one town hall meeting between civilians and the police. But only 99 villages reported two meetings, only 69 reported three meetings, and only 49 reported four or more. While this degree of saturation was sufficient to generate statistically significant treatment effects on our index of compliance, it may not have been enough to change attitudes or behaviors, especially over such a long period of time. Compliance with the other components of the program was even lower: only 23 villages reported a door-to-door visit, and none reported more than one. Only 13 villages reported a nighttime patrol, and only one reported more than one. Again, this may not have been enough to change residents' minds about the police.

Given the structure of the intervention, it is perhaps unsurprising that treatment compliance was so low. Uganda's community policing program demanded that officers expend extra effort traveling to villages and meeting with civilians, but provided no new resources to offset the financial and opportunity costs that officers incurred in the process. Moreover, despite the resources we invested in monitoring the intervention, the data we collected was inevitably incomplete, and even when it revealed evidence of noncompliance, UPF leadership generally did not sanction officers who were caught shirking.

The weak or null effects of the intervention on crime and perceptions of the police may also be a result of the relatively long lag between the intervention, which ended between March and

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[29]Note, however, that we did not survey *all* officers at each station at baseline. So a 100% turnover rate among our respondents may not indicate a 100% turnover rate among all officers at the station.

June 2019 (depending on the community),[30] and the endline survey, which began in December 2019 and continued until February 2020.[31] It is possible that the intervention had beneficial effects on some outcomes in the short term, which decayed to nulls over time. Finally, it is possible that the treatment itself was simply too weak to increase trust in an institution that has long been perceived as untrustworthy. Treatment compliance was relatively low, but even if it had been much higher, there is no guarantee that COP would have changed citizens' attitudes or behaviors in a statistically detectable way. This further underscores the importance of careful monitoring and robust incentives and sanctions to maximize compliance and minimize the risk of misconduct. Absent these mechanisms, community policing may only reinforce existing police-community relations.

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[30]The last town hall meeting we are aware of was scheduled for June 8, 2019. It is possible that additional meetings occurred after this date, but we are doubtful. To the best of our knowledge, only two town hall meetings were scheduled in June 2019. In most communities, the last meeting was scheduled in March or April. Some communities held no meetings in 2019 at all.

[31]Acquiring government approval to conduct research on public opinion of policing in Uganda is a slow and arduous process, and our endline was delayed by several months as a result.

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Table A2: Results Table for Main Hypotheses

Hyp.	Outcome	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
C	Compliance idx.	0.159	0.064	(0.031, 0.286)	0.016	
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.010	0.031	(-0.072, 0.051)	0.739	0.882
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.050	0.053	(-0.057, 0.156)	0.358	0.715
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.010	0.052	(-0.093, 0.113)	0.847	0.882
3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	-0.188	0.159	(-0.510, 0.134)	0.245	0.882
3b	Police abuse idx.	0.099	0.046	(0.007, 0.191)	0.036	0.145
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.026	0.061	(-0.097, 0.148)	0.679	0.882
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.005	0.033	(-0.071, 0.061)	0.882	0.882
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.352	0.163	(0.025, 0.678)	0.036	0.145
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.018	0.049	(-0.116, 0.079)	0.711	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.104	0.046	(0.011, 0.196)	0.028	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.036	0.045	(-0.127, 0.054)	0.425	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.039	0.033	(-0.105, 0.027)	0.241	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.015	0.046	(-0.077, 0.107)	0.746	
S2	Community trust	0.019	0.038	(-0.058, 0.095)	0.629	

Table A3: Constituent Outcomes and Indices Hypotheses

Hyp.	Outcome	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
C	Foot patrol frequency	-0.039	0.069	(-0.177, 0.099)	0.574	
C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.056	0.061	(-0.067, 0.179)	0.365	
C	Community meeting awareness	0.311	0.070	(0.171, 0.451)	0.000	
1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.012	0.022	(-0.032, 0.056)	0.599	0.945
1a	Armed robbery (personal)	0.032	0.025	(-0.019, 0.083)	0.215	
1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.000	0.019	(-0.037, 0.037)	0.999	
1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	0.018	0.033	(-0.047, 0.084)	0.576	
1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	0.002	0.021	(-0.039, 0.043)	0.920	0.945
1a	Burglary (personal)	0.003	0.019	(-0.034, 0.040)	0.868	
1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.028	0.040	(-0.107, 0.052)	0.487	
1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.004	0.063	(-0.122, 0.131)	0.945	0.945
1a	Armed robbery (community)	0.037	0.047	(-0.057, 0.131)	0.434	
1a	Aggravated assault (community)	0.016	0.026	(-0.035, 0.068)	0.528	
1a	Simple assault (community)	0.025	0.034	(-0.044, 0.094)	0.476	
1a	Sexual assault (community)	0.021	0.055	(-0.089, 0.131)	0.705	
1a	Domestic abuse (community)	-0.021	0.069	(-0.159, 0.117)	0.766	
1a	Murder (community)	-0.042	0.092	(-0.226, 0.141)	0.645	
1a	Other violent crimes (community)	-0.012	0.018	(-0.048, 0.024)	0.505	
1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-0.059	0.047	(-0.154, 0.035)	0.212	0.945
1a	Burglary (community)	-0.060	0.046	(-0.151, 0.032)	0.195	
1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.058	0.040	(-0.023, 0.138)	0.159	
1b	Feared violent crime	0.046	0.051	(-0.056, 0.148)	0.373	0.560
1b	Fear non-violent crime	0.070	0.056	(-0.042, 0.182)	0.213	0.560
1b	Feared walking	0.012	0.037	(-0.062, 0.086)	0.745	0.745
2	Trust in police	0.025	0.050	(-0.075, 0.124)	0.623	0.879
2	Trust in service of police	-0.008	0.051	(-0.110, 0.095)	0.879	0.879
3a	Emapthy idx.	-0.085	0.166	(-0.419, 0.249)	0.609	0.813
3a	Empathy (complaints)	0.173	0.233	(-0.297, 0.643)	0.461	

3a	Empathy (reports)	-0.338	0.206	(-0.754, 0.078)	0.108	
3a	Police accountability idx.	-0.126	0.089	(-0.306, 0.054)	0.167	0.333
3a	Police takes complaints seriously	-0.276	0.149	(-0.576, 0.025)	0.071	
3a	Hypothetical 2: discipliniary punishment	-0.064	0.150	(-0.366, 0.237)	0.669	
3a	Hypothetical 2: report fellow officer	-0.208	0.184	(-0.579, 0.162)	0.263	
3a	Hypothetical 2: reports by other officers	-0.153	0.159	(-0.473, 0.168)	0.342	
3a	Hypothetical 3: discipliniary punishment	-0.067	0.095	(-0.260, 0.125)	0.484	
3a	Hypothetical 3: report fellow officer	-0.242	0.165	(-0.574, 0.090)	0.149	
3a	Hypothetical 3: reports by other officers	-0.133	0.204	(-0.544, 0.279)	0.519	
3a	Hypothetical 5: discipliniary punishment	-0.060	0.135	(-0.333, 0.213)	0.659	
3a	Hypothetical 5: report fellow officer	0.003	0.219	(-0.439, 0.445)	0.991	
3a	Hypothetical 5: reports by other officers	-0.045	0.160	(-0.367, 0.277)	0.778	
3a	Police abuse idx.	-0.037	0.158	(-0.356, 0.282)	0.818	0.818
3a	Hypothetical 5: own misconduct	-0.095	0.137	(-0.372, 0.182)	0.494	
3a	Hypothetical 5: others' misconduct	0.018	0.197	(-0.378, 0.415)	0.926	
3a	Police corruption idx.	-0.189	0.122	(-0.434, 0.057)	0.129	0.333
3a	Hypothetical 2: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.108	0.163	(-0.437, 0.221)	0.511	
3a	Hypothetical 2: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.132	0.195	(-0.526, 0.261)	0.501	
3a	Hypothetical 3: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.296	0.136	(-0.570, -0.023)	0.035	
3a	Hypothetical 3: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.206	0.135	(-0.477, 0.066)	0.134	
3b	Police abuse	0.015	0.041	(-0.068, 0.098)	0.723	0.723
3b	Police abuse	0.018	0.019	(-0.021, 0.057)	0.349	0.465
3b	Bribe frequency	0.083	0.041	(0.002, 0.165)	0.045	0.178
3b	Bribe amount	0.121	0.080	(-0.040, 0.282)	0.137	0.274
4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.003	0.038	(-0.080, 0.074)	0.936	0.938
4a	Armed robbery reported (personal)	0.000	0.039	(-0.079, 0.079)	0.997	
4a	Simple assault reported (personal)	-0.003	0.028	(-0.060, 0.054)	0.915	
4a	Other violent crimes reported (personal)	0.000	0.037	(-0.073, 0.073)	0.996	
4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.066	0.042	(-0.019, 0.151)	0.123	0.617
4a	Burglary reported (personal)	0.083	0.041	(0.001, 0.166)	0.047	
4a	Other non-violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.043	0.030	(-0.103, 0.018)	0.161	
4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	0.021	0.068	(-0.117, 0.158)	0.764	0.938

4a	Armed robbery reported (community)	0.039	0.052	(-0.065, 0.144)	0.453	
4a	Aggravated assault reported (community)	0.011	0.037	(-0.063, 0.086)	0.765	
4a	Simple assault reported (community)	0.013	0.036	(-0.058, 0.084)	0.718	
4a	Sexual assault reported (community)	0.061	0.068	(-0.076, 0.198)	0.374	
4a	Domestic physical abuse reported (community)	-0.017	0.044	(-0.105, 0.072)	0.707	
4a	Other violent crime reported (community)	0.006	0.018	(-0.029, 0.042)	0.718	
4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	0.004	0.052	(-0.100, 0.108)	0.938	0.938
4a	Burglary reported (community)	-0.013	0.053	(-0.119, 0.094)	0.814	
4a	Other non-violent crime reported (community)	0.038	0.040	(-0.042, 0.118)	0.350	
4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.007	0.029	(-0.065, 0.051)	0.810	0.938
4a	Burglary resolution	-0.040	0.038	(-0.116, 0.036)	0.300	
4a	Domestic abuse resolution	0.061	0.057	(-0.054, 0.176)	0.290	
4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.042	0.027	(-0.096, 0.012)	0.128	
4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	0.006	0.039	(-0.072, 0.083)	0.883	0.883
4b	Gave information to police	-0.014	0.034	(-0.083, 0.054)	0.672	0.883
4c	Reported drinking on duty	0.023	0.048	(-0.073, 0.119)	0.628	0.628
4c	Reported police beating	0.042	0.051	(-0.060, 0.145)	0.412	0.628
4c	Reported police abuse	0.024	0.047	(-0.071, 0.119)	0.614	0.628
4c	Victimization reported to police station	0.833	0.408	(0.016, 1.651)	0.046	0.184
M1a	Police will investigate	-0.063	0.048	(-0.158, 0.033)	0.192	
M1a	Police will be fair	0.017	0.051	(-0.085, 0.119)	0.738	
M1a	Political interest idx.	-0.004	0.034	(-0.072, 0.065)	0.914	
M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.037	0.032	(-0.101, 0.027)	0.249	
M1a	Police serve equally	0.032	0.046	(-0.061, 0.125)	0.494	
M1b	Legal knowledge idx.	0.041	0.020	(0.000, 0.082)	0.048	
M1b	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	0.079	0.040	(-0.000, 0.159)	0.051	
M1b	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	0.018	0.035	(-0.051, 0.088)	0.595	
M1b	Legal Knowledge (fees)	0.107	0.051	(0.004, 0.210)	0.042	
M1b	Legal Knowledge (domestic abuse)	-0.033	0.036	(-0.106, 0.040)	0.369	
M1b	Reporting knowledge idx.	0.044	0.034	(-0.024, 0.111)	0.202	
M1b	Police Knowledge (followup)	0.063	0.035	(-0.006, 0.132)	0.074	
M1b	Police Knowledge (where is station)	0.023	0.052	(-0.082, 0.127)	0.666	

M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	-0.091	0.053	(-0.197, 0.016)	0.093
M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.020	0.047	(-0.075, 0.115)	0.673
M1c	Obey police norm	0.001	0.045	(-0.090, 0.091)	0.989
M2a	Police timeliness	-0.041	0.037	(-0.115, 0.033)	0.276
M2a	Police investigation capacity	-0.028	0.034	(-0.095, 0.040)	0.414

Table A4: Results Table for Main Hypotheses - Including Uganda-specific Outcomes

Hyp.	Outcome	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
C	Compliance idx.	0.149	0.046	(0.058, 0.241)	0.002	
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.002	0.026	(-0.054, 0.050)	0.937	0.937
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.017	0.037	(-0.057, 0.091)	0.645	0.860
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.003	0.036	(-0.069, 0.076)	0.928	0.937
4a	Crime reporting idx.	-0.009	0.018	(-0.044, 0.027)	0.621	0.860
4b	Crime tips idx.	0.010	0.022	(-0.033, 0.054)	0.641	0.860
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.006	0.027	(-0.047, 0.060)	0.809	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.008	0.012	(-0.017, 0.032)	0.538	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.027	0.023	(-0.073, 0.019)	0.241	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.019	0.024	(-0.067, 0.030)	0.440	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness idx.	0.028	0.041	(-0.055, 0.111)	0.495	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy idx.	-0.014	0.033	(-0.080, 0.052)	0.668	

Table A5: Uganda Specific Constituent Outcomes (non-standardized)

Hyp.	Outcome	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
C	Active neighborhood watch team	0.072	0.027	(0.018, 0.126)	0.010	
C	Watch team patrols	0.170	0.078	(0.013, 0.326)	0.034	
1a	Land conflict property (personal)	0.004	0.011	(-0.019, 0.026)	0.748	0.926
1a	Land conflict violent (personal)	0.002	0.010	(-0.018, 0.022)	0.839	0.926
1a	Land conflict violent (community)	-0.010	0.033	(-0.075, 0.056)	0.772	0.926
1b	Unsafe walking at night	-0.012	0.055	(-0.123, 0.100)	0.833	0.833
1b	Unsafe home at night	-0.011	0.043	(-0.098, 0.076)	0.801	0.833
2	Not intimidated police	-0.014	0.038	(-0.091, 0.063)	0.716	0.879
4a	Would report armed robbery	-0.047	0.027	(-0.102, 0.008)	0.092	0.810
4a	Would report burglary	-0.042	0.040	(-0.121, 0.038)	0.298	0.922
4a	Would report theft	-0.021	0.049	(-0.119, 0.077)	0.671	0.922
4a	First report robbery	-0.032	0.032	(-0.095, 0.032)	0.320	0.922
4a	First report burglary	-0.026	0.028	(-0.082, 0.030)	0.353	0.922
4a	First report theft	-0.008	0.022	(-0.051, 0.036)	0.731	0.922
4a	Animal theft resolution	-0.021	0.024	(-0.070, 0.028)	0.398	0.922
4a	First report domestic violence	-0.003	0.021	(-0.046, 0.039)	0.869	0.983
4a	First report land conflict	-0.024	0.016	(-0.056, 0.007)	0.125	0.810
4a	Land conflict resolution	-0.017	0.023	(-0.063, 0.030)	0.473	0.922
4a	Share info burlgary	-0.035	0.033	(-0.102, 0.031)	0.290	0.922
4a	Share info theft	-0.024	0.036	(-0.097, 0.048)	0.501	0.922
4a	Share info dom. viol.	0.012	0.048	(-0.084, 0.107)	0.806	0.952
4a	Aggravated assault reported (personal)	-0.004	0.003	(-0.011, 0.002)	0.166	0.861
4a	Defilement reported (personal)	-0.001	0.003	(-0.008, 0.006)	0.745	0.922
4a	Rape reported (personal)	0.000	0.003	(-0.006, 0.006)	1.000	1.000
4a	Physical abuse reported (personal)	0.012	0.005	(0.002, 0.023)	0.022	0.579
4a	Verbal abuse reported (personal)	0.001	0.003	(-0.006, 0.008)	0.731	0.922
4a	Verbal abuse reported (community)	-0.002	0.006	(-0.014, 0.010)	0.704	0.922
4a	Mob violence reported (community)	0.013	0.016	(-0.018, 0.044)	0.415	0.922

4a	Riot reported (community)	0.006	0.012	(-0.017, 0.029)	0.606	0.922
4b	Share info indirectly	0.026	0.012	(0.002, 0.050)	0.037	0.077
4b	Assist investigation indirectly	0.024	0.010	(0.004, 0.043)	0.017	0.077
4b	Share info armed robbery	-0.002	0.014	(-0.030, 0.025)	0.876	0.883
4b	Share info theft	-0.035	0.017	(-0.069, -0.002)	0.039	0.077
M1a	Police take job seriously	0.025	0.025	(-0.025, 0.076)	0.319	
M1a	Police care	0.029	0.024	(-0.019, 0.077)	0.229	
M1a	Police are committed	0.012	0.018	(-0.023, 0.047)	0.497	
M1a	Police investigate without pay	-0.015	0.018	(-0.051, 0.022)	0.429	
M1a	Facilitation is unacceptable	0.005	0.012	(-0.020, 0.029)	0.702	
M1a	Criminal pay to go free unlikely	-0.029	0.050	(-0.129, 0.071)	0.564	
M1a	Police treat men and women equally	0.015	0.023	(-0.031, 0.061)	0.520	
M1a	Police treat rich and poor equally	0.011	0.018	(-0.025, 0.048)	0.539	
M1a	Police take burglary seriously	-0.036	0.065	(-0.166, 0.094)	0.581	
M1a	Police fair burglary	0.045	0.060	(-0.075, 0.165)	0.458	
M1a	Police take theft seriously	-0.036	0.061	(-0.159, 0.086)	0.554	
M1a	Police fair theft	0.006	0.058	(-0.110, 0.121)	0.921	
M1a	Police take dom. viol. seriously	-0.092	0.051	(-0.194, 0.009)	0.075	
M1a	Police fair dom. viol.	0.052	0.053	(-0.054, 0.159)	0.331	
M1a	Right amount of force	-0.012	0.024	(-0.060, 0.037)	0.637	
M1a	Punish for reporting unlikely	0.009	0.036	(-0.063, 0.080)	0.805	
M1b	Legal knowledge (report misconduct)	0.008	0.016	(-0.024, 0.041)	0.606	
M1b	Legal knowledge (drop case)	0.017	0.014	(-0.012, 0.046)	0.243	
M1b	Legal knowledge (defilement)	0.030	0.025	(-0.020, 0.081)	0.232	
M1b	Legal knowledge (LC1 chairperson)	-0.016	0.027	(-0.070, 0.039)	0.572	
M1b	Legal knowledge (child labor)	-0.019	0.014	(-0.047, 0.009)	0.173	
M1b	Legal knowledge (mob violence)	-0.015	0.017	(-0.049, 0.019)	0.381	
M1b	Legal knowledge (phone number)	-0.007	0.011	(-0.030, 0.015)	0.518	
M1c	Victim report armed robbery	-0.047	0.027	(-0.102, 0.008)	0.092	
M1c	Bystander report armed robbery	-0.096	0.045	(-0.185, -0.006)	0.037	
M1c	Victim report burglary	-0.042	0.040	(-0.121, 0.038)	0.298	
M1c	Bystander report burglary	-0.061	0.039	(-0.140, 0.019)	0.130	

M1c	Victim report animal theft	-0.021	0.049	(-0.119, 0.077)	0.671
M1c	Bystander report animal theft	-0.033	0.043	(-0.119, 0.053)	0.449
M1c	Victim report dom. viol.	0.003	0.058	(-0.114, 0.120)	0.960
M1c	Bystander report dom. viol.	0.046	0.046	(-0.045, 0.137)	0.318
M2a	Police aware of challenges	0.001	0.021	(-0.042, 0.044)	0.959
M2b	Police consider opinions	0.042	0.057	(-0.072, 0.156)	0.461
S2	Courts punish timely	-0.005	0.021	(-0.047, 0.036)	0.806
S2	Courts punish appropriately	-0.010	0.019	(-0.049, 0.028)	0.601