

**A SEAT AT THE TABLE: THE  
ROLE OF INFORMATION,  
CONDITIONS, AND VOICE  
IN REDISTRIBUTING  
INTRA-HOUSEHOLD  
PROPERTY RIGHTS**

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## Abstract

This paper evaluates different policy instruments to increase demand for gender equality in formal land ownership among married couples in rural Uganda. We do so in the context of a land titling intervention offering households free land titles. We cross-randomized whether (a) the household is exposed to an information treatment making salient the benefits of adding the wife's name to the title as joint owner of the land; (b) the land title offer is made conditional on the wife's name being added to the title; and (c) the intervention is targeted to both spouses versus husbands alone. The results show that when the intervention is targeted to husbands, only half of the households choose to add the wives' name on the title as joint owners of the land. But exposure to the information treatment persuades the majority of households add the wives' names on the titles. In contrast, when the information is targeted to couples, the majority of households choose to add the wives' names on the titles irrespective of the information treatment. We find that imposing the condition that titles must include the wives' names does not cause a reduction in overall demand for titling. The results have important policy impacts for land formalization programs in Africa.

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## 1. Introduction

Insecure property rights over land can have adverse consequences for development across economies (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Besley and Ghatak 2010) and welfare within households (Goldstein and Udry 2008). Throughout the developing world, governments and donors have implemented land formalization and redistribution programs aiming, sometimes successfully, to strengthen property rights and reduce inequality.

In this study, we experimentally test the impact of a novel set of policy instruments to address within-household inequality in property rights between women and men. Male-female inequalities in land ownership are well documented across much of the developing world (Doss et al. 2015), yet efforts to address these inequalities have met with mixed results (Ali, Deininger, and Goldstein 2014; Ali et al. 2016; Goldstein et al. 2018). Moreover, while there is a large literature on the impact of the partial and full redistribution of land across households (A. V. Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak 2002; Ravallion and Van De Walle 2006; Adamopoulos and Restuccia 2020), there remains a paucity of evidence on ways to stimulate land redistribution *within* households. The intra-household redistribution of property rights can have important implications for productivity and welfare, particularly given potential allocative inefficiencies within rural households (Udry 1996).

This paper tests three policy instruments — the provision of information, the imposition of conditions for “hard” affirmative action, and the provision of a mechanism for voice — to increase demand for gender equality in formal land ownership among married couples in rural Uganda, a setting with large intra-household imbalances in asset ownership and bargaining power. The study, which is embedded within a land titling intervention offering free land titles to households, tests whether providing information, imposing conditions, or reducing informational asymmetries through enhanced voice yields the highest return on the within-household (re)distribution of property rights.

We cross-randomize whether: (a) the household is exposed to an information treatment through a short video making salient the benefits of adding the wife’s name to the title as joint owner of the land; (b) the land title offer is made conditional on the wife’s name being added to the title;

and (c) the intervention is targeted to both spouses versus husbands alone — thereby varying whether the wife has “a seat at the table” for the titling decision. The key study outcomes are whether the household accepts the offer and chooses to include both spouses’ names on the freehold title (a redistribution of property rights within the household), accepts the offer but only includes the husband’s name on the title (formalizing unequal property rights), or rejects the offer altogether (the status quo of customary rights).

A growing body of work demonstrates the role that information can play in changing outcomes in education (Reinikka and Svensson 2011; Dizon-Ross 2019), health (Bennett, Naqvi, and Schmidt 2018), and labor markets (Abel, Burger, and Piraino 2020). A newer strand of research, meanwhile, aims to address information and bargaining frictions to better understand decision-making between women and men within the same household (Ashraf et al. 2020; Apedo-Amah, Djebbari, and Ziparo 2020; Conlon et al. 2021). This study extends this work by testing the impact of exogenous information shocks on a high-stakes, real-world decision: who owns land within a given household.

In addition, evidence from other contexts suggests that imposing conditions on transfers can improve outcomes for women and their families (Armand et al. 2020; Baird, McIntosh, and Özler 2011). However, we are only aware of one other study (Ali et al. 2016) that experimentally examines the role of conditions (in this case, conditional subsidies in an urban setting) on the demand for gender equality in household land ownership. Our study fully relaxes the cost constraints to (joint) titling, and instead examines whether conditional incentives are effective in a rural setting with strong customary norms, and whether information and the strengthening of women’s voice — when combined or in isolation — can change household preferences and decisions around joint land ownership.

By exogenously varying whether the offer is made to one or both spouses, we can assess the relative impact of strengthening a woman’s voice vis-à-vis her spouse while holding household resources constant.<sup>1</sup> Much of the academic and policy literature around voice focuses on the

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<sup>1</sup> Following Katz (1997), we narrowly use “voice” here to mean “the right and ability to enter into the household bargaining process.” Other definitions of voice emphasize tend to emphasize the “the capacity to speak up and be

community or state through the lens of collective action (Hirschman 1970; A. Banerjee and Somanathan 2001) and political representation (Klugman et al. 2014; Beaman et al. 2012). This study instead contributes to the large literature on bargaining and cooperation within the household, by experimentally varying women’s ability to exercise voice around an important household decision.<sup>2</sup> Although some studies have varied the observability of and participation in financial choices within the household (Ashraf 2009), none has tested the impact on decisions on ownership of land — the central asset of the rural and urban poor.

We find that when the intervention was targeted solely to husbands, only half chose to add the wife’s name on the title as a joint owner of the land, while essentially the other half chose to put only their name on the title as the sole owner of the land (only 5% rejected the land title offer). But exposure to the information treatment persuaded the majority of husbands (73%) to add their wives’ names on the titles. In contrast, when the information was targeted to couples, most (68%) chose to add the wives’ names on the titles, while only a few (16%) excluded their names (and almost 16% opted out of titling altogether).

Women’s beliefs about the benefits of joint titling are likely more attuned to the issues salient in the information treatment, and so to the extent that targeting couples enables the wives to influence the decision we should expect couples to be less impacted by it. When the wives are not present, however, the information treatment inspired the majority of husbands to put their wives’ names on the land titles. In line with the results from Ali et al. (2016), we also find no evidence that imposing the conditionality reduced overall demand for titling, suggesting that men appear to be willing to trade off a reduction in bargaining power for an increase in land tenure security provided by a (joint) land title.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the study’s conceptual framework, while Section 3 describes the experimental research design. Section 4 presents the

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heard, from homes to houses of parliament, and to shape and share in discussions, discourse, and decisions that affect them” (Klugman et al. 2014).

<sup>2</sup> The goal was to simulate two alternative household decision-making environments: One where household decisions are made solely by the husband (proxying for patriarchy), and the other where decisions are made jointly by the husband and wife (possibly with different weights, but where the woman is empowered).

empirical results, followed by a discussion of these results and their implications for research and policy in Section 5.

## **2. Conceptual Framework**

In a household model where women's property rights set the balance of power between the spouses, an improvement in the rights of the wife increases her bargaining power at the expense of the husband, reducing his share of household consumption. But husbands can also benefit from an improvement in their wives' rights [Geddes and Lueck 2002, Doepke and Tertilt 2009]. Our information treatment focuses on two channels. First, giving strong land rights to the wife can be an instrument through which the land is kept for the children upon the husband's death instead of being captured by other relatives. Second, strong land rights incentivize investment thus increasing total output available for household consumption (the increase in the "pie" can more than compensate the reduction in his share of the pie).

We do not assume that our information treatment provides any *new* information. In fact, the issues made salient in the information treatment are in line with the local knowledge, customs, and practices. However, non-informative communication can affect beliefs through salience, attention, and framing [Mullanaithan et al. 2008]. In this paper, we test whether providing husbands with information about the benefits to the family of strengthening married women's land rights persuade them to put their wives' names on the land titles being offered to them. We choose to target men as a benchmark because under the customary patriarchy system -- within which our intervention takes place -- men make most of the decisions related to the allocation of property rights.

An alternative strategy is to ensure that wives participate in the decision-making process. To the extent that spouses have systematically different beliefs about the costs and benefits of joint titling, ensuring that wives have a say in the decision will lead to different outcomes that better reflect their preferences. Our strategy to induce greater participation among wives is to require their presence during the interaction with the household as part of the land titling intervention.

If the content of our information treatment is more aligned with women's preferences *and* if requiring women's participation in the discussion with the household increases their voice, we

should expect the information treatment to be more effective when only husbands are deciding. This mirrors a core prediction of most (Bayesian-based) models of persuasion stating that information should be more effective when receivers are less attuned to the content of the message [DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010]. In a sense thus it is as if persuading men to empower their wives and directly empowering women by increasing their voice in household decision-making substitute each other.

We experimentally test these hypotheses in the context of a land titling intervention in Uganda offering rural households the possibility to formally register a (randomly selected) parcel of their land and obtain a freehold title for it. As discussed below, to half of the households we made this offer conditional on the wife's name being added to the title following earlier work by Ali et al. [2016]. Removing the choice of whether to register the land in husbands' names only exacerbates the trade-off faced by men between the increased tenure security that is provided by a title at the household level, and the intrahousehold redistribution of property rights that a *joint* title may induce.

### **3. Research Design**

The field experiment comprises 737 households from 170 communities (4-5 randomly selected eligible households within each community) across four districts (Mbarara, Sheema, Buhweju, and Isingiro) in the Western Region of Uganda. Household with a married (or cohabitating) couple owning at least one unregistered parcel of land were deemed eligible for the study.

Households were randomly assigned to three cross-cutting conditions. First, in half of the households we asked to talk to both the husband and the wife (the *Couples* condition), while in the other half we asked to talk to the husband (the *Husbands* condition). In practice, 98% of the wives were present in the Couples condition, compared to 19% in the Husbands condition ( $p < 0.01$ ). Husbands were always present in both conditions.

Second, to half of the households we provided information about the benefits of strengthening married women's land rights by adding their names to the titles, while to the other half we did not provide such information. All households however received detailed information about the benefits and implications of titling (including co-titling), to ensure that our information treatment

was not confounded by general information about titling. The first randomization was done at the household level, the second randomization was done at the village level to minimize spillovers of information across households.

Third, we randomized households in our sample to one of two possible decisions. Half of the households were asked to decide whether they wanted to receive a land title, and if so, which names they wanted to include on the title. The other half was asked whether they wanted to receive a land title, under the condition that the wife's name had to be on the title. This randomization was also done at the village level. The Appendix provides detailed information about the titling intervention and the different experimental conditions. Appendix Table A1 shows that the different groups of households are balanced using baseline survey data.

#### **4. Results**

We start by examining decisions when households can choose which names to put on the title. The stacked bar plots in Figure 1 show the distributions of land titling decisions for Husbands and Couples, with and without our information treatment. We use OLS regressions to obtain the p-values on the differences in the distributions across groups, with standard errors clustered at the community level.<sup>3</sup>

Our two key results are as follows. First, Couples are more likely than Husbands to either title the land in both spouses' names or leave it untitled, rather than titling it in husbands' names only. About 45% (16%) of the Husbands (Couples) in the control group choose to title the land in husbands' names only, 49% (68%) choose to title the land in both spouses' names, and 5% (16%) choose to leave the land untitled. Couples are thus 29pp (or 65%) less likely to title the land in husbands' names only, of which two-thirds is accounted for by an increase in the likelihood of titling it in both spouses' names, and one-third by a reduction in the likelihood of titling overall. The difference in the distribution of decisions between Husbands and Couples is highly significant ( $p < 0.01$ ).

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<sup>3</sup> All results in this paper are robust to controlling for randomization strata (i.e parish) fixed effects.

Second, the information treatment causes a 24pp (or 52%) reduction in the share of Husbands choosing to title the land in their name only, entirely accounted for by an increase in the share of Husbands choosing to title the land in both spouses' names ( $p < 0.01$ ). In contrast, the information treatment has no significant impact on Couples' decisions ( $p = 0.35$ ). About 22% (9%) of the Husbands (Couples) in the control group choose to title the land in husbands' names only, 73% (73%) choose to title the land in both spouses' names, and 6% (18%) choose to leave the land untitled ( $p = 0.01$ ). The information treatment thus closes the gap between Husbands and Couples in the share of households titling land in both spouses' names, while Husbands in the information group are still more likely than Couples to choose to title the land in husbands' names only.

Next, we examine the impact of making the land titling offer conditional on the wife's name being included on the title. Since we do not find significant evidence that our information treatment interacts with this conditionality treatment, we pool the informed and non-informed households together to increase statistical power. We emphasize however that our analysis on the impact of the conditionality is a composite effect averaged across our informed and non-informed households. Our goal is to test whether imposing the conditionality affects overall demand for titling, and if so whether the impact varies across Husbands and Couples.

Table 1 shows the results obtained from an OLS regressing a dummy for whether the household accepts the land title offer against: (i) a dummy equal to one if the offer was made conditional on the wife's name being added to the title, or zero if not; (ii) a dummy equal to one for Couples, or zero for Husbands; and (iii) their interaction. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. The conditionality reduces Husbands' willingness to title by 4.2pp, but not significantly so ( $p = 0.15$ ). In contrast, and somewhat surprisingly, the conditionality *increases* Couples' willingness to title by 6.8pp ( $p = 0.07$ ). When the conditionality is imposed, the share of Couples choosing to title the land no longer differs significantly from that of Husbands.

## 5. Discussion

Our results highlight the effectiveness of empowering women by giving them a seat at the table and of persuading men of the benefits of gender equality in strengthening women's land rights.

Our experiment takes place in the context of a land titling intervention in rural Uganda, where land rights are typically governed by customary, patriarchal systems, and where formal land registration can be very costly to many rural families. The imperfect tenure security provided by this informal system and the cost of formal titling may explain why requiring the wife's name to be on the title as part of the intervention did not reduce overall demand for titling among the Husbands. In future work, we will examine whether our empowerment and information treatments have stronger impacts on intrahousehold power dynamics compared to this more affirmative-action type of policy.

More surprisingly is the result that imposing the conditionality increases demand for titling among Couples. We can only speculate why, but a possible explanation is that by removing the scope for negotiation between spouses on which names to put on the title, the conditionality treatment could be reducing the likelihood of impasse and non-cooperative behavior. The fact that Couples are less likely than Husbands to choose to title the land when they can decide which names to put on the title is consistent with some couples failing to reach an agreement, foregoing the opportunity to title their land. Assuming that titling is Pareto improving for the household, this is an inefficient outcome. More research is needed.


Moving forward, theory predicts that stronger land rights improve incentives for longer-term productive investments on the land. This prediction however weakens when farmers face binding liquidity constraints. To investigate the potential complementarity between liquidity and tenure security, we have cross-randomized our sample with a cash grant intervention targeted to the women. The cash grants (of approximately USD 200) were made unconditionally but clearly labelled for productive investment in agriculture or non-agricultural income-generating activities. It was timed to allow female farmers to make agricultural investments at the beginning of the planting season. The Appendix provides details about the implementation of this cash grant intervention. We will be collecting survey data from households in our sample to measure the impacts of titling, with and without the cash grants.

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**Figure 1: Land Titling Decisions**



**Notes:** Sample is 545 households (126 communities) for whom land titling offer was made unconditionally.

**Table 1: Impact of Conditionality on Overall Take-Up**  
**OLS estimates; standard errors in parentheses, clustered at**  
**community level; P-values in brackets**

<b>Conditionality</b>	-0.042 (.029) [.150]
<b>Couples</b>	-.116 (.033) [.001]
<b>Conditionality X Couples</b>	.110 (.045) [.015]
<b>Conditionality + Conditionality X Couples</b>	.068 (.037) [.070]
<b>Couples + Conditionality X Couples</b>	-.005 (.030) [.860]
<b>Mean (Husbands, Unconditional)</b>	.945
<b>R-squared</b>	.018
<b>Observations</b>	738

## Appendix: Intervention Details

The village leader accompanied the field officer (FO) to the participant household and asked to speak with the husband/couple. The village leader introduced the FO to the husband/couple, who then explained the overall objective of the visit. At that point the FO was left alone with the husband/couple to proceed with the interaction.

### Control Villages

The FO provided the husband/couple with detailed information about the benefits and process of obtaining a land title. All FOs followed a script to ensure that the messages were delivered in a consistent manner across all participant households (see Online Appendix A). The discussion was meant to be interactive though and participants were encouraged throughout to reflect on the information provided and ask questions. To ensure that households received a harmonized set of information, FOs were provided with — and received training on — answers to a list of potentially “frequently asked questions” (see Online Appendix B).

The discussion focused on the following key aspects of land titling. First, it addressed the benefits of formal titling in terms of improving the security of tenure, transmissibility, and monetizability of the land. Participants were told that a land title provides owners the assurance that the land is theirs and affords the conclusive resolution of any ownership or boundary conflicts. They were also told that a land title improves their ability to transmit the land through either sale or inheritance, and to use the land for purposes other than agriculture (e.g., as collateral for a loan). Second, the discussion focused on the legal implications of joint titling, including the right of survivorship (i.e., that a living co-owner gains full ownership over the land upon death of the other co-owner), and the right to proceeds (i.e., that joint owners are entitled to a proportional share of any proceeds that may be derived from the land, both agricultural and otherwise). Providing an explicit explanation to all participants about the legal implications of joint titling is important because it helps us sharpen the interpretation of the information and conditionality treatments as being due to the provision of concrete incentives for joint titling, over and above any increased salience and knowledge about it. Third, the discussion provided an overview of the different steps and costs associated with obtaining a title, acknowledging how prohibitive such costs could be for most households in rural areas. The high costs of obtaining a title were emphasized to help participants fully appreciate the value of the offer.

After the discussion, participants were shown an eight-minute video on a handheld tablet computer. The goal was to convey the key messages in a less technical and more entertaining fashion to increase engagement and understanding. The video was filmed on-site in the study region and the dialogue was in Runyankole, the most widely-spoken language in the area. It had two segments (see Online Appendix C). The first segment was an acted scene in a rural village between a young adult man (Mwebembezi) and his older uncle (Asiimwe). Mwebembezi has been thinking about getting a land title for a while, but the complicated nature of the process and the high costs involved have been a stumbling block. One day while he is outside in his garden drinking a cup of tea, he sees his uncle passing by and he invites him over. The two men engage in a discussion about land titling. Asiimwe who is very knowledgeable and experienced explains to his nephew the benefits of a land title. He tells him that a land title is the conclusive proof that the land is his. He also tells him that, with a title, he can rent out his land without having to worry that someone else may try to claim ownership. He further explains that a land title gives one the peace of mind

that one can reap the future rewards of any investment made on the land. He also tells his nephew that a land title puts him in a better position to borrow money from a trusted institution. After a brief discussion about the process of getting a land title, the scene ends with Mwebembezi sounding convinced and eager to get a title, but also lamenting the prohibitive cost of doing so. The second segment of the video includes real-life testimonies from men in nearby communities that have who have gone through the land titling process. These men shared their experiences, the reasons that led them to obtain a title, and the positive impact that titling has had on their households — including safeguarding the land for the children and accessing financial services.

After the video, the FO explains to the husband/couple that he/they have been selected for the opportunity to receive a land title free of charge. The FO explains that all costs associated with the process of obtaining a title (such as surveying the land, obtaining appropriate boundary markers, and the actual cost of applying for and receiving the title) would be covered by the project. The FO also tells participants that they would receive help to correctly fill out the application forms, be kept informed about progress on the status of their application, and that they would either have the title delivered to them or they would be facilitated to collect it from the land office.<sup>4</sup> At that point the FO asks the husband/couple if he/they is/are willing to accept the offer. If yes, he asks which names he/they would like to include in the title.

### **Information Treatment Villages**

A growing body of work demonstrates the role that information can play in changing economic outcomes for women and men (Ashraf, et al. 2020). In villages assigned to the gender information treatment, the husband/couple received additional information on the benefits of joint titling at two points: during the discussion with the FO and during the screening of the video.

First, immediately after sharing information on the benefits of land titles and the legal implications of joint titling (as in control communities), the FO informs the husband/couple of ways in which joint titling can benefit the household, including: the enhanced incentives for both spouses to invest in and benefit from the land; the greater security of tenure for the wife (and her children) should the husband pass away; and the secure property claims even if one of the spouses were to temporarily move elsewhere.

Second, the video shared in information treatment villages includes additional acted footage and real-life testimonials to illustrate the advantages of joint land titling. The first seven minutes of the video are exactly the same as the one shared in control communities, with a young adult man (Mwebembezi) and his uncle (Asiimwe) discussing the benefits of —and the required steps to obtain—a land tile. In the information treatment villages, viewers then see Nyabo, Mwebembezi's wife, arriving home. Her husband recounts for her the conversation he was having with his uncle. She says that she has heard about land titles but does not understand much about them, adding that "land issues are for the men, can women be involved?" Uncle Asiimwe reveals that he has a land title himself and that he included his wife on the document since she is his "life partner." He also did this to ensure that the land is safe in the event of his passing. He reports that he and his wife now invest in their land without worries and that they are closer to one another since obtaining a joint title.

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<sup>4</sup> In practice, we went back to the village and delivered it to the households in person.

Mwebembezi reflects on the conversation and concludes that "the land is ours, we both contribute to our family." He also notes that, were he to die, Nyabo and their children wouldn't be kicked off the land if they had a joint title. He suggests to his wife that they obtain a joint land title "so that our land and its developments are safe." Nyabo agrees with him.

The video then concludes with a series of testimonials from actual couples who have obtained joint land titles. This segment includes additional content from the same two men who were included in the control community video testimonials, as well as new content from three women who are titled co-owners of land. The men and women in this segment explain their decision to jointly title their land and share what they view as the benefits of joint titling. The testimonials focus on themes of improved marital quality and trust, enhanced agency and feelings of self-worth among women, increased cooperation within the household, expanded economic returns from borrowing and investing, and securing the family property from expropriation or encroachment from relatives or others—especially after the death of the husband.

### **Conditionality Treatment Villages**

The conditionality treatment mirrored the intervention in control villages with one key exception: participant husbands/couples were offered a free land title *on the condition that* both spouses' names be included on the document as co-owners. Evidence from other contexts suggests that imposing conditions on transfers can improve outcomes for women and their families (Armand, et al. 2020, Baird, McIntosh and Özler 2011). The condition was explicitly attached to the title offer made to the husband/couple after the discussion and video screening, and was mentioned once more when the husband/couple was/were asked to list who will be included on the land title as an owner. Husbands/couples were nevertheless free to add more names to the title as co-owners (including co-wives), provided that they also participate in the land adjudication process. As in control villages, households in conditionality treatment villages received information on the legal implications of joint titling.

### **Information + Conditionality Treatment Villages**

In villages selected for the combined treatment arm, participating households received all components of the information and conditionality treatments. This included information, in both the discussion and video, on the benefits of titling, the costs and process for land titling, the legal implications of joint titling, and the benefits of jointly titling land with one's spouse. In addition, the FO made the land title offer conditional on having the names of the husband and wife listed as co-owners on the document. Including this treatment arm allows us to test whether information and conditions act as complements or substitutes for joint title demand.

## References

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## Appendix: Cash Grants

### Methodology and rollout

The team implemented a cash transfer intervention “Omukazi Omwekambi”<sup>5</sup> aimed at income-generating investments to half of the study sample, in partnership with a Ugandan non-government organization Ignosi Research. This activity was conducted from March 12, 2021 to April 15, 2021. The intervention aimed to disburse cash grants of approximately UGX 700,000 (~USD 200) to 823 selected women farmers from the total study sample of 1646 participants, across all the districts in the sample (Mbarara, Sheema, Buhweju and Isingiro districts in Western Uganda). The women selected to receive the cash transfer were chosen randomly, stratified by the previous land-titling treatment status. Thus, two thirds of these 823 women were previously offered a freehold land title for a parcel of land as part of the impact evaluation.

The cash transfer intervention was framed as being “for women and their households”. It was targeted to the designated wife of the household as enlisted in the 2017 baseline study, but information about the grant was made available to the husband, and not kept private to the wife. The transfer was unconditional but clearly labelled for productive investment in agriculture or non-agricultural income-generating activities. It was timed to allow farmers to make agricultural investments for the coming planting season. The Ignosi team partnered with local banks and saccos to disburse the cash safely and in-person to each beneficiary. COVID-19 safety protocols were adhered to throughout the process.

The implementation of the cash transfer involved three steps:

- 1) Mobilization of the local council chairpersons over the phone, informing them of the study context, the intervention, and timelines of the activity.
- 2) Mobilization of the selected beneficiaries over the phone, to inform them that they were selected for the cash transfer intervention, describe the intervention’s context, and set up appointments for them to visit the local bank or sacco to collect the cash amount. They were also informed about ID documentation that would be required for disbursements and offered a travel allowance to visit the local bank/sacco.
- 3) Disbursement at the local bank/sacco at the appointed time. At this step, two Ignosi field officers worked together with each beneficiary at a time, to verify her identity, and deliver a script that labelled the cash grant as intended to encourage productive agricultural or non-agricultural income-generating investments. A pamphlet with the labelling information was given to the beneficiary to take home. The field officers also collected administrative data on implementation, including how the beneficiary planned to spend her investment.

Of the 823 targeted women beneficiaries, 778 were successfully given the grant. Thus, the intervention achieved a high take-up rate of 96 %. For the remaining households, reasons for non-disbursement to the wife included: the wife was deceased or missing (in these cases the husband was given the grant), the household refused to participate, or the household had moved to a non-study area.

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<sup>5</sup> This name roughly translates to “industrious, enterprising woman” and was derived from a popular local proverb. The local field team proposed the name.

Figure 1: Labelling pamphlet for “Omukazi Omwekambi”, given to beneficiaries.



The implementation protocol required that the disbursements happen in private with the designated beneficiary, and that 25% of the disbursements be audited by a team of 2 auditors who would call beneficiaries after disbursement to check if protocols had been followed and the full amount of cash had been transferred. All except one disbursement were done in private, and audits found that protocol had been adhered to: all beneficiaries were given the UGX700,000 in cash, were done in private, labelling scripts were read to the beneficiaries, and Ministry of Health standard operating procedures were observed regarding COVID-19 safety.

Figure 2: An Ignosi field officer disburses a grant to a beneficiary.



#### Descriptive results: Planned grant use

A majority of beneficiaries reported that they planned to use the grant for livestock (70 percent), with goats being the most popular choice (45%) followed by pigs (25%). About 17% of beneficiaries planned to invest more in existing non-farm businesses, and 31 % planned to invest in fertilizers, pesticides and other agricultural inputs (Table 2).

Table 2: Planned usage of grant as reported by beneficiaries at disbursement.

<b>Investment</b>	<b>% beneficiaries planning to use grant for this investment</b>
Fertilizers, pesticides or other inputs	31%
Seedlings - cash crops (coffee primarily)	5%
Seedlings - food crops (plantain, matoke, groudnuts, beans, potatoes etc)	10%
More or better seeds/seedlings	12%
Plant trees	1%
Agricultural tools and implements	3%
Labor for agriculture	14%
Rent in more land - agriculture	9%
Buy more land (mostly for agriculture)	1%
Agriculture related business eg crop resales	3%
Livestock - one type	52%
Livestock - multiple types	18%
Livestock feeds or equipment	8%
Livestock enclosure	15%
Other physical investment on land	5%
Home repairs or renovation	3%
Non farm business - add capital to existing	17%
Non farm business - start new	4%
Non farm asset (sewing machine, chairs etc)	2%

Labor for nonfarm business	0%
School fees	7%
Medical expenses	1%
Other consumption	1%
Pay off debt	1%
Save	2%
Give husband some of it	0%
Types of livestock :	
Goat(s)	45%
Pig(s)	25%
Cow(s)	8%
Chicken or poultry	9%
<b>Total observations</b>	<b>778</b>